Logical Forms examines the formal languages of classical first order logic and modal logic, and some alternatives and in each case takes as the central question: how can natural language best be formalized in this formal language? The approach involves close encounters with issues in the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of language.

Logical form has always been a prime concern for philosophers belonging to the analytic tradition. For at least one century, the study of logical form has been widely adopted as a method of investigation, relying on its capacity to reveal the structure of thoughts or the constitution of facts. This book focuses on the very idea of logical form, which is directly relevant to any principled reflection on that method. Its central thesis is that there is no such thing as a correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfill two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and to semantics. This thesis has a negative and a positive side. The negative side is that a deeply rooted presumption about logical form turns out to be overly optimistic: there is no unique notion of logical form that can play both roles. The positive side is that the distinction between two notions of logical form, once properly spelled out, sheds light on some fundamental issues concerning the relation between logic and language.

Directionality and Logical Form provides a detailed treatment of the syntax of focusing particles, such as only and even in a cross-linguistic perspective. The derivation of logical forms is shown to be under the control, not only of the ECP and subjacency, but also of directionality of government and the particular word-order parameter that holds in a given language: head-final languages systematically disallow certain derivations or readings that are available in head-initial languages. The reason is that heads that deviate in their selection properties from canonical head-finality project a directionality barrier. Various strategies are explored by which this barrier can be circumvented. Although the theory is developed mainly on the basis of the head position in German, it can be directly used to explain constraints on the scope of Wh-in-situ in Bengali and closely related languages. Audience: Syntacticians and semanticists interested in parametric variation, as well as linguists working on Germanic and/or Indo-Aryan languages.

One of the central issues of analytic philosophy and especially the theory of language is the concept of logical form. As typically understood this concept covers investigations into universal logical features underlying languages. However, from Frege and Russell onwards logical form analysts were no longer confined to such narrow linguistic perspectives. For them, investigating the logical form of language took the wider philosophical perspective of trying to understand language as our principal means for representing the world. From Russell's theory of definite descriptions to Davidson's truth-theoretical analyses of adverbial modification, citation, and reported speech, to lay open the logical structures underlying language is seen as a way of revealing the structure and features of the thereby represented world. Seventeen specially written essays by eminent philosophers and linguists appear for the first time in this anthology. Logical Form and Language brings together exciting new contributions from diverse points of view, which illuminate the lively current debate about this topic.

Logical Form in Natural Language clearly explains and defends the truth-theoretic method in semantics first developed by Donald Davidson to analyze logical forms of sentences of natural language.

Lowe investigates the forms of thought, showing how this study is crucial to understanding the powers of the intellect.

This volume deals with the connection between thinking-and-speaking and our form(s) of life. All contributions engage with Wittgenstein’s approach to this topic. As a whole, the volume takes a stance against both biological and ethnological interpretations of the notion "form of life" and seeks to promote a broadly logico-linguistic understanding instead. The structure of this book is threefold. Part one focuses on lines of thinking that lead from Wittgenstein’s earlier thought to the concept of form of life in his later work. Contributions to part two examine the concrete philosophical function of this notion as well as the ways in which it differs from cognate concepts. Contributions to part three put Wittgenstein’s notion of form of life in perspective by relating it to phenomenology, ordinary language philosophy and problems in contemporary analytic philosophy.

Our conception of logical space is the set of distinctions we use to navigate the world. Agustín Rayo argues that this is shaped by acceptance or rejection of 'just is'-statements: e.g. 'to be composed of water just is to be composed of H2O'. He offers a novel conception of metaphysical possibility, and a new trivialist philosophy of mathematics.

This book takes an idea first explored by medieval logicians 800 years ago and revisits it armed with the tools of contemporary linguistics, logic, and computer science. The idea - the Holy Grail of the medieval logicians - was the thought that all of logic could be reduced to two very simple rules that are sensitive to logical polarity (for example, the presence and absence of negations). Ludlow and Živanović pursue this idea and show how it has profound consequences for our understanding of the nature of human inferential capacities. They also show its consequences for some of the deepest issues in contemporary linguistics, including the nature of quantification, puzzles about discourse anaphora and pragmatics, and even insights into the source of aboutness in natural language. The key to their enterprise is a formal relation they call "p-scope" - a polarity-sensitive relation that controls the operations that can be carried out in their Dynamic Deductive System. They show that with p-scope in play, deductions can be carried out using sublogical operations like those they call COPY and PRUNE - operations that are simple syntactic operations on sentences. They prove that the resulting deductive system is complete and sound. The result is a beautiful formal tapestry in which p-scope unlocks important properties of natural language, including the property of "restrictedness," which they prove to be equivalent to the semantic notion of conservativity. More than that, they show that restrictedness is also a key to understanding quantification and discourse anaphora, and many other linguistic phenomena.

The second volume of Jonathan Barnes' papers on ancient philosophy contains twenty-seven pieces under the broad heading of Logic. The essays were written over a period of some forty years. Some of them were published in obscure places (and two or three of them in a foreign language). The French essays have been done into English; and all the essays have been retouched, and a few of them substantially revised. The first three essays in the volume are of a general nature, being concerned with ancient views on the status of logic--and with the distinction between formal and material inferences. The next nine items deal with different aspects of Aristotelian logic--the copula, negation, the categories, homonymy, and the principle of contradiction. Then come three papers about the connection (or lack of connection) between Aristotelian logic and Stoic logic. Two of the pieces discuss Theophrastus' theory of 'hypothetical' syllogisms. After that, things run more or less chronologically--a short notice on the Dialecticians, three essays on aspects of Stoic logic, a pair of papers on ancient theories of meaning, items on adverbs and connectors, on Philoponus and Boethius, and on an anonymous tract written in the autumn of 1007 AD. All in all, there is matter to divert scholars and students of ancient philosophy.