When retired engineer Magnus Ironblood is tempted into one more campaign, he finds himself working alongside some unlikely allies. Sent as part of an Imperial force to bring to heel the secessionist forces of Countess von Kleister, this ragtag army finds themselves outgunned.

With roots dating to 1872, the Colorado Fuel and Iron (CF&I) Company at Pueblo served as the principal heavy industry leader in the Rocky Mountain region, producing steel rails, spikes, and track accessories for the burgeoning railroad industry. Over the next 121 years, the company grew to manufacture dozens of other products used in the agriculture, mining, commercial, and residential industries, driving Pueblo to become the "Pittsburgh of the West." As the region's largest private employer, CF&I also played a significant role in the history of American labor relations. A vertically integrated company maintaining its own mining, transportation, land and water resources, and medical, recreational, and steelmaking facilities, CF&I played a critical role in the history and development of the products that connected the Centennial State and, ultimately, the West.

In response to the tragedy of the Ludlow Massacre, John D. Rockefeller Jr. introduced one of the nation’s first employee representation plans (ERPs) to the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company in 1915. With the advice of William Mackenzie King, who would go on to become prime minister of Canada, the plan—which came to be known as the Rockefeller Plan—was in use until 1942 and became the model for ERPs all over the world.In Representation and Rebellion Jonathan Rees uses a variety of primary sources—including records recently discovered at the company’s former headquarters in Pueblo, Colorado—to tell the story of the Rockefeller Plan and those who lived under it, as well as to detail its various successes and failures. Taken as a whole, the history of the Rockefeller Plan is not the story of ceaseless oppression and stifled militancy that its critics might imagine, but it is also not the story of the creation of a paternalist panacea for labor unrest that Rockefeller hoped it would be.Addressing key issues of how this early twentieth-century experiment fared from 1915 to 1942, Rees argues that the Rockefeller Plan was a limited but temporarily effective alternative to independent unionism in the wake of the Ludlow Massacre. The book will appeal to business and labor historians, political scientists, and sociologists, as well as those studying labor and industrial relations.