Documents the unlikely friendship between the British Prime Minister and the thirty-fifth President, tracing their collaborative efforts during the Bay of Pigs, the construction of the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

This handbook examines the personal relationships between American presidents and British prime ministers. It aims to determine how personal diplomacy shaped the Anglo-American relationship and whether individual leaders made the relationship “special.” From the great rapprochement of the 1890s to the Cold War and contemporary transatlantic rapport, the Anglo-American relationship has been one of global significance, making presidents and prime ministers central to international security, trade and commerce, culture, and communication. Naturally, it explores the ideas and convictions of presidents and prime ministers, the political parties they led, as well as the political images constructed in the media and how the aura of the Anglo-American relationship might differ from the reality. With a deeper understanding of these political leaders and the relationship they forge with their counterparts, we come that much closer to appreciating the dynamics of transatlantic statecraft.

Nigel J. Ashton analyses Anglo-American relations during a crucial phase of the Cold War. He argues that although policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic used the term 'interdependence' to describe their relationship this concept had different meanings in London and Washington. The Kennedy Administration sought more centralized control of the Western alliance, whereas the Macmillan Government envisaged an Anglo-American partnership. This gap in perception gave rise to a 'crisis of interdependence' during the winter of 1962-3, encompassing issues as diverse as the collapse of the British EEC application, the civil war in the Yemen, the denouement of the Congo crisis and the fate of the British independent nuclear deterrent.

Why did the Cuban Missile Crisis happen? How was it resolved? By focusing on the roles of a number of key individuals, such as JFK, Robert Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, and by using recently declassified materials, this book frames answers to these questions. In so doing, it presents a cluster of new findings and arguments, including a fresh interpretation of Khrushchev's motives for putting missiles in Cuba, new information on the mystery surrounding Senator Kenneth Keating's secret sources, and evidence indicating that JFK planned to carry out a military strike on Cuba at the start of the crisis.

From the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of American Prometheus comes the first effort to set the Cuban Missile Crisis, with its potential for nuclear holocaust, in a wider historical narrative of the Cold War—how such a crisis arose, and why at the very last possible moment it didn't happen. In this groundbreaking look at the Cuban Missile Crisis, Martin Sherwin not only gives us a riveting sometimes hour-by-hour explanation of the crisis itself, but also explores the origins, scope, and consequences of the evolving place of nuclear weapons in the post-World War II world. Mining new sources and materials, and going far beyond the scope of earlier works on this critical face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union—triggered when Khrushchev began installing missiles in Cuba at Castro's behest—Sherwin shows how this volatile event was an integral part of the wider Cold War and was a consequence of nuclear arms. Gambling with Armageddon looks in particular at the original debate in the Truman Administration about using the Atomic Bomb; the way in which President Eisenhower relied on the threat of massive retaliation to project U.S. power in the early Cold War era; and how President Kennedy, though unprepared to deal with the Bay of Pigs debacle, came of age during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here too is a clarifying picture of what was going on in Khrushchev's Soviet Union. Martin Sherwin has spent his career in the study of nuclear weapons and how they have shaped our world. Gambling with Armegeddon is an outstanding capstone to his work thus far.

In October 1962, the world went to the brink of Armageddon. This study provides a new archive-based account of the Cuban missile crisis, providing the first detailed and authoritative account from the British perspective. The book draws upon new British and US archival material and recent scholarship in the west and the former USSR. The diplomatic, military and intelligence dimensions of British policy are scrutinised. New material is presented and existing interpretations of UK-US relations at this crucial moment are reassessed. The book contributes a new aspect to the literature on the Cuban missile crisis, by exploring where the views of Washington and its closest ally converged and diverged.

"A minor classic in its laconic, spare, compelling evocation by a participant of the shifting moods and maneuvers of the most dangerous moment in human history." —Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. During the thirteen days in October 1962 when the United States confronted the Soviet Union over its installation of missiles in Cuba, few people shared the behind-the-scenes story as it is told here by the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy. In this unique account, he describes each of the participants during the sometimes hour-to-hour negotiations, with particular attention to the actions and views of his brother, President John F. Kennedy. In a new foreword, the distinguished historian and Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., discusses the book's enduring importance and the significance of new information about the crisis that has come to light, especially from the Soviet Union.

October 1962: the United States and the Soviet Union stood eyeball to eyeball, each brandishing enough nuclear weapons to obliterate civilization in the Northern Hemisphere. It was one of the most dangerous moments in world history. Day by day, for two weeks, the inner circle of President Kennedy's National Security Council debated what to do, twice coming to the brink of attacking Soviet military units in Cuba -- units equipped for nuclear retaliation. And through it all, unbeknownst to any of the participants except the President himself, tape was rolling, capturing for posterity the deliberations that might have ended the world as we know it. Now available in this new concise edition, The Kennedy Tapes retains its gripping sense of history in the making. Book jacket.

The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited provides a comprehensive overview of the new materials recently released by the Soviet Union, United States, and Cuba. The authors have all had a major role in bringing to light either significant reevaluations of the crisis, or in some cases, truly startling challenges to the conventional wisdom surrounding much of the crisis. This important collection, edited by a long-time student of the crisis, is a coherent, original, and up-to-date work that bears on a moment when the world, for good cause, held its breath in fear that the morning might bring the apocalypse.

On the 50th anniversary of the most dangerous confrontation of the nuclear era, two of the leading experts on the Cuban missile crisis recreate the drama of those tumultuous days as experienced by the leaders of the three countries directly involved: U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and Cuban President Fidel Castro.