This is a companion volume to the main report (HCP 98-I, ISBN 9780102951486) and a third volume (HCP 98-III, ISBN 9780102951509) which examines the landing ship dock (auxiliary) project

The Major Projects Report 2007 covers cost, time and performance data for military equipment projects in the year ended 31 March 2008. 20 of the largest projects are examined where the main investment decision has been taken by the Ministry of Defence (the MoD) along with ten projects still in the Assessment Phase. Six projects are new to this report: future lynx; modernised target acquisition designation sight/pilots night vision sensor; naval extrememly high frequency/super high frequency satellite communication terminals; Typhoon future capability programme; advanced jet trainer project and project Eagle

This report analyses the Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07 of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) (published as HC 697, session 2006-07, ISBN 9780102946369). The MoD's assessment of its expected achievements against its six Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets, which run until the end of March 2008, has deteriorated since the previous year's Annual Report and Accounts. At the end of 2007, the MoD did not expect to meet the target relating to generating forces and expects "only partly" to meet targets relating to recruitment and retention, and defence equipment procurement. The failure to meet the target for generating forces is a consequence of the continuing high levels of deployment of the Armed Forces. The Committee is concerned that the Armed Forces have been operating at or above the level of concurrent operations they are resourced and structured to deliver for seven of the last eight years, and for every year since 2002. Achieving manning balance in all three Service continues to be a challenge. Shortages remain within many specialist trades in all three Armed Services, but especially in the Army Medical Service. The report notes the failure to meet harmony guidelines in the Army and the Royal Air Force - another indicator of the pressure on the Armed Forces from the continuing high level of operations - and another target missed by all three services is for ethnic minority recruitment. The MoD continues to experience substantial forecast cost increases on equipment programmes, and the report notes delays in delivering equipment programmes to the planned in-service dates. The MoD faces difficult choices in the face of expected cuts in the defence programme and the management of a streamlining exercise to reduce civilian posts in the headquarters.

A companion volume (HCP 23-I, session 2006-07, ISBN 0102943745) is available separately which contains the project summary sheets for the projects covered in this report.

This is a companion volume to the main report, Major Projects Report 2007 (HCP 98-I, ISBN 9780102951486) and a second volume (HCP 98-II, ISBN 9780102951493) containing the project summary sheets

This particular publication is published alongside a second volume containing the project summary sheets (HCP 595-II ISBN 0102936439). This NAO report represents the 14th such report into the MoD's procurement of defence equipment. The report examines cost, time and performance data for projects in the year ended 31 March 2005. In total 30 defence equipment projects were examined. Part 1 of this report presents the overall performance of these projects and the progress in implementing Smart Acquisition; Part 2 examines the assessment phase in more detail. The NAO proposes a number of recommendations, among them are: that the cost-effective and timely delivery of mission critical equipments need to be fully recognized when the main investment decision is made; that the Department should clarify what is required to demonstrate the maturity of different types of project, including a clear statement of required best practice along with the consideration of risk and cost and time estimates that are appropriate to the individual projects undertaken.

This is a companion volume to the main report (HCP 85-I, ISBN 9780102963342)

This is a companion volume to the main report (HC 489-I, ISBN 9780102965506)

The programme aims to maintain the UK's nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the current system, with the introduction into service of the first of a new class of submarines in 2024. The timetable is challenging and the MoD needs to manage key risks if continuous nuclear deterrence is to be maintained. The current two year initial concept phase for the new class of submarines requires a series of important and difficult decisions to be taken by September 2009 to keep the programme on track. The MoD has appointed a Senior Responsible Owner to co-ordinate these decisions. The current predicted cost of procuring the new nuclear deterrent is between �15 billion and �20 billion (2006-7 prices), as outlined in the 2006 White Paper, The future of the UK's nuclear deterrent (Cm. 6994, ISBN 9780101699426). The estimated operating costs once the new class of submarines comes into operation are similar to those of the current deterrent, and the MoD recognises the need by September 2009 to produce robust estimates of whole-life costs. There are major areas of uncertainty in the budget, including the provision for contingency and VAT. The submarine industry is a highly specialised industrial sector with a number of monopoly suppliers and there are real difficulties in providing the right incentives for these suppliers to deliver to time and budget. The tight timetable set for ensuring the seamless transition from the present Vanguard class of submarines to the future class is challenging. A further risk to the programme is a shortage of nuclear-related skills in industry and within MoD - potentially aggravated by competition from civil nuclear projects.

In respect of its largest defence projects there are early signs that the Ministry of Defence has begun to make realistic trade-offs between cost, time, technical requirements and the amount of equipment to be purchased. Nevertheless, the continuing variances to cost and time show the MOD needs to do consistently better. This report, which gives a progress review of the 16 largest defence projects, shows that in the last year there has been a total forecast slippage of 139 months and increase in costs of £468 million. This means that, since the projects were approved, costs have increased by £6.6 billion (around 12 per cent more than the planned cost) and the projects have been delayed by 468 months, taking almost a third longer than originally expected. It would be unrealistic to expect MOD and industry to identify every risk at the start of technically challenging projects. However, the continuing problems indicate that MOD has more to learn from historic. The MOD is accepting the capability risk and some wider costs resulting from these project delays and is having to make difficult decisions about long-term capabilities. The MOD has made a significant investment in new and upgraded helicopters to address the shortfall identified in the NAO's 2004 report. The MOD has also spent £787 million on air transport and air-to-air refuelling aircraft to support current operations and address capability gaps, such as those caused by the previously reported delays to the A400M transport aircraft. However, capability gaps remain