This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February–March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February–late May 2014). It examines Russia’s approach, draws inferences from Moscow’s intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere.

This vital report by the U.S. Army carefully examines the threat posed by the aggressive Russian strategy in Europe pursued by President Vladimir Putin. In the summer of 2014, Russia forcibly annexed Crimea from Ukraine and then actively supported ethnic Russian separatists in an on-going irredentist bid in Eastern Ukraine. This aggressive policy threatens to challenge NATO and the United States in its support of Ukraine and other nations of Eastern Europe. From this changing strategic environment, three central questions emerge: (1) What is the Russian strategy in their periphery? (2) What is the appropriate U.S. response? (3) What are the implications for U.S. landpower? Vladimir Putin's grand strategy relies on a complex mix of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic factors to preserve and expand Russian global power. Putin's strategy hinges on maintaining internal legitimacy, advancing a narrative of Russian greatness, manipulating nationalism, and protecting sources of revenue. He seizes opportunities to improve his position by controlling the media and the wealth of the elite class. Additionally, he maintains government control of large sectors of the Russian economy and industry, while engaging in energy politics abroad to advance its national interests. Finally, Putin is determined to keep former Soviet bloc countries oriented politically and economically toward Russia. In this, he espouses distinctly anti-Western rhetoric, casting NATO and the United States as Russian adversaries. Chapter 1: The Russian Strategic Environment * I. Historical Introduction * Russia yesterday * Russia today * Russia in crisis * II. Putin's Rise to Power * Out of nowhere * Putin's Russia * Establishing his rule * The man and his method * III. The Russian Military * Disarray * Ivanov doctrine * Continued reforms * Reforms since 2008 * Concerns * IV. The Russian Economy and Energy Sector * A weak ruble * Energy dependency * Impact of Ukraine crisis * Concerns * V. The Russian System * Trends * Tensions, frictions, and fissures * End state * VI. Conclusion * Chapter 2: Russian Landpower * I. Introduction * II. Recent Russian Military Operations * The 2008 Russia-Georgia Conflict * Russia's Lessons Learned * Georgia's Lessons Learned * III. The 2014-2015 Russian-Ukrainian Conflict * Russian Operations in Crimea * Russian Operations in Eastern Ukraine * IV. Recent Russian Military Operations: Similarities and Differences * Russian Landpower Today: State of Modernization and Readiness * Doctrine * Organization * Training * Materiel * Leadership * Personnel * V. Conclusion * Chapter 3 - The Emerging Russian approach * I. Strategy of Ambiguity * NATO/EU Divisions * Strategic Center of Gravity * Critical Capabilities * Critical Requirements * Flashpoints * Protection of Ethnic Russians Abroad * Western Alignment of a State * II. Anatomy of the Russian Response * The Russian Operational Approach * Objectives * Mechanisms * Desired Conditions * Lines of Operations and Examples * III. Assessment of Russian Strategy * IV. Conclusion * Chapter 4: Analysis and Recommendations * I. Introduction * II. Ends * Strategic Approach of the United States and NATO * III. Ways * Countering the Russian Approach to the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) * Countering the Russian Approach to Georgia and Ukraine * Countering the Russian Approach to Other Potential Russian Targets (Moldova and the Arctic) * IV. Putting the Army Operating Concept into Action * Where the Army Operating Concept Fits Well Where the Army Operating Concept Fits Well * Where the Army Operating Concept Falls Short * Tenets of Army Operations and the Current Force Structure in Europe * The Army Operating Concept: Risk and Mitigation * V. Means * Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) * Georgia and Ukraine * Other Potential Russian Targets (Moldova and the Arctic) * Recommended Role for NATO

The invasion and illegal annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014 represents the breadth of Russia's influence campaign in Ukraine and the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty represents the first attempt to change the boundary of a European nation since the end of the Cold War. Russian operations span the spectrum from covert information operations intended to influence political opinion to overt deployment of military forces for unconventional warfare designed to dominate civilian populations. We cannot afford to understate its importance or ignore its lessons. The commander of United States European Command [EUCOM], General Scaparrotti, characterized the Russian operations in Crimea as activities short of war or, commonly referred to [as] the "gray zone." The Russian influence campaign and unconventional warfare efforts in Ukraine contain all the hallmarks of the gray zone operations: ambiguity of attribution, indirect approach, and below the threshold of open conflict. Russia's gray zone activities in Crimea are important for us to review, and unique because it was an influence campaign of propaganda and disinformation, culminating in the employment of Russian special operations forces on the sovereign territory of Ukraine. General Scaparrotti [has also] stated that Russia is using a range of military and nonmilitary tools to, "undermine the international system and discredit those in the West who have created it." [According to] General Scaparrotti, Russia takes not only a military approach, but a, "whole-of-government approach" to information warfare to include intelligence and other groups, which accounts for its rapid and agile use of social media and cyber.

