This volume deals with theodicy as a subject-matter for religious education. In order to enable people to reflect on the theodicy issue, to deal with their religious doubts and perhaps even to cope with suffering, it is very important that religious education is attentative to the problem of evil. But is it possible to ‘learn’ theodicy? And, if so, what does ‘learning’ mean in this respect? What kind of aims and objectives are desirable and attainable here? These theoretical issues are addressed in the first part of this book. The second part reports on empirical research conducted on the effects of an experimental theodicy course designed for third grade students of lower level secondary schools. As the research findings indicate, it is indeed possible to ‘learn’ something about theodicy.

Revises the traditional free will defense regarding the existence of evil in the world of a loving God.

Born in Egypt in 882, Saadiah Gaon was the first systematic philosopher of Judaism, the father of both scientific biblical exegesis and Jewish philosophic philosophy. In this book, L.E. Goodman presents the first English translation of Saadiah's important Book of Theodicy, a commentary on the Book of Job. Goodman's translation preserves Saadiah's penetrating naturalism, tenacity of theme and argument, and sensitivity to the nuances of poetic language.

If God is all powerful and entirely good and loving, why is there so much evil in the world? Based on a close canonical reading of Scripture, this book offers a new approach to the challenge of reconciling the Christian confession of a loving God with the realities of suffering and evil. John Peckham offers a constructive proposal for a theodicy of love that upholds both the sovereignty of God and human freedom, showing that Scripture points toward a framework for thinking about God's love in relation to the world.

Why does God permit evil and suffering? This question, known as the problem of evil in theological and philosophical circles, has perennially vexed Christian theology. Academic studies on the problem of evil, however, have failed to move the conversation forward in recent years. In this volume, designed for students and scholars alike, Mark S. M. Scott traces the major models and motifs in Christian explanations for evil (called theodicies) and argues for a thorough rethinking of the problem of evil and theodicy based on distinctly Christian theological criteria and resources.

In Kant and Theodicy: A Search for an Answer to the Problem of Evil, George Huxford proves that Kant’s engagement with theodicy was career-long and not confined to his short 1791 treatise that dealt explicitly with the subject. Huxford treats Kant’s developing thought on theodicy in three periods: pre-Critical (exploration), early-Critical (transition), and late-Critical (conclusion). Illustrating the advantage of approaching Kant through this framework, Huxford argues that Kant’s stance developed through his career into his own unique authentic theodicy; Kant rejected philosophical theodicies based on theoretical/speculative reason but advanced authentic theodicy grounded in practical reason, finding a middle ground between philosophical theodicy and fideism, both of which he rejected. Nevertheless, Huxford concludes that Kant’s authentic theodicy fails because it fails to meet his own definition of a theodicy.

Max Weber famously characterized the ongoing process of intellectualization and rationalization that separates the natural world from the divine (by excluding magic and value from the realm of science, and reason and fact from the realm of religion) as the "disenchantment of the world." Egil Asprem argues for a conceptual shift in how we view this key narrative of modernity. Instead of a sociohistorical process of disenchantment that produces increasingly rational minds, Asprem maintains that the continued presence of "magic" and "enchantment" in people's everyday experience of the world created an intellectual problem for those few who were socialized to believe that nature should contain no such incalculable mysteries. Drawing on a wide range of early twentieth-century primary sources from theoretical physics, occultism, embryology, radioactivity, psychical research, and other fields, Asprem casts the intellectual life of high modernity as a synchronic struggle across conspicuously different fields that shared surprisingly similar intellectual problems about value, meaning, and the limits of knowledge.

Drawing on Islamic as well as Christian sources, David Burrell provocatively shows that Job does not explain the problem of evil.

"Christensen's theological response to the problem of evil examines how sin, evil, corruption, and death not only fit into redemptive history but also magnify the glory of a good God"--

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Questions as personal as those about suffering require a very personal response. However, the most popular responses to the problem of evil revolve around abstract discussions of greater goods, maximization of value, and best possible worlds, depicting God as at best an impartial bureaucrat and at worst a utility fanatic, rather than as a loving parent concerned first and foremost for his children. Vince R. Vitale develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. He begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. The book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Vitale then critiques theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons--for they would not exist otherwise, but it is the individual human persons themselves.