The book aims at exploring how business model innovation can be achieved logically by focusing on the user.

An essential tool for our post-truth world: a witty primer on logic—and the dangers of illogical thinking—by a renowned Notre Dame professor Logic is synonymous with reason, judgment, sense, wisdom, and sanity. Being logical is the ability to create concise and reasoned arguments—arguments that build from given premises, using evidence, to a genuine conclusion. But mastering logical thinking also requires studying and understanding illogical thinking, both to sharpen one’s own skills and to protect against incoherent, or deliberately misleading, reasoning. Elegant, pithy, and precise, Being Logical breaks logic down to its essentials through clear analysis, accessible examples, and focused insights. D. Q. McInerney covers the sources of illogical thinking, from naïve optimism to narrow-mindedness, before dissecting the various tactics—red herrings, diversions, and simplistic reasoning—the illogical use in place of effective reasoning. An indispensable guide to using logic to advantage in everyday life, this is a concise, crisply readable book. Written explicitly for the layperson, McInerny’s Being Logical promises to take its place beside Strunk and White’s The Elements of Style as a classic of lucid, invaluable advice. Praise for Being Logical “Highly readable . . . D. Q. McInerny offers an introduction to symbolic logic in plain English, so you can finally be clear on what is deductive reasoning and what is inductive. And you’ll see how deductive arguments are constructed.”—Detroit Free Press “McInerny’s explanatory outline of sound thinking will be eminently beneficial to expository writers, debaters, and public speakers.”—Booklist “Given the shortage of logical thinking, And the fact that mankind is adrift, if not sinking, It is vital that all of us learn to think straight. And this small book by D.Q. McInerny is great. It follows therefore since we so badly need it, Everybody should not only but it, but read it.” —Charles Osgood

Our conception of logical space is the set of distinctions we use to navigate the world. Agustín Rayo argues that this is shaped by acceptance or rejection of 'just is'-statements: e.g. 'to be composed of water just is to be composed of H2O'. He offers a novel conception of metaphysical possibility, and a new trivialist philosophy of mathematics.

A general formal theory of causal reasoning as a logical study of causal models, reasoning, and inference. In this book, Alexander Bochman presents a general formal theory of causal reasoning as a logical study of causal models, reasoning, and inference, basing it on a supposition that causal reasoning is not a competitor of logical reasoning but its complement for situations lacking logically sufficient data or knowledge. Bochman also explores the relationship of this theory with the popular structural equation approach to causality proposed by Judea Pearl and explores several applications ranging from artificial intelligence to legal theory, including abduction, counterfactuals, actual and proximate causality, dynamic causal models, and reasoning about action and change in artificial intelligence. As logical preparation, before introducing causal concepts, Bochman describes an alternative, situation-based semantics for classical logic that provides a better understanding of what can be captured by purely logical means. He then presents another prerequisite, outlining those parts of a general theory of nonmonotonic reasoning that are relevant to his own theory. These two components provide a logical background for the main, two-tier formalism of the causal calculus that serves as the formal basis of his theory. He presents the main causal formalism of the book as a natural generalization of classical logic that allows for causal reasoning. This provides a formal background for subsequent chapters. Finally, Bochman presents a generalization of causal reasoning to dynamic domains.

"Maddy's short monograph looks at Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, from the perspective of the form of naturalism that she calls "second philosophy." That view takes an empirical approach to logical truth -- essentially arguing that if philosophers want to understand the world, they should start from a position informed by scientific understandings of the world, because science is often a reliable guide to how the world works. Similarly, just like science, logic is also grounded in the structure of our world, and our basic cognitive machinery is tuned by evolutionary pressures to detect that structure where it occurs. Ludwig Wittgenstein (particularly in the "Tractatus") also linked the logical structure of representation with the structure of the world, but still insisted that the sense of our representations must be given prior to -- independently of -- any facts about how the world happens to be. When that requirement is removed, Wittgenstein's position in the Tractatus approaches Maddy's Second Philosophy -- that logic is grounded in the structure of the world and our representational systems reflect that structuring. The later Wittgenstein also hews closely to Second Philosophy, holding that our logical practices are grounded in our interests and motivations, and our natural inclinations, and the features of the world. In this sense, logic is no different from other descriptions of the world -- just more general and responding to features so basic and ubiquitous that they tend to go unnoticed. Maddy's Second Philosophy finds Wittgenstein as an important precursor and kindred spirit, and promotes a new view of him as a naturalistic phliosopher"--

