"What stopped Hitler in 1940 - why did he not attempt to invade Britain? And if he had, would he have been successful? Most of us would answer that "The Few" of Fighter Command saved Britain from certain invasion, because every historian of World War Two, from Winston Churchill onwards, has said so. Yet in this fresh look, Derek Robinson argues that the Battle of Britain alone could not have been why Operation Sealion, the planned German invasion, was scrapped. The greater obstacle was a force that both Churchill and Hitler failed to acknowledge." "Robinson suggests that most accounts of 1940 are written as if the Channel and the Royal Navy did not exist. In fact, an inadequate German fleet was relying on the use of 1,000 flat-bottomed barges as landing craft - which even in a flat calm would have taken ten days to effect the complete landing. These cumbersome vessels would also have been sitting ducks for the Royal Navy, which at that time was still massive - 70 to 80 destroyers were ready and waiting in home waters." "The skill and courage of the Spitfire and Hurricane pilots who fought the Battle of Britain are not in question, and Robinson never downplays the extent of their sacrifice - he is the author of many acclaimed books depicting the lives of fighter pilots in both world wars. Here he challenges a verdict that has been in place for 50 years and his views will be unwelcome to some. But as well as relating the Battle of Britain with his trademark realism, Robinson now presents clear evidence to make us question our easy acceptance of the old story."--BOOK JACKET.

This major history documents the German invasion of Norway, focusing on the events at sea. The first operation in which the air force, army, and navy worked closely together, Operation Weserübung included the first dive-bomber attack to sink a major warship and the first carrier task-force operations. Based on primary sources from British, German, and Norwegian archives, this book gives a balanced account of the reasons behind the invasion and showcases an unrivaled collection of photographs. As the definitive study of Germany's first and last major seaborne invasion, it offers a close look at an important but often neglected aspect of World War II.

On 16 May 1940 an emergency meeting of the French High Command was called at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. The German army had broken through the French lines on the River Meuse at Sedan and elsewhere, only five days after launching their attack. Churchill, who had been telephoned by Prime Minister Reynaud the previous evening to be told that the French were beaten, rushed to Paris to meet the French leaders. The mood in the meeting was one of panic and despair; there was talk of evacuating Paris. Churchill asked Gamelin, the French Commander in Chief, 'Where is the strategic reserve?' 'There is none,' replied Gamelin. This exciting book by Julian Jackson, a leading historian of twentieth-century France, charts the breathtakingly rapid events that led to the defeat and surrender of one of the greatest bastions of the Western Allies, and thus to a dramatic new phase of the Second World War. The search for scapegoats for the most humiliating military disaster in French history began almost at once: were miscalculations by military leaders to blame, or was this an indictment of an entire nation? Using eyewitness accounts, memoirs, and diaries, Julian Jackson recreates, in gripping detail, the intense atmosphere and dramatic events of these six weeks in 1940, unravelling the historical evidence to produce a fresh answer to the perennial question of whether the fall of France was inevitable.

"I have decided to prepare for, and if necessary to carry out, an invasion against England."--Adolph Hitler, July 16, 1940 Operation Sealion was the codename for the Nazi invasion of Britain that Hitler ordered his generals to plan after France fell in June 1940. Although the plan ultimately never came to fruition, a few sets of the Germans' detailed strategy documents are housed in the rare book rooms of libraries across Europe. But now the Bodleian Library has made documents from their set available for all to peruse in this unprecedented collection of the invasion planning materials. The planned operation would have involved landing 160,000 German soldiers along a forty-mile stretch of coast in southeast England. Packets of reconnaissance materials were put together for the invading forces, and the most intriguing parts are now reproduced here. Each soldier was to be given maps and geographical descriptions of the British Isles that broke down the country by regions, aerial photographs pinpointing strategic targets, an extensive listing of British roads and rivers, strategic plans for launching attacks on each region, an English dictionary and phrase book, and even a brief description of Britain's social composition. Augmenting the fascinating documents is an informative introduction that sets the materials in their historical and political context. A must-have for every military history buff, German Invasion Plans for the British Isles, 1940 is a remarkable revelation of the inner workings of Hitler's most famous unrealized military campaign.

An in-depth analysis of Nazi Germany’s unused strategy to invade the UK during the Battle of Britain in World War II. It is hard to believe that in the summer of 1940, neither the Allies nor the Axis powers had any experience of large amphibious operations. German planning for Operation Sealion was concerned with pioneering new techniques and developing specialized landing craft. Remarkably, in only two months they prepared an invasion fleet of 4,000 vessels. In Operation Sealion, Peter Schenk begins by examining the vessels that were developed and deployed for the operation: converted cargo vessels and steamers, more specialized landing craft, barges and pontoons, and auxiliary vessels such as tugs and hospital ships. He then goes on to outline the strategic preparations for the landing and looks at the operational plans of, in turn, the navy, army, and air force. The planned invasion is described in full detail so that the reader can follow the proposed sequence of events from loading, setting sail, and the crossing of the English Channel, to the landing and the early advances into southern England. Schenk uniquely estimates the chances of success. This absorbing account of Hitler’s abortive mission, more detailed than anything written before, is of interest not just to the naval historian but to anyone with an interest in World War II or military strategy.

