This book provides the first comprehensive study of the evolution of the Iraqi military from the British mandate era to post-Baathist Iraq. Ethnic and sectarian turmoil is endemic to Iraq, and its armed forces have been intertwined with its political affairs since their creation. This study illustrates how the relationship between the military and

This book provides the first comprehensive study of the evolution of the Iraqi military from the British mandate era to post-Baathist Iraq. Ethnic and sectarian turmoil is endemic to Iraq, and its armed forces have been intertwined with its political affairs since their creation. This study illustrates how the relationship between the military and the political centre in Iraq has evolved, with the military bringing about three regime changes in Iraq’s history before being brought under control by Saddam Hussein, up until the 2003 war. The instability that followed was partly due to the failure to create a new military that does not threaten the government, yet is still strong enough to deter rival factions from armed conflict. The reconstitution of the armed forces will be a prerequisite for an American withdrawal from Iraq, but this book argues that immense challenges lie ahead, despite the praise from the Bush administration for the progress of the new Iraqi army.

This book provides the first comprehensive study of the evolution of the Iraqi military from the British mandate era to post-Baathist Iraq. Ethnic and sectarian turmoil is endemic to Iraq, and its armed forces have been intertwined with its political affairs since their creation. This study illustrates how the relationship between the military and the political centre in Iraq has evolved, with the military bringing about three regime changes in Iraq's history before being brought under control by Saddam Hussein, up until the 2003 war. The instability that followed was partly due to the failure to create a new military that does not threaten the government, yet is still strong enough to deter rival factions from armed conflict. The reconstitution of the armed forces will be a prerequisite for an American withdrawal from Iraq, but this book argues that immense challenges lie ahead, despite the praise from the Bush administration for the progress of the new Iraqi army.

A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.

Nearly 1.9 million U.S. troops have been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq since October 2001. Many service members and veterans face serious challenges in readjusting to normal life after returning home. This initial book presents findings on the most critical challenges, and lays out the blueprint for the second phase of the study to determine how best to meet the needs of returning troops and their families.

"Security cooperation with Iraq remains a critical component of the US-Iraq relationship. Despite neighboring Iran's ability to limit US political and economic engagement, Iraq still seeks US assistance to develop its military and to combat resurgent terrorist organizations. This monograph provides a historical and cultural basis from which to understand the limitations and potential for US cooperation with Iraq's armed forces" -- Publisher's web site.

For nearly two decades the United States Air Force (USAF) oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the inter German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful conventional arm well rehearsed in the tactics required to operate over a central European battlefield. Then, in a matter of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions that had been developed over the previous decade and a half. The USAF faced a different foe employing a different military doctrine in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting a fast paced land offensive, the combat wings of the United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to attack a large, well fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force. The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF's mission dictated the need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and procedures to meet theater objectives. How effectively did CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guard to the changing realities of combat? Answering that question is central to this study, and the answer resides in evaluation of the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its operational and tactical performance against the Republican Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria used for evaluating innovations.

Armies of Arabia is the first book to comprehensively analyze the armed forces of the Gulf monarchies. Zoltan Barany explains the conspicuous ineffectiveness of Gulf militaries with a combination of political-structural and sociocultural factors. Following a brief exposition on their historical evolution, he explores the region's six armies of the region comparatively, through the lenses of military politics, sociology, economics, and diplomacy. The book'sthemes come together in the last chapter that critically evaluates the Saudi and Emirati armed forces' record in the on-going war in Yemen.

In his November 19, 2005 presidential address, President George W. Bush summarized U.S. military policy as, "Our situation can be summed up this way: as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." EMBEDDED offers a firsthand account by a young Marine military advisor serving on the frontlines with the Iraqi Army of the effectiveness of America's efforts to help the Iraqis stand on their own. As a Division I track athlete and a magna cum laude graduate of the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School, Wes Gray was given a full scholarship to the Ph.D. program in finance at the University of Chicago, the top ranked program in the world. However, after passing his comprehensive exams and while weighing offers from Wall Street, he had an epiphany: the right thing to do before taking on the challenges of the business world was to serve his nation and fulfill a lifelong dream of becoming a United States Marine. In 2006, 1st. Lt. Gray was deployed as a Marine Corps military advisor to live and fight with an Iraqi Army battalion for two hundred and ten days in the Haditha Triad, a small population center in the dangerous and austere al-Anbar Province of western Iraq.What he encountered was an insurgent fire pit recently traumatized by the infamous “Haditha Massacre,” in which 24 Iraqi civilians – men, women and children – were shot at close range by U.S. Marines at close range in retaliation for the death of a Marine lance corporal in a roadside bombing. Despite the tensions triggered by the shootings, Gray was able to form a bond with the Iraqi soldiers because he had an edge that very few U.S. service members possess 3⁄4 the ability to communicate because of his proficiency in Iraqi Arabic. His language skills and deep understanding of Iraqi culture were quickly recognized by the Iraqi soldiers who considered him an Arab brother and fondly named him “Jamal.” By the end of his advisor tour, he was a legend within the Iraqi Army. During his time in Iraq, Wes kept a detailed record of his observations, experiences, and interviews with Iraqi citizens and soldiers in vivid and brutally honest detail. Ranging from tension filled skirmishes against the insurgents to insights into the dichotomy between American and Iraqi cultures, he offers a comprehensive portrait of Iraq and the struggles of its people and soldiers to stand up and make their country a nation once again. His book is a Marine intelligence officer’s compelling report about the status and prospects of America's strategy for success in Iraq.

Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.