3 of law as an object that has always already been there, systematic and com plete. Quite the contrary. Some, indeed practically all of us, reject this sort of epistemology of law, and where the hypothesis of the coherence of the legal universe is put forward, this is in order to define it in very noticeably different terms from those traditionally used in legal scholarly accounts. If this referent, the law presented as a full discourses, runs through all of the contributions, this is because reasoning by analogy has to be found its specific place within this legal culture. It is the place to locate the problem of "lacunae" in law, which at bottom allows our various contributions to be classified. With Zaccaria and Maris, the question of lacunae is accepted as such (this is, we might say, the "traditionalist" aspect of these two articles, which is counterbalanced by - keeping to the same terminology - "modernist" emphases, sometimes Dworkinian in nature), and becomes the backdrop for considerations of purely hermeneutic type, in Zaccaria, ex tended in Maris to the field of ethics. The papers from Lenoble and Jackson, the former philosophical and the latter semiological, take as their main tar get this legal knowledge where the theory of lacunae finds its place.

In this book, the pervasive use of analogies in the reasoning of lawyers and judges is explained in clear, simple, untechnical prose.

An analogy of legal views and legal intellect, a body of work brought to you from legal experts with countless years of experience combined.

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This work tackles the most intriguing type of reasoning which one may employ within the field of law. In addition to the merits and drawbacks of legal analogy, it discusses the orthodox approaches to it, together with their critical analysis, also posing challenges that these conceptions have difficulty in managing. As an alternative, the book advances an account of legal analogical reasoning that correlates well with the division into rational and intuitive thinking that occurs in contemporary psychology. By doing so, many of the unique properties of legal analogy which have been traditionally associated with it and which have often been difficult to explain become readily understandable. Moreover, the very source of the almost mystical faith in power and infallibleness of such analogy is revealed here, while this faith—astonishing or not—not only escapes condemnation, but is shown to be warranted from a scientific point of view. Finally, the book also presents vast scope of application, premises, schematic structures and factors able to influence the force of legal analogy.

The book investigates how an analogy between States and international organizations has influenced and supported the development of the law that applies to intergovernmental institutions on the international plane. That is best illustrated by the work of the International Law Commission on the treaties and responsibility of international organizations, where the Commission for the most part extended to organizations rules that had been originally devised for States. Revisiting those codification projects while also looking into other areas, the book reflects on how techniques of legal reasoning can be - and have been - used by international institutions and the legal profession to tackle situations of uncertainty, and discusses the elusive position that international organizations occupy in the international legal system. By cutting across some foundational topics of the discipline, the book makes a substantive contribution to the literature on subjects and sources of international law.

Investigates the role of federal judges in prison reform, and policy making in general.