The frustrating stalemate on the western front with its unprecedented casualties provoked a furious debate in London between the civil and military authorities over the best way to defeat Germany. The passions aroused continued to the present day. The mercurial and dynamic David Lloyd George stood at the centre of this controversy throughout the war. His intervention in military questions and determination to redirect strategy put him at odds with the leading soldiers and admirals of his day. Professor Woodward, a student of the Great War for some four decades, explores the at times Byzantine atmosphere at Whitehall by exhaustive archival research in official and private papers. The focus is on Lloyd George and his adversaries such as Lord Kitchener, General Sir William Robertson, and Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig. The result is a fresh, compelling and detailed account of the interaction between civil and military authorities in total war.

'Lloyd George at War, 1916-1918' refutes the traditional view that Lloyd George was the person most responsible for winning the Great War. Cassar's careful analysis shows that while his work on the home front was on the whole good, he was an abysmal failure as a strategist and nearly cost Britain the war.

Would it have been possible for the First World War to be avoided? Steve Cliffe, author of Churchill, Kitchener and Lloyd George: First World Warlords, believes so as did David Lloyd George, Britain’s wartime prime minister. In a bloody act of annihilation that killed over half a million young British men, George was one of three powerful personalities who indelibly stamped their authority and influence on the conduct and final outcome of ‘the war to end all wars’. Of the other two, Winston Churchill became better known for his role in the Second World War, and Lord Kitchener was arguably the greatest instigator of Britain’s war effort. With his image stamped on the iconic ‘Your country needs you’ enlistment poster during the war, Kitchener exerted tremendous influence on both politicians and a lost generation of British youth. Those who start wars seldom finish them, and Kitchener, tragically, was no exception to this grim rule. Illustrations: 40 black-and-white photographs

Actor Joseph Gordon-Levitt makes his feature directorial debut with this funny yet earnest psychological comedy-drama about a womanizer named Jon Martello (Gordon-Levitt) who earns the nickname "Don Jon" for his ability to charm beautiful women, but remains unable to forge a meaningful connection with the opposite sex due to his all-consuming Internet porn addiction. Meanwhile, as Jon struggles to free himself from the realm of virtual debauchery, he connects with two disparate women (Scarlett Johansson and Julianne Moore), who separately try to teach him the true value of intimacy. ~ Jason Buchanan, Rovi

The frustrating stalemate on the western front with its unprecedented casualties provoked a furious debate in London between the civil and military authorities over the best way to defeat Germany. The passions aroused continued to the present day. The mercurial and dynamic David Lloyd George stood at the centre of this controversy throughout the war. His intervention in military questions and determination to redirect strategy put him at odds with the leading soldiers and admirals of his day. Professor Woodward, a student of the Great War for some four decades, explores the at times Byzantine atmosphere at Whitehall by exhaustive archival research in official and private papers. The focus is on Lloyd George and his adversaries such as Lord Kitchener, General Sir William Robertson, and Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig. The result is a fresh, compelling and detailed account of the interaction between civil and military authorities in total war.

Lloyd George became Prime Minister at a crucial point in the history of his country. There was a threat to British naval power, the Liberal party - to which he belonged - was bitterly divided and the unrest in Ireland was a growing menace. This account reveals the extent of Lloyd George's innovations in government and their impact on traditional Britain. It also describes how he steered Britain to victory in World War II, handling the generals and politicians at home with great skill.

The popular image of the First World War is dominated by two misconceptions. The first holds that the war was an exercise in futility in which incompetent upper class generals callously sacrificed an entire generation of young men to no good purpose. The second holds that the debate about British strategic policy during the First World War was a gladiatorial contest between `brass hats' (generals), and `frock coats' (politicians). Historians, denied access for too long to the contemporary records of the private deliberations of policy-makers, had been forced to follow both interpretations. David French challenges this orthodoxy and suggests that the policy-makers were united in trying to relate strategic policy to a carefully considered set of war aims. His challenging conclusion is that the policy-makers never lost sight of their goal, which was to ensure that Britain fought the war at an acceptable cost and emerged from it with its security enhanced against both its enemies and its allies.