The Korean Peninsula, which constitutes one of the strategic pivots of Northeast Asian security, has remained a contested theatre for major powers. Denuclearisation of the Peninsula is unfolding as one of the most defining challenges in shaping regional security. The end state in the Peninsula and how it is to be realised is debated amongst the stakeholders. This book aims to situate some of the critical issues in the Korean theatre within the competing geopolitical interests, strategic choices and policy debates among the major powers. This volume is an endeavour to bring together leading Indian experts including former Indian ambassadors to the Republic of Korea, senior members from the defence and strategic community to analyse the developing situation in the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Peninsula has remained a contested theatre for the major powers. Brutal wars have been fought involving imperial Japan, Czarist Russia, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Qing China, the People's Republic of China, and the United States (US) which left the Peninsula conquered, colonised, and divided, starting with Chosun (Yi) Korea from 1392-1910 to colonial Korea from 1910-45 to divided Korea since 1945.1 Subsequently, the Korean War from 1950-53 defined the character of the Cold War in Northeast Asia. The strategic choices in the Korean theatre have been influenced by the competing geopolitical interests of regional stakeholders. In the post-Cold War era, the Peninsula remained a key variable in shaping the Northeast Asian security architecture since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or North Korea continued to employ the strategic use of nuclear brinksmanship.

The eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula will send political and economic reverberations throughout Northeast Asia and will catalyze the struggle over a new regional order among the four great powers of the Pacific—Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. Korea’s Future and the Great Powers addresses the vital issues of how to achieve a stable political order in a unified Korea, how to finance Korean economic reconstruction, and how to link Korea into a cooperative framework of international diplomatic relations.

The Korean Peninsula was and is in a state of flux.More than 60 years after the war that left the country divided, the policies and unpredictability of the North Korean regime, in conjunction with the U.S. alliance with South Korea and the involvement of China in the area, leave the situation there one of the most capricious on the globe. Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula presents the opinions from experts on the subject matter from the policy, military, and academic communities. Drawn from talks at a conference in September 2010 at Marine Corps University, the papers explore the enduring security challenges, the state of existing political and military relationships, the economic implications of unification, and the human rights concerns within North and South Korea. They also reiterate the importance for the broader East Asia region of peaceful resolution of the Korean issues.

Despite American success in preventing the conquest of South Korea by communist North Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans who expected the kind of total victory they had experienced in WW II. In Korea, the U.S. limited itself to conventional weapons. Even after communist China entered the war, Americans put China off-limits to conventional bombing as well as nuclear bombing. Operating within these limits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel 2 invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other U.N. forces could fight without fear of air attack.

When the major powers sent troops to the Korean peninsula in June of 1950, it supposedly marked the start of one of the last century's bloodiest conflicts. In volume 1, Allan Millett, however, reveals that the Korean War actually began with partisan clashes two years earlier and had roots in the political history of Korea under Japanese rule, 1910-1945. In volume 2, he shifts his focus to the twelve-month period from North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, through the end of June 1951 -- the most active phase of the internationalized "Korean War."

Against the backdrop of China’s mounting influence and North Korea’s growing nuclear capability and expanding missile arsenal, South Korea faces a set of strategic choices that will shape its economic prospects and national security. In South Korea at the Crossroads, Scott A. Snyder examines the trajectory of fifty years of South Korean foreign policy and offers predictions—and a prescription—for the future. Pairing a historical perspective with a shrewd understanding of today’s political landscape, Snyder contends that South Korea’s best strategy remains investing in a robust alliance with the United States. Snyder begins with South Korea’s effort in the 1960s to offset the risk of abandonment by the United States during the Vietnam War and the subsequent crisis in the alliance during the 1970s. A series of shifts in South Korean foreign relations followed: the “Nordpolitik” engagement with the Soviet Union and China at the end of the Cold War; Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy,” designed to bring North Korea into the international community; “trustpolitik,” which sought to foster diplomacy with North Korea and Japan; and changes in South Korea’s relationship with the United States. Despite its rise as a leader in international financial, development, and climate-change forums, South Korea will likely still require the commitment of the United States to guarantee its security. Although China is a tempting option, Snyder argues that only the United States is both credible and capable in this role. South Korea remains vulnerable relative to other regional powers in northeast Asia despite its rising profile as a middle power, and it must balance the contradiction of desirable autonomy and necessary alliance.

