Humanitarian intervention is rising ever higher in international relations discourse, with many publications exploring the nature, legality and success of these interventions. However, less attention is given to what happens after an intervention. This book looks in particular at the implications for territorial and border relations, exploring the case of Kosovo, which in many ways can be seen as a turning point in post-cold war international humanitarian intervention. The 1999 intervention has had significant consequences for Kosovo in terms of political transformations, territorial alterations and enclavisation, none of which was officially intended or foreseen when NATO intervened. Two decades after NATO’s intervention and a decade after unilaterally declaring independence, Kosovo continues to be confronted with daunting existential challenges that inevitably affect the stability of the region, border relations, and the credibility of the organisations operating within Kosovo, namely the UN, the EU and NATO. The book claims that not only is the political and territorial conflict far from being settled, but that the implications have gone beyond Kosovo, creating shock waves which have galvanised conflicts elsewhere. In effect, Kosovo has been used as a pretext, as a legitimation and as an inspiration for those who aspire to challenge the border status quo. The book is primarily aimed at undergraduate and postgraduate students of International Relations and Political Science and as well as Border Studies scholars, but will also appeal to researchers focusing on state-building, peace-building, humanitarian studies, nationalism/secessionism and Balkan studies.

The Kosovo conflict has the potential to redraw the landscape of international politics, with significant ramifications for the UN, major powers, regional organizations, and the way in which we understand and interpret world politics. Can the veto now effectively be circumvented to launch selective enforcement operations? Can the humanitarian imperative be reconciled with the principle of state sovereignty? This book offers interpretations of the Kosovo crisis from numerous perspectives: the conflict-parties, NATO allies, the immediate region surrounding the conflict, and further afield. Country perspectives are followed by scholarly analyses of the longer-term normative, operational, and structural consequences of the Kosovo crisis for world politics.

The war in Kosovo was a turning point: NATO deployed its armed forces in war for the first time, and placed the controversial doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention' squarely in the world's eye. It was an armed intervention for the purpose of implementing Security Council resolutions-but without Security Council authorization.This report tries to answer a number of burning questions, such as why the international community was unable to act earlier and prevent the escalation of the conflict, as well as focusing on the capacity of the United Nations to act as global peacekeeper.The Commission recommends a new status for Kosovo, 'conditional independence', with the goal of lasting peace and security for Kosovo-and for the Balkan region in general. But many of the conslusions may be beneficially applied to conflicts the world-over.

Explores the foundations of conflict in Kosovo, charging that the international community's failure to support the Albanians in their initial passive resistance to Serbian repression led to violence.

The author describes the reasons why humanitarian military interventions succeed or fail, basing his analysis on the interventions carried out in the 1990s in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor.

Responsibility to Protect: Research, bibliography, background. Supplementary volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Servian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations.

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been many competing ideas about how to explain contemporary conflicts, and about how the West should respond to them. This study, newly available in paperback, examines how the media interpret conflicts and international interventions, testing the sometimes contradictory claims that have been made about recent coverage of war. Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts takes a comparative approach, examining UK press coverage across six different crises. Through detailed analysis of news content, it seeks to identify the dominant themes in explaining the post-Cold War international order, and to discover how far the patterns established prior to September 11, 2001 have subsequently changed. Based on extensive original research, the book includes case studies of two "humanitarian military interventions" (in Somalia and Kosovo), two instances where Western governments were condemned for not intervening enough (Bosnia and Rwanda), and the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.

An interdisciplinary approach to humanitarian intervention by experts in law, politics, and ethics.