Introduction : the accountability function of courts in new democracies / Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella, and Elin Skaar Judicial review in developed democracies / Martin Shapiro How some reflections on the United States' experience may inform African efforts to build court systems and the rule of law / Jennifer Widner The constitutional court and control of presidential extraordinary powers in Colombia / Rodrigo Uprimny The politics of judicial review in Chile in the era of domestic transition, 1990-2002 / Javier A. Couso Legitimating transformation : political resource allocation in the South African constitutional court / Theunis Roux The accountability function of courts in Tanzania and Zambia / Siri Gloppen Renegotiating "law and order" : judicial reform and citizen responses in post-war Guatemala / Rachel Sieder Economic reform and judicial governance in Brazil : balancing independence with accountability / Carlos Santiso In search of a democratic justice what courts should not do : Argentina, 1983-2002 / Roberto Gargarella Lessons learned and the way forward / Irwin P. Stotzky.

Judiciaries must be politically impartial and immune from political interference if democracy is to be consolidated in countries in transition from authoritarian rule. Without an independent judiciary there can be no rule of law, and without the rule of law there can be no democracy. Judges and Democratization is based on the premise that democracy cannot be consolidated without the rule of law of which judicial independence is an indispensable part. It pays particular attention to the restraints placed upon judicial independence, and the reforms which are being applied, or remain to be adopted, in order to guard against the different kinds of interference which prevent judicial decisions being taken in a wholly impartial way. It examines the paradox of judicial activism arising from the independence endowed upon the judiciary by post-authoritarian constitutions. The book asks how, in the context of this endowed authority, such accountability can be made compatible with the preservation of judicial independence when the concept of an accountable, independent judiciary appears to be a contradiction in terms. This text will be of key interest to teachers and students of politics, comparative government/politics, combined politics and law, democracy and governance, human rights and democratization, and democratic development.

This book argues that independent courts can defend democracy by encouraging political elites to more prudently exercise their powers.

This book explores secession from three normative disciplines: political philosophy, international law and constitutional law. The author first develops a moral theory of secession based on a hypothetical multinational contract. Under this contract theory, injustices do not determine the existence of a right to secede, but the requirements to exercise it. The book’s second part then argues that international law is more inclined to accept and advance a remedial right approach to secession. Therefore, justice as multinational fairness is to be fully institutionalized under the constitutional law of liberal democracies. The final part proposes constitutionalizing a qualified right to secede with the aim of fostering recognition and accommodation of national pluralism as well as cooperation and compromise between majority and minority nations.

The power of national and transnational constitutional courts to issue binding rulings in interpreting the constitution or an international treaty has been endlessly discussed. What does it mean for democratic governance that non-elected judges influence politics and policies? The authors of Judicial Power - legal scholars, political scientists, and judges - take a fresh look at this problem. To date, research has concentrated on the legitimacy, or the effectiveness, or specific decision-making methods of constitutional courts. By contrast, the authors here explore the relationship among these three factors. This book presents the hypothesis that judicial review allows for a method of reflecting on social integration that differs from political methods, and, precisely because of the difference between judicial and political decision-making, strengthens democratic governance. This hypothesis is tested in case studies on the role of constitutional courts in political transformations, on the methods of these courts, and on transnational judicial interactions.

When can the Executive manipulate the composition of a Court? What political factors explain judicial instability on the bench? Using original field data from Argentina's National Supreme Court and all twenty-four Provincial Supreme Courts, Andrea Castagnola develops a novel theory to explain forced retirements of judges. She argues that in developing democracies the political benefits of manipulating the court outweigh the costs associated with doing so. The instability of the political context and its institutions causes politicians to focus primarily on short-term goals and to care mostly about winning elections. Consequently, judiciaries become a valuable tool for politicians to have under their control. Contrary to the predictions of strategic retirement theory, Castagnola demonstrates that there are various institutional and non-institutional mechanisms for induced retirement which politicians have used against justices, regardless of the amount of support their party has in Congress. The theoretical innovations contained herein shed much needed light on the existing literature on judicial politics and democratization. Even though the political manipulation of courts is a worldwide phenomenon, previous studies have shown that Argentina is the theory-generating case for studying manipulation of high courts.