On October 28, 1940, the Italian army under Benito Mussolini invaded Greece. The British had insisted on guaranteeing Greek and Turkish neutrality, despite the fact that Greece was never more than a limited campaign in an unlimited war as far as they were concerned. The British, however, were never quite sure that Greece was not their last foothold in Europe, and they harbored dreams of holding on to this last bastion of civilization and of protecting it with a diplomatic and military alliance—a Balkan bloc. These dreams bore little relation to military and economic realities, and so the stage was set for tragedy. In Diary of a Disaster, Robin Higham details the unfolding events from the invasion, though the Italian defeat and the subsequent German invasion, until the British evacuation at the end of April 1941. The Greek army, while tough, was small and based largely upon reserves. They were also largely equipped with obsolete French, Polish, and Czech arms for which there was now no other source than captured Italian materiel. Transportation was also lacking as Greece lacked all-weather roads over much of the country, had no all-weather airport, and only one rail line connecting Athens with Salonika and Florina in the north. Added to the woes of the Greek military, the British commander-in-chief for the Middle East, Sir Archibald Wavell, faced huge logistical challenges as well. Based in Cairo, he was responsible for a huge theatre of operation, from hostile Vichy French forces in Syria to the Boers in South Africa nearly six thousand miles away. His air force was comprised of only a handful of modern aircraft with biplanes and outdated, early monoplanes making up the bulk of his force. Radar was also unavailable to him. His navy was woefully short on destroyers and often incommunicado while at sea. While Wavell had roughly 500,000 men under his command, he was severely limited in how he could use them. The South Africans could only be deployed in East Africa and the Austrians and New Zealanders could not be employed without the consent of their home governments. In short, Churchill had instructed Wavell to offer support that he did not really have and could not afford to give to the Greeks. Higham walks readers through these events as they unfold like a modern Greek tragedy. Using the format of a diary, he recounts day-by-day the British efforts though the failure of Operation Lustre, which no one outside of London thought had any chance of stemming the Nazi tide in Greece.

From the comfortable distance of seven decades, it is quite easy to view the victory of the Allies over Hitler’s Germany as inevitable. But in 1940 Great Britain’s defeat loomed perilously close, and no other nation stepped up to confront the Nazi threat. In this cogently argued book, Robin Prior delves into the documents of the time—war diaries, combat reports, Home Security’s daily files, and much more—to uncover how Britain endured a year of menacing crises. The book reassesses key events of 1940—crises that were recognized as such at the time and others not fully appreciated. Prior examines Neville Chamberlain’s government, Churchill’s opponents, the collapse of France, the Battle of Britain, and the Blitz. He looks critically at the position of the United States before Pearl Harbor, and at Roosevelt’s response to the crisis. Prior concludes that the nation was saved through a combination of political leadership, British Expeditionary Force determination and skill, Royal Air Force and Navy efforts to return soldiers to the homeland, and the determination of the people to fight on “in spite of all terror.” As eloquent as it is controversial, this book exposes the full import of events in 1940, when Britain fought alone and Western civilization hung in the balance.

Between May 1940 and the summer of 1941 the British people expected a German invasion that, had it succeeded, would have enslaved them into the Nazis' racist war. This period saw an unparalleled effort to prepare the defence of the UK against invasion. Scotland's nationally important heavy industries, vital Royal Navy bases, and one of the UK's key ports, were very vulnerable to the sort of airborne attack that had devastated the defences of Belgium. Everyone was certain that a Fifth Column of Nazi sympathisers and agents was working actively to spread rumours and despair, and to aid the invasion forces, and in reality the country was far from united. Although the 1939 - 45 War is the most written-about war in history there is no account of the heroic efforts made in those months to prepare Scotland for the inevitable invasion, and how the defences were intended to be used. This book tells that story, against the wider history of the period and its people, and describes what was built, and what now survives.

Ernest R. May's Strange Victory presents a dramatic narrative-and reinterpretation-of Germany's six-week campaign that swept the Wehrmacht to Paris in spring 1940. Before the Nazis killed him for his work in the French Resistance, the great historian Marc Bloch wrote a famous short book, Strange Defeat, about the treatment of his nation at the hands of an enemy the French had believed they could easily dispose of. In Strange Victory, the distinguished American historian Ernest R. May asks the opposite question: How was it that Hitler and his generals managed this swift conquest, considering that France and its allies were superior in every measurable dimension and considering the Germans' own skepticism about their chances? Strange Victory is a riveting narrative of those six crucial weeks in the spring of 1940, weaving together the decisions made by the high commands with the welter of confused responses from exhausted and ill-informed, or ill-advised, officers in the field. Why did Hitler want to turn against France at just this moment, and why were his poor judgment and inadequate intelligence about the Allies nonetheless correct? Why didn't France take the offensive when it might have led to victory? What explains France's failure to detect and respond to Germany's attack plan? It is May's contention that in the future, nations might suffer strange defeats of their own if they do not learn from their predecessors' mistakes in judgment.