This Task Force report comprehensively reviews the situation on the peninsula as well as the options for U.S. policy. It provides a valuable ranking of U.S. interests, and calls for a firm commitment from the Obama administration to seek denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, backed by a combination of sanctions, incentives, and sustained political pressure, in addition to increased efforts to contain proliferation. It notes that China's participation in this effort is vital. Indeed, the report makes clear that any hope of North Korea's dismantling its nuclear program rests on China's willingness to take a strong stance. For denuclearization to proceed, China must acknowledge that the long-term hazard of a nuclear Korea is more perilous to it and the region than the short-term risk of instability. The report also recognizes that robust relations between Washington and its allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, must underpin any efforts to deal with the North Korean problem. It looks as well at regime change and scenarios that could lead to reunification of the peninsula. At the same time that the Task Force emphasizes the danger and urgency of North Korea's behavior, it recognizes and applauds the beneficial U.S. relationship with South Korea, which has proved to be a valuable economic and strategic partner. In this vein, the Task Force advocates continued close coordination with Seoul and urges prompt congressional passage of the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement.

This book explores Korea's place in terms of multiple levels and domains of interaction pertaining to foreign-policy behaviors and relations with the four regional/global powers (China, Russia, Japan, and the United States). The synergy of global transformations has now brought to an end Korea's proverbial identity and role as the helpless shrimp among whales, and both North Korea and South Korea have taken on new roles in the process of redefining and projecting their national identities. Synthetic national identity theory offers a useful perspective on change and continuity in Korea's turbulent relationships with the great powers over the years. Following a review of Korean diplomatic history and competing theoretical approaches, along with a synthetic national-identity theory as an alternative approach, one chapter each is devoted to how Korea relates to the four powers in turn, and the book concludes with a consideration of inter-Korean relations and potential reunification.

The tensions between the Koreas--and the potential involvement of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States in a Korean conflict--create a nearly open-ended spectrum of possible conflicts. These conflicts could range from posturing and threats to a major conventional conflict on the Korean peninsula, with intervention by outside powers, to the extreme of nuclear conflict. The Korean balance is also affected by the uncertain mix of cooperation and competition between the United States and China, particularly with the U.S. "pivot" toward Asia and the steady modernization of Chinese forces. This new volume, up to date through Spring 2015, provides a detailed examination of the military forces in Northeast Asia--North and South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States--setting those forces in the larger geostrategic context.

Americans think of the Korean War as death and hardship in the bitter hills of Korea. It was certainly this, and for those who fought this is what they generally saw. Yet every foot of the struggles forward, every step of the retreats, the overwhelming victories, the withdrawals and last ditch stands had their seagoing support and overtones. The spectacular ones depended wholly on amphibious power -- the capability of the twentieth century scientific Navy to overwhelm land-bound forces at the point of contact. Yet the all pervading influence of the sea was present even when no major landing or retirement or reinforcement highlighted its effect. When navies clash in gigantic battle or hurl troops ashore under irresistible concentration of ship-borne guns and planes, nations understand that sea power is working. It is not so easy to understand that this tremendous force may effect its will silently, steadily, irresistibly even though no battles occur. No clearer example exists of this truth in wars dark record than in Korea. Communist-controlled North Korea had slight power at sea except for Soviet mines. So beyond this strong underwater phase the United States Navy and allies had little opposition on the water. It is, therefore, easy to fail to recognize the decisive role navies played in this war fought without large naval battles.