This book incorporates recent research that emphasizes the need for civil society and a grassroots approach to peacebuilding while taking into account a variety of perspectives, including neoconservatism and revolutionary analysis. The contributions, which include the reflections of those involved in the negotiation and implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, also provide policy prescriptions for modern conflicts.

A re-evaluation of the Northern Ireland peace process, which offers the fullest account available of the quest to bring an end to Europe's longest running modern conflict.

Many important lessons have come out of the negotiations for the Belfast Agreement. This book explains how public opinion polls were used in support of the Northern Ireland peace process. Significantly, it was the politicians who decided the questions so that they could map out areas of compromise and common ground that their supporters would accept. This book explains how the work was done so that others can apply the benefits of this experience to their own peace building activities.

This book examines the economic and political contributions of the EU to the Northern Ireland peace process, tracing the genesis of EU involvement since 1979 and analysing how it acted as an arena in which to foster dialogue and positive cooperation. Based on extensive archival research and exclusive elite interviews this volume provides the first comprehensive study of how the EU contributed to the reconfiguration of Northern Ireland from a site of conflict to a site of conflict amelioration and peace-building. The book demonstrates that the relationship between Northern Ireland and the EU has been much more significant in the peace process than previously suggested.

Fifteen minutes before five o'clock on Good Friday, 1998, Senator George Mitchell was informed that his long and difficult quest for an Irish peace accord had succeeded--the Protestants and Catholics of Northern Ireland, and the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, would sign the agreement. Now Mitchell, who served as independent chairman of the peace talks for the length of the process, tells us the inside story of the grueling road to this momentous accord. For more than two years, Mitchell, who was Senate majority leader under Presidents Bush and Clinton, labored to bring together parties whose mutual hostility--after decades of violence and mistrust--seemed insurmountable: Sinn Fein, represented by Gerry Adams; the Catholic moderates, led by John Hume; the majority Protestant party, headed by David Trimble; Ian Paisley's hard-line unionists; and, not least, the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, headed by Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair. The world watched as the tense and dramatic process unfolded, sometimes teetering on the brink of failure. Here, for the first time, we are given a behind-the-scenes view of the principal players--the personalities who shaped the process--and of the contentious, at times vitriolic, proceedings. We learn how, as the deadline approached, extremist violence and factional intransigence almost drove the talks to collapse. And we witness the intensity of the final negotiating session, the interventions of Ahern and Blair, the late-night phone calls from President Clinton, a last-ditch attempt at disruption by Paisley, and ultimately an agreement that, despite subsequent inflammatory acts aimed at destroying it, has set Northern Ireland's future on track toward a more lasting peace.

By providing a critical interpretation of political leadership during the Northern Ireland peace process, Gormley-Heenan shows the 'leadership lens' offers insights not offered by conventional analyses of peacemaking processes. The book discusses the confusions, contradictions and chameleonic nature of leadership and its role, capacity and effect.

The ratification of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 was the culmination of a lengthy and contentious peace process that involved the efforts of a committed team of political actors. In 2001, Marianne Elliott brought together a collection of essays by many of these pivotal figures in The Long Road to Peace in Northern Ireland, an invaluable resource for students, scholars, and politicians. Now Elliott, one of the most prominent chroniclers of Irish history, presents a fully updated edition with new essays commissioned to explore the events of the past five years. A period that saw successes such as the decommissioning of the Provisional IRA but also a rise in drug trafficking and organized crime, as a generation of men who have done nothing other than serve as paramilitaries are now finding their skills most valued as criminals. With contributions from U.S. Senator George J. Mitchell, Sir David Goodall, Jan Egeland, Lord Owen, and Peter Mandelsohn, the second edition of The Long Road to Peace in Northern Ireland is an illuminating record of the ongoing peace process—and its consequences—told by the people directly involved in its evolution.

The politics of Ulster Unionism is central to the success or failure of any political settlement in Northern Ireland. This book examines the relationship between Ulster Unionism and the peace process in reference to these questions.

The book is part of a wider study of the management of contemporary peace processes and has a strong comparative theme. It draws heavily on interviews with key players (politicians and policymakers) in the peace process. Darby and Mac Ginty identify six key strands in the Northern Ireland peace process and assess how factors in each facilitated or obstructed political movement. Chapters are devoted to political change, violence and security, economic factors, external influences, popular responses, and the role of images and symbols.

The peace agreement in Northern Ireland has been held up as a beacon for conflict resolution around the world. The lessons of Ulster have been applied by prime ministers, presidents, diplomats and intelligence agents to many areas of violent conflict, from Spain to Sri Lanka, from Afghanistan to Iraq and, frequently, the Israel-Palestine crisis. From Belfast to Basra, the notion that it is necessary to engage in dialogue with one's enemies has been fetishised across the political spectrum. Talking to terrorists is a necessary pre-requisite to peace, it is argued, and governments should avoid rigid pre-conditions in their attempt to bring in the extremes. But does this understanding really reflect what happened in Northern Ireland? Moreover, does it apply to other areas where democratic governments face threats from terrorist organisations, such as in the Basque region of northern Spain? In challenging this notion, the authors offer an analytical history of the transition from war to peace in Northern Ireland, and compare the violent conflict in the Basque country over the same period, demonstrating how events there have developed very differently than the advocates of 'the Northern Ireland model' might presume. The authors recognise that governments have often talked to terrorists and will continue to do so in the future. But they argue that what really matters is not the act of talking to terrorists itself but a range of other variables including the role of state actors, intelligence agencies, hard power and the wider democratic process. Above all, there is a crucial difference between talking to terrorists who believe that their strategy is succeeding and those who have been made to realise that their aims are unattainable by violence.