This book studies the reactions of India, Brazil, and South Africa the three main non-proliferation actors of the Global South to Iran's nuclear program. Their responses are explained and situated in wider foreign policy context.

"The Institute of Science and International Security’s new book Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons chronicles the Islamic Republic of Iran’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. The book draws from original Iranian documents seized by Israel’s Mossad in 2018 in a dramatic overnight raid in Tehran. The “Nuclear Archive” allows deep insight into the country’s effort to secretly build nuclear weapons. The book relies on unprecedented access to archive documents, many translated by the Institute into English for the first time. The first part of the book concentrates on Iran’s crash nuclear weapons program in the early 2000s to build five nuclear weapons and an industrial complex to produce many more. By 2003, responding to growing pressure from European powers to freeze its publicly known nuclear programs and fearing a possible U.S. military attack, Iran’s leaders decided to downsize, but not stop, their secret nuclear weapons effort. The second part of the book discusses Iran’s nuclear path post-2003, revealing a careful plan to continue nuclear weapons work, overcome bottlenecks and better camouflage nuclear weapons development activities. Since 2003, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear scientists and weaponeers have concentrated on establishing capabilities to make weapon-grade uranium and developing more reliable, longer-range ballistic missiles."--Publisher description.

The first systematic look at the different strategies that states employ in their pursuit of nuclear weapons Much of the work on nuclear proliferation has focused on why states pursue nuclear weapons. The question of how states pursue nuclear weapons has received little attention. Seeking the Bomb is the first book to analyze this topic by examining which strategies of nuclear proliferation are available to aspirants, why aspirants select one strategy over another, and how this matters to international politics. Looking at a wide range of nations, from India and Japan to the Soviet Union and North Korea to Iraq and Iran, Vipin Narang develops an original typology of proliferation strategies—hedging, sprinting, sheltered pursuit, and hiding. Each strategy of proliferation provides different opportunities for the development of nuclear weapons, while at the same time presenting distinct vulnerabilities that can be exploited to prevent states from doing so. Narang delves into the crucial implications these strategies have for nuclear proliferation and international security. Hiders, for example, are especially disruptive since either they successfully attain nuclear weapons, irrevocably altering the global power structure, or they are discovered, potentially triggering serious crises or war, as external powers try to halt or reverse a previously clandestine nuclear weapons program. As the international community confronts the next generation of potential nuclear proliferators, Seeking the Bomb explores how global conflict and stability are shaped by the ruthlessly pragmatic ways states choose strategies of proliferation.

The first detailed Iranian account of the diplomatic struggle between Iran and the international community, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir opens in 2002, as news of Iran's clandestine uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities emerge. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, previously the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and spokesman for Tehran's nuclear negotiating team, brings the reader into Tehran's private deliberations as its leaders wrestle with internal and external adversaries. Mousavian provides readers with intimate knowledge of Iran's interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency and global powers. His personal story comes alive as he vividly recounts his arrest and interrogations on charges of espionage. Dramatic episodes of diplomatic missions tell much about the author and the swirling dynamics of Iranian politics and diplomacy—undercurrents that must be understood now more than ever. As intense debate continues over the direction of Iran's nuclear program, Mousavian weighs the likely effects of military strikes, covert action, sanctions, and diplomatic engagement, considering their potential to resolve the nuclear crisis. Contents 1. The Origin and Development of Iran's Nuclear Program 2. The First Crisis 3. From Tehran to Paris 4. From the Paris Agreement to the 2005 Presidential Election 5. The Larijani Period 6. To the Security Council 7. Back to the Security Council and a New Domestic Situation 8. Iran Alone: The Jalili Period 9. U.S. Engagement 10. The Crisis Worsens 11. Conclusion

A comprehensive but concise overview of Iran's politics, economy, military, foreign policy, and nuclear program. The volume chronicles U.S.-Iran relations under six American presidents and probes five options for dealing with Iran. Organized thematically, this book provides top-level briefings by 50 top experts on Iran (both Iranian and Western authors) and is a practical and accessible "go-to" resource for practitioners, policymakers, academics, and students, as well as a fascinating wealth of information for anyone interested in understanding Iran's pivotal role in world politics.

