Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Regulation) (FDIC) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Regulation) (FDIC) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 29, 2018 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are adopting a final rule that implements a quantitative liquidity requirement consistent with the liquidity coverage ratio standard established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The requirement is designed to promote the short-term resilience of the liquidity risk profile of large and internationally active banking organizations, thereby improving the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, and to further improve the measurement and management of liquidity risk. The final rule establishes a quantitative minimum liquidity coverage ratio that requires a company subject to the rule to maintain an amount of high-quality liquid assets (the numerator of the ratio) that is no less than 100 percent of its total net cash outflows over a prospective 30 calendar-day period (the denominator of the ratio). The final rule applies to large and internationally active banking organizations, generally, bank holding companies, certain savings and loan holding companies, and depository institutions with $250 billion or more in total assets or $10 billion or more in on-balance sheet foreign exposure and to their consolidated subsidiaries that are depository institutions with $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets. The final rule focuses on these financial institutions because of their complexity, funding profiles, and potential risk to the financial system. Therefore, the agencies do not intend to apply the final rule to community banks. In addition, the Board is separately adopting a modified minimum liquidity coverage ratio requirement for bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies without significant insurance or commercial operations that, in each case, have $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets but that are not internationally active. The final rule is effective January 1, 2015, with transition periods for compliance with the requirements of the rule. This book contains: - The complete text of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Regulation) (FDIC) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section

Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Comptroller of the Currency Regulation) (OCC) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Comptroller of the Currency Regulation) (OCC) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 29, 2018 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are adopting a final rule that implements a quantitative liquidity requirement consistent with the liquidity coverage ratio standard established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The requirement is designed to promote the short-term resilience of the liquidity risk profile of large and internationally active banking organizations, thereby improving the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, and to further improve the measurement and management of liquidity risk. The final rule establishes a quantitative minimum liquidity coverage ratio that requires a company subject to the rule to maintain an amount of high-quality liquid assets (the numerator of the ratio) that is no less than 100 percent of its total net cash outflows over a prospective 30 calendar-day period (the denominator of the ratio). The final rule applies to large and internationally active banking organizations, generally, bank holding companies, certain savings and loan holding companies, and depository institutions with $250 billion or more in total assets or $10 billion or more in on-balance sheet foreign exposure and to their consolidated subsidiaries that are depository institutions with $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets. The final rule focuses on these financial institutions because of their complexity, funding profiles, and potential risk to the financial system. Therefore, the agencies do not intend to apply the final rule to community banks. In addition, the Board is separately adopting a modified minimum liquidity coverage ratio requirement for bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies without significant insurance or commercial operations that, in each case, have $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets but that are not internationally active. The final rule is effective January 1, 2015, with transition periods for compliance with the requirements of the rule. This book contains: - The complete text of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Comptroller of the Currency Regulation) (OCC) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section

A distinguished Yale economist and legal scholar’s argument that law, of all things, has the potential to rescue us from the next economic crisis. After the economic crisis of 2008, private-sector spending took nearly a decade to recover. Yair Listokin thinks we can respond more quickly to the next meltdown by reviving and refashioning a policy approach whose proven success is too rarely acknowledged. Harking back to New Deal regulatory agencies, Listokin proposes that we take seriously law’s ability to function as a macroeconomic tool, capable of stimulating demand when needed and relieving demand when it threatens to overheat economies. Listokin makes his case by looking at both positive and cautionary examples, going back to the New Deal and including the Keystone Pipeline, the constitutionally fraught bond-buying program unveiled by the European Central Bank at the nadir of the Eurozone crisis, the ongoing Greek crisis, and the experience of U.S. price controls in the 1970s. History has taught us that law is an unwieldy instrument of macroeconomic policy, but Listokin argues that under certain conditions it offers a vital alternative to the monetary and fiscal policy tools that stretch the legitimacy of technocratic central banks near their breaking point while leaving the rest of us waiting and wallowing.

This report summarizes the higher capital requirements for U.S. banks regulated for safety and soundness.

Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.

This book critically examines the theoretical foundations and legal framework for macroprudential policy, its tools and governance in the UK, the US, and the EU. It goes deeper into a normative discussion of the legitimacy of macroprudential policy in these jurisdictions, where the mandate for maintaining financial stability has been delegated to independent authorities. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 reopened debates regarding legitimacy of the independent regulatory state, given its democratic deficit. The response to a perceived legitimacy gap has been to increase political oversight in financial policymaking and regulation. The book posits that the real problem is not a lack of democracy, but rather a lack of social justice. Across the globe, there is growing dissatisfaction with a financial system and regulatory process that appear depersonalised and perpetuate inequalities. Citizens are calling for more socially just systems of governance and the future success of financial policymakers and regulators will hinge on this. Given the marked distributional effects that have been noted in some macroprudential policy tools, the book questions whether macroprudential policy should be solely based on highly rationalised and strongly quantitative reasons. By proposing that macroprudential policymakers should have a social justice mandate alongside their financial stability mandate, as well as legal mechanisms for operationalising the added authority, the book contributes to the growing discourse on the role of social justice in public policy.