In the following pages the contents of these TATSU are presented, arranged by type and by the shipyards which did the construction. They are also presented graphically according to type and date of construction. Three salient points emerge from this analysis: (1) Construction of fleet units has concentrated overwhelmingly on carriers, with a notable deficiency of both heavy surface units and fleet type destroyers. (2) Beginning in 1943, a tremendous proportion of warship construction has been devoted to escort vessels. (3) Major shipbuilding has been carried on entirely in the home islands, with the bulk of it concentrated in a few shipyards in the great industrial areas of Japan. In referring to the TATSU it is important to remember that the date of announcement simply indicates that the ship was under construction at that time. There is no fixed correlation between this date and the date of completion. A destroyer ordinarily is in service within two or three months of its announcement. With larger ships the time lag is greater, and with smaller ships it is less. For purposes of graphic presentation the rate of construction for the last two months of 1944 has been estimated wherever practical.

Britain’s foremost scholar of the international shipping industry, based at the Centre for Port and Maritime History, University of Liverpool, here examines the growth and development of Japan’s modern shipping and shipbuilding industries across a wide range of topics, through the pre-war, Pacific War and post-war periods, to the transfer of shipping technology, the role of bulk carriers and world trade and the organization and structure of the Japanese merchant navy. Prompted originally by his research into the decline of the British industries in a global context, his focus inevitably turned to Japan which in the post-war years had replaced Britain as the world’s largest ship operators and ship owners and remains so today.

Making extensive use of Japanese and U.S. sources, including wartime intelligence reports from the National Defense Archives in Tokyo and recently declassified U.S. documents, this book examines the reasons for Japan's failure to protect its merchant fleet.

This unique historical document was compiled by Imperial Japanese Navy Constructor Shizuo Fukui soon after the war ended. It offers a detailed record of what remained of the Japanese Navy for Allied use.