An introduction to Prolog programming for artificial intelligence covering both basic and advanced AI material. A unique advantage to this work is the combination of AI, Prolog and Logic. Each technique is accompanied by a program implementing it. Seeks to simplify the basic concepts of logic programming. Contains exercises and authentic examples to help facilitate the understanding of difficult concepts.

What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon. This picture (explored more bydecision-theorists and philosophers of science thatn by mainstream epistemologists) invites the use of probabilistic coherence to constrain rational belief. But this latter project has often involved defining graded beliefs in terms of preferences, which may seem to change the subject away fromepistemic rationality.Putting Logic in its Place explores the relations between these two ways of seeing beliefs. It argues that the binary conception, although it fits nicely with much of our commonsense thought and talk about belief, cannot in the end support the traditional deductive constraints on rational belief. Binary beliefs that obeyed these constraints could not answer to anything like our intuitive notion of epistemic rationality, and would end up having to be divorced from central aspects of ourcognitive, practical, and emotional lives.But this does not mean that logic plays no role in rationality. Probabilistic coherence should be viewed as using standard logic to constrain rational graded belief. This probabilistic constraint helps explain the appeal of the traditional deductive constraints, and even underlies the force of rationally persuasive deductive arguments. Graded belief cannot be defined in terms of preferences. But probabilistic coherence may be defended without positing definitional connections between beliefsand preferences. Like the traditional deductive constraints, coherence is a logical ideal that humans cannot fully attain. Nevertheless, it furnishes a compelling way of understanding a key dimension of epistemic rationality.

The book is intended for students who want to learn how to prove theorems and be better prepared for the rigors required in more advance mathematics. One of the key components in this textbook is the development of a methodology to lay bare the structure underpinning the construction of a proof, much as diagramming a sentence lays bare its grammatical structure. Diagramming a proof is a way of presenting the relationships between the various parts of a proof. A proof diagram provides a tool for showing students how to write correct mathematical proofs.

“A remarkable book capable of reshaping what one takes philosophy to be.” —Cora Diamond, Kenan Professor of Philosophy Emerita, University of Virginia Could there be a logical alien—a being whose ways of talking, inferring, and contradicting exhibit an entirely different logical shape than ours, yet who nonetheless is thinking? Could someone, contrary to the most basic rules of logic, think that two contradictory statements are both true at the same time? Such questions may seem outlandish, but they serve to highlight a fundamental philosophical question: is our logical form of thought merely one among many, or must it be the form of thought as such? From Descartes and Kant to Frege and Wittgenstein, philosophers have wrestled with variants of this question, and with a range of competing answers. A seminal 1991 paper, James Conant’s “The Search for Logically Alien Thought,” placed that question at the forefront of contemporary philosophical inquiry. The Logical Alien, edited by Sofia Miguens, gathers Conant’s original article with reflections on it by eight distinguished philosophers—Jocelyn Benoist, Matthew Boyle, Martin Gustafsson, Arata Hamawaki, Adrian Moore, Barry Stroud, Peter Sullivan, and Charles Travis. Conant follows with a wide-ranging response that places the philosophical discussion in historical context, critiques his original paper, addresses the exegetical and systematic issues raised by others, and presents an alternative account. The Logical Alien challenges contemporary conceptions of how logical and philosophical form must each relate to their content. This monumental volume offers the possibility of a new direction in philosophy.