This book examines Taiwan’s judicial reform process, which began three years after the 1996 transition to democracy, in 1999, when Taiwanese legal and political leaders began discussing how to reform Taiwan’s judicial system to meet the needs of the new social and political conditions. Covering different areas of the law in a comprehensive way, the book considers, for each legal area, problems related to rights and democracy in that field, the debates over reform, how foreign systems inspired reform proposals, the political process of change, and the substantive legal changes that ultimately emerged. The book also sets Taiwan’s legal reforms in their historical and comparative context, and discusses how the reform process continues to evolve.

After more than seventy years of uninterrupted authoritarian government headed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Mexico formally began the transition to democracy in 2000. Unlike most other new democracies in Latin America, no special Constitutional Court was set up, nor was there any designated bench of the Supreme Court for constitutional adjudication. Instead, the judiciary saw its powers expand incrementally. Under this new context inevitable questions emerged: How have the justices interpreted the constitution? What is the relation of the court with the other political institutions? How much autonomy do justices display in their decisions? Has the court considered the necessary adjustments to face the challenges of democracy? It has become essential in studying the new role of the Supreme Court to obtain a more accurate and detailed diagnosis of the performances of its justices in this new political environment. Through critical review of relevant debates and using original data sets to empirically analyze the way justices voted on the three main means of constitutional control from 2000 through 2011, leading legal scholars provide a thoughtful and much needed new interpretation of the role the judiciary plays in a country’s transition to democracy This book is designed for graduate courses in law and courts, judicial politics, comparative judicial politics, Latin American institutions, and transitions to democracy. This book will equip scholars and students with the knowledge required to understand the importance of the independence of the judiciary in the transition to democracy.

Mexico's Unrule of Law: Human Rights and Police Reform Under Democratization looks at recent Mexican criminal justice reforms. Using Mexico City as a case study of the social and institutional realities, Niels Uildriks focuses on the evolving police and justice system within the county's long-term transition from authoritarian to democratic governance. By analyzing extensive and penetrating police surveys and interviews, he goes further to offer innovative ideas on how to simultaneously achieve greater community security, democratic policing, and adherence to human rights.

The controversy raises challenging questions about the role of a powerful judiciary in a democracy. In Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy, a series of essays commissioned by the Institute for Research on Public Policy, some of Canada's foremost commentators - academics, politicians, and Supreme Court judges themselves - take up the debate. Some tangle over the pivotal question: should judges have the decisive say on issues involving entrenched rights that have profound implication for the policy preferences of elected bodies? Others examine related issues, including Supreme Court appointment procedures, interest group litigation, the historical roots of the notwithstanding clause, and the state of public opinion on Canada's courts. Those interested in the power of the judicial branch will find much in this collection to stimulate fresh thinking on issues that are likely to remain on the public agenda for years to come. Contributors include Joseph F. Fletcher (Toronto), Janet Hiebert (Queen's), Gregory Hein (Toronto), Peter W. Hogg (York), Paul Howe, Rainer Knopff (Calgary), Sébastien Lebel-Grenier (Sherbrooke), Howard Leeson (Regina), Kate Malleson (London School of Economics), E. Preston Manning (Reform Party of Canada), Hon. Beverley McLachlin (Supreme Court of Canada), F.L. Morton (Calgary), Pierre Patenaude (Sherbrooke), Peter Russell, Allison A. Thornton (Blake, Cassels and Graydon), Frederick Vaughan (emeritus, Guelph), Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib (Toronto), Hon. Bertha Wilson (emeritus, Supreme Court of Canada), and Jacob Ziegel (Toronto).