The Russian Federation's 2014 operation to annex Crimea from Ukraine sparked an intense wave of literature on the nature of Russia's modern warfare practices. Most commonly, Western academics, politicians, and military leaders alike have labelled Russia's actions in Crimea and its follow-on operations in Eastern Ukraine as a new form of "hybrid warfare." Despite these claims, the 2014 Crimean operation was more accurately the Russian Federation's modern application of historic Soviet political warfare practices--the overt and covert informational, political, and military tools used to influence the actions of foreign governments and foreign populations. They involved the use of active measures, including propaganda, disinformation, front organizations, and forged political processes, as well as Maskirovka, the military's elaborate deception schemes. Two of the most prominent examples of the Soviet government's application of these political warfare techniques were the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (the "Prague Spring") and the earliest stages of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. An in-depth case study analysis of these historical Soviet conflicts and the Russian annexation of Crimea demonstrates that the operation, which inspired discussions about Russian "hybrid warfare," was more accurately the modern adaptation of these Soviet political warfare tools than it was the invention of a new type of warfare.

The chilling political thriller dangerously close to becoming reality 'Make no mistake: if Russia marches into the Baltics it means nuclear war.' Damian Whitworth, The Times 'The authenticity of the high-level crisis talks within Nato which Shirreff attended in his past life, is so palpable that it lands this book like a 22lb bass. This and the foreword are reasons enough to buy a copy.' The Express 'The best piece of super power military fiction since Tom Clancy's The Hunt for Red October. Enjoy this riot of a book. And be very afraid - it really could happen like this.' Robert Fox, Evening Standard 'This piece of "faction" is billed as an urgent warning - it's also an act of near mutiny.' Michael Burleigh, The Times 'A must read...Shirreff's warnings - veiled as fiction - ring with authenticity, rich in technical details and insight.' General Wesley K. Clark, US Army, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe According to General Sir Richard Shirreff, recently retired Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe we are already at war with Russia. Putin is waging war by unconventional means: terrorist attacks in Ukraine and in the UK and cyber warfare. This book shows how war with Russia could erupt into conventional warfare with the bloodiest and most appalling consequences. As Admiral James G Stavridis, US Navy, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, says 'You fail to read this book at your peril.' Putin has already started a lethal dynamic which, unless checked right now, could see him invade the Baltic states. Russia's invasion and seizure of Georgia in 2008 was our 'Rhineland moment'. We ignored the warning signs - as we did back in the 1930s. Crimea in 2014 was the President's 'Sudetenland moment' and again he got away with it. Since 2014 Russia has invaded Ukraine. The Baltics could be next. Our political leaders assume that nuclear deterrence will save us. General Sir Richard Shirreff shows us why this will not wash.

"Cumbo examines how Russia sees its territorial aggression in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. He recommends that the United States and NATO should work together to exploit the weaknesses of the Russian military and 'tread lightly' with regards to the crisis in Ukraine"--Publisher's web site.

*This book is in the Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series (General Editor: Geoffrey R.H. Burn). With the consolidation of the Russian state under the rule of Vladimir Putin, Russia has begun to assert itself on the international stage to a degree that has not been seen since the end of the Soviet Union. In particular, Russia has engaged in a number of aggressive actions against its neighbors (e.g., Georgia, Ukraine) while also re-asserting its interests in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and more generally in global forums. Chief among this new assertiveness is the development of non-conventional assets of propaganda, information technology, communications, space-based assets, and cyber technology. While many have discussed the rise of asymmetrical warfare, Russian foreign policy, and Russia’s post-Soviet wars, what makes this book unique is how it puts these discussions together into a cogent analysis of contemporary Russian foreign policy alongside current international relations theories. This study examines Russia’s recent wars in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe and outlines the focus of Russian assertiveness in key regions central to their security interests. Further, it elucidates the threat that Russian conventional and unconventional warfare poses to populations in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and elsewhere. In addition, the book highlights the propensity of Russian military thinkers to see a blurring of the line between peace and war, and how Russian capabilities are being used to take advantage of this blurred line. In the book’s conclusion, prescriptions are made as to how the Western powers, and especially the United States, can attempt to blunt Russian aggression, particularly against NATO nations. Among these prescriptions is that the West must rebut the current Russian information and propaganda campaigns in Europe and elsewhere. Further, the West must recognize the increased Russian flexibility to respond to unexpected and spontaneous events in nations around the globe with the development of its information, cyber, and propaganda assets. The conclusion asserts that defense of key Western allies such as the Baltic Republics requires not only a conventional presence (such as NATO forces) but also the development and deployment of asymmetrical assets to counter the Russian capabilities. Learning from Russia’s Recent Wars is an important book for Russian studies, international relations, and foreign policy collections.