Between 1973 and 1980, the cost of crude oil rose suddenly and dramatically, precipitating convulsions in international politics. Conventional wisdom holds that international capital markets adjusted automatically and remarkably well: enormous amounts of money flowed into oil-rich states, and efficient markets then placed that new money in cash-poor Third World economies. David Spiro has followed the money trail, and the story he tells contradicts the accepted beliefs. Most of the sudden flush of new oil wealth didn't go to poor oil-importing countries around the globe. Instead, the United States made a deal with Saudi Arabia to sell it U.S. securities in secret, a deal resulting in a substantial portion of Saudi assets being held by the U.S. government. With this arrangement, the U.S. government violated its agreements with allies in the developed world. Spiro argues that American policymakers took this action to prop up otherwise intolerable levels of U.S. public debt. In effect, recycled OPEC wealth subsidized the debt-happy policies of the U.S. government as well as the debt-happy consumption of its citizenry.

Jeff D. Colgan explores why some oil-exporting countries are aggressive, while others are not. Using evidence from key countries such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, Petro-Aggression proposes a new theoretical framework to explain the importance of oil to international security.

The creation of oil rents in the 1970s put Algeria, Iraq, and Libya on the fast track to modernization. Massive revenues turned Algeria into the Mediterranean dragon, Libya into an emirate, and Iraq into the preeminent rising military power of the Arab world. From a political perspective, the progressive socialism of these countries would seem to have engendered profound, promising change: increased rights for women, positive urbanization, and improved education. Yet oil wealth's realities are beyond disillusioning. The international community now wonders whether reform can ever penetrate such nations and if the west will ever enjoy a secure gas supply. Offering the first global evaluation of these issues, Luis Martinez considers the nature of oil-sponsored violence in Algeria, Iraq, and Libya and its ability both to weaken and bolster their regimes.

Meticulously researched, this book examines US dollar hegemony and the unsustainable macroeconomics of 'petrodollar recycling', pointing out that issues underlying the Iraq war also apply to geostrategic tensions between the US and other countries including the member states of the EU, Iran, Venezuela and Russia. The author warns that without changing course, the American Experiments will end the way all empires end -- with military over-tension and subsequent economic decline. He recommends the multilateral pursuit of both energy and monentary reforms within a United Nations framework to create a more balanced global energy and monetary system -- thereby reducing the possibility of future oil and oil-currency related warfare.

In Oil Money, David M. Wight offers a new framework for understanding the course of Middle East–US relations during the 1970s and 1980s: the transformation of the US global empire by Middle East petrodollars. During these two decades, American, Arab, and Iranian elites reconstituted the primary role of the Middle East within the global system of US power from a supplier of cheap crude oil to a source of abundant petrodollars, the revenues earned from the export of oil. In the 1970s, the United States and allied monarchies, including the House of Pahlavi in Iran and the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia, utilized petrodollars to undertake myriad joint initiatives for mutual economic and geopolitical benefit. These petrodollar projects were often unprecedented in scope and included multibillion-dollar development projects, arms sales, purchases of US Treasury securities, and funds for the mujahedin in Afghanistan. Although petrodollar ties often augmented the power of the United States and its Middle East allies, Wight argues they also fostered economic disruptions and state-sponsored violence that drove many Americans, Arabs, and Iranians to resist Middle East–US interdependence, most dramatically during the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Deftly integrating diplomatic, transnational, economic, and cultural analysis, Wight utilizes extensive declassified records from the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, the IMF, the World Bank, Saddam Hussein's regime, and private collections to make plain the political economy of US power. Oil Money is an expansive yet judicious investigation of the wide-ranging and contradictory effects of petrodollars on Middle East–US relations and the geopolitics of globalization.

The book covers a wide range of topics of relevance to policymakers in countries that have sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and those that receive SWF investments. Renowned experts in the field have contributed chapters. The book is organized around four themes: (1) the role and macrofinancial linkages of SWFs, (2) institutional factors, (3) investment approaches and financial markets, and (4) the postcrisis outlook. The book also discusses the challenges facing sovereign wealth funds in the coming years, from an inside perspective on countries, including Canada, Chile, China, Norway, Russia, and New Zealand. Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds will contribute to a further understanding of the nature, strategies and behavior of SWFs and the environment in which they operate, as their importance is likely to grow in the coming years.

Based on a special National Bureau of Economic Research conference held in Oct. 1989. Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Perkins, a former chief economist at a Boston strategic-consulting firm, confesses he was an "economic hit man" for 10 years, helping U.S. intelligence agencies and multinationals cajole and blackmail foreign leaders into serving U.S. foreign policy and awarding lucrative contracts to American business.