Purpose: A one-day international symposium hosted by the Marine Corps University (MCU) and the Marine Corps University Foundation to enhance the overall understanding of Iran, exploring its internal dynamics, regional perspectives, and extra-regional factors and examining its near-term political and strategic options and their potential impact on the course of action of the United States and the USMC.

Considering the latest Iranian nuclear developments, one might question whether a study now on how best to restrain Tehran is simply one that's come too late. To be sure, estimates vary as to when Iran could build its first bomb. Some believe Tehran could do it before the end of 2005; others think Iran would only be able to do so by the end of the decade. In either case, though, the die seems cast: If Iran wants, it has all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on its own. Certainly, trying to deny Iran further nuclear technology in the hopes that this will prevent it from getting nuclear weapons is no longer a credible strategy. The questions this edited volume addresses are whether or not any strategy can prevent Iran from going nuclear, what the proper goals of such a strategy might be (deterring use, keeping Tehran from deploying weapons, getting it to dismantle its nuclear program, etc.), and what other nonproliferation goals ought to be attempted (including trying to dissuade other nations from following Iran's example). The answers this volume offers are: 1) in the long-run Iran will gain little from going nuclear, and 2) much can be gained by enforcing the nonproliferation rules Iran agreed to and spelling out the costs to Iran of its continuing acquisition of nuclear weapons- related capabilities.

This volume assumes the worst: a defensive, aggressive Iran already possesses a nuclear arsenal. How should the United States handle this threat, and can it deter the use of such weapons? Through three scenario models, this study explores the political, strategic, and operational challenges facing the United States in a post–Cold War world. The authors concentrate on the type of nuclear capability Iran might develop; the conditions under which Iran might resort to threatened or actual weapons use; the extent to which Iran’s military strategy and declaratory policy might embolden Iran and its proxies to pursue more aggressive policies in the region and vis-à-vis the United States; and Iran’s ability to transfer nuclear materials to others within and outside the region, possibly sparking a nuclear cascade. Drawing on recent post–Cold War deterrence theory, the authors consider Iran’s nuclear ambitions as they relate to its foreign policy objectives, domestic politics, and role in the Islamic world, and they suggest specific approaches to improve U.S. defense and deterrence planning.

This book provides an international legal analysis of the most important questions regarding Iran's nuclear program since 2002. Setting these legal questions in their historical and diplomatic context, this book aims to clarify how the relevant sources of international law - including primarily the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA treaty law - should be properly applied in the context of the Iran case. It provides an instructional case study of the application of these sources of international law, the lessons which can be applied to inform both the on-going legal and diplomatic dynamics surrounding the Iran nuclear dispute itself, as well as similar future cases. Some questions raised regard the watershed diplomatic accord reached between Iran and Western states in July, 2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action. The answers will be of interests to diplomats and academics, as well as to anyone who is interested in understanding international law's application to this sensitive dispute in international relations.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the international system was largely dominated by the USA and the colonial powers of western Europe. After the two world wars, the political and economic dominance of these states guaranteed them and their allies an almost complete control of world politics. However, as it is the norm in the international system, power structures are not immutable. After the end of the Cold War, rapid changes to the existing international hierarchies took place, as new countries from the so-called ‘‘developing world’’ began to emerge as crucial actors capable of questioning and altering the power dynamics of the world. It is therefore unthinkable to ignore emerging countries such as Russia, the People’s Republic of China, India, Brazil or South Africa in the decision-making process in today’s world order. In addition, there is a group of smaller, yet increasingly important countries that, while acknowledging their inability radically to change the rules of the international system, are still eager to shift power relations and enhance their influence in the world. Argentina, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Vietnam are generally recognised as part of this grouping of emerging powers from the Global South. While there is a consensus amongst academics that emerging powers from the Global South must have a stabilising role within their own regions, previous analyses have focused primarily on the impact that emerging powers have had in their own regions’ conflict resolution initiatives. This volume, instead, aims to go beyond these analyses and provide new insights regarding the effect that this stabilising role has on the continental and global positioning of emerging powers. In other words, this book explores the relation between a country’s involvement in conflict resolution initiatives and its positioning in the international system. The volume will contribute to this approach using the perspective of academics and practitioners from countries of the Global South, particularly from states that have strengthened - or sometimes weakened - their position in the international hierarchy of power through a leading role in regional conflict resolution initiatives.