This book moves scholarly debates beyond the old question of whether or not international institutions matter in order to examine how they matter, even in a world of power politics. Power politics and international institutions are often studied as two separate domains, but this is in need of rethinking because today most states strategically use institutions to further their interests. Anders Wivel, T.V. Paul, and the international group of contributing authors update our understanding of how institutions are viewed among the major theoretical paradigms in international relations, and they seek to bridge the divides. Empirical chapters examine specific institutions in practice, including the United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European Union. The book also points the way to future research. International Institutions and Power Politics provides insights for both international relations theory and practical matters of foreign affairs, and it will be essential reading for all international relations scholars and advanced students.

A new theoretical framework for understanding how social, economic, and political conflicts influence international institutions and their place in the global order Today’s liberal international institutional order is being challenged by the rising power of illiberal states and by domestic political changes inside liberal states. Against this backdrop, Ideology and International Institutions offers a broader understanding of international institutions by arguing that the politics of multilateralism has always been based on ideology and ideological divisions. Erik Voeten develops new theories and measures to make sense of past and current challenges to multilateral institutions. Voeten presents a straightforward theoretical framework that analyzes multilateral institutions as attempts by states to shift the policies of others toward their preferred ideological positions. He then measures how states have positioned themselves in global ideological conflicts during the past seventy-five years. Empirical chapters illustrate how ideological struggles shape the design of international institutions, membership in international institutions, and the critical role of multilateral institutions in militarized conflicts. Voeten also examines populism’s rise and other ideological threats to the liberal international order. Ideology and International Institutions explores the essential ways in which ideological contestation has influenced world politics.

A new theory of market power politics that explains when and why states will delay cooperation or even fight wars in pursuit of this elusive goal. How are the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Russian incursions into Ukraine and Georgia, and China's occupation of islands in the South China Sea related? All three of these important moments in modern history were driven by the motivation to capture market power. Whether it was oil for Iraq, natural gas for Russia, or rare earth elements for China, the goal isn't just the commodities themselves--it is the ability to determine their price on the global market. In Market Power Politics, Stephen Gent and Mark Crescenzi develop a new theory of market power politics that explains when and why states will delay cooperation or even fight wars in pursuit of this elusive goal. Empirically examining case studies from different regions of the world, they explore how competition between states over market power can create disruptions in the global political economy and potentially lead to territorial aggression and war. They also provide clear policy recommendations, urging international institutions to establish norms that reduce the potential for open conflict. Ultimately, Market Power Politics shows that nations' desire to increase their market power means that the push for territorial expansion will continue to shape the trajectory of world politics.

Power Plays argues that international institutions prevent extortion in some areas, but cause states to shift coercive behavior into less effective policy domains.

This edited volume examines power in its different dimensions in global governance. Scholars tend to underestimate the importance of power in international relations because of a failure to see its multiple forms. To expand the conceptual aperture, this book presents and employs a taxonomy that alerts scholars to the different kinds of power that are present in world politics. A team of international scholars demonstrate how these different forms connect and intersect in global governance in a range of different issue areas. Bringing together a variety of theoretical perspectives, this volume invites scholars to reconsider their conceptualization of power in world politics and how such a move can enliven and enrich their understanding of global governance.

The essays in this book trace the development of the author's thinking about international institutions between 1980 and 1988. The introduction, written especially for this volume, summarizes and defends the neoliberal institutionalism that he advocates as a framework for understanding world politics.

The last few decades have witnessed an extraordinary transfer of policy-making prerogatives from individual nation-states to supranational institutions. If you think this is cause for celebration, you are not alone. Within the academic community (and not only among students of international cooperation), the notion that political institutions are mutually beneficial--that they would never come into existence, much less grow in size and assertiveness, were they not "Pareto-improving"--is today's conventional wisdom. But is it true? In this richly detailed and strikingly original study, Lloyd Gruber suggests that this emphasis on cooperation's positive-sum consequences may be leading scholars of international relations down the wrong theoretical path. The fact that membership in a cooperative arrangement is voluntary, Gruber argues, does not mean that it works to everyone's advantage. To the contrary, some cooperators may incur substantial losses relative to the original, non-cooperative status quo. So what, then, keeps these participants from withdrawing? Gruber's answer, in a word, is power--specifically the "go-it-alone power" exercised by the regime's beneficiaries, many of whom would continue to benefit even if their partners, the losers, were to opt out. To lend support to this thesis, Gruber takes a fresh look at the political origins and structures of European Monetary Unification and NAFTA. But the theoretical arguments elaborated in Ruling the World extend well beyond money and trade, touching upon issues of long-standing interest to students of security cooperation, environmental politics, nation-building--even political philosophy. Bold and compelling, this book will appeal to anyone interested in understanding how "power politics" really operates and why, for better or worse, it is fueling much of the supranational activity we see today.

Conventional wisdom holds that "institutions matter." Here, Andrew MacIntyre reveals exactly how they matter in the developing world. Combining an eye for current concerns in international politics with a deep knowledge of Southeast Asia, MacIntyre explores the impact of institutions on effective governance. He examines the "national political architecture"—the complex of rules that determine how leadership of a state is constituted and how state authority is exercised. The Power of Institutions sets out an intriguing conundrum: one well-established body of literature decries the evils of highly centralized political systems, while an equally vigorous school of thought outlines the dangers of political fragmentation. MacIntyre presents the problems associated with institutional extremes, common in developing countries, as the "power concentration paradox." Either extreme is likely to be associated with distinctive governance problems. MacIntyre illustrates his wider arguments by focusing on Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. He shows how their diverse political architectures influenced their responses to the Asian economic crisis and played into pressures for political reform. The Power of Institutions makes clear why the configuration of political institutions is one of the most pressing challenges in many parts of the developing world today.

This book examines a new approach to Chinese foreign policy development in the post-Cold War international order.

How is the United States able to control the IMF with only 17 per cent of the votes? How are the rules of the global economy made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explains how international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and interests of the leading state and the member countries. Presenting a new model of institutional design and comparing the IMF, WTO, and EU, Stone argues that institutional variations reflect the distribution of power and interests. He shows that US interests influence the size, terms, and enforcement of IMF programs, and new data, archival documents, and interviews reveal the shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia, and Argentina.