This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The DoD and State and the USAID have relied extensively on contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements for a wide range of services in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the agencies have faced challenges in obtaining sufficient information to manage these contracts and assistance instruments. This report assessed the implementation of the Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker and data reported by the three agencies for Afghanistan and Iraq for FY 2009 and the first half of FY 2010 on the: (1) number of contractor and assistance personnel, including those providing security; (2) number of personnel killed or wounded; and (3) number and value of contracts and assistance instruments and extent of competition for new awards. Illus.

The interagency process was the focus of a Capstone project and Research Symposium at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University during the 2006-07 academic year. The Bush School's Capstone seminar is a semester-long graduate course in the Master's Program in International Affairs that provides a research experience for students in the final semester of the 2-year program. As part of their leadership development, the students operate in teams to address an important policy issue (under the direction of a faculty member) and in support of a client. In this case, the client was the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. Our thanks to Colonel Richard Lacquement and Dr. Janine Davidson for sponsoring our Capstone interagency project.

The DoD, State and the USAID have relied extensively on contractors, grantees, and coop. agreement recipients to support troops and civilian personnel and carry out reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The agencies identified common info. on their contracts, grants, coop. agreements, and associated personnel. In their July 2008 memo. of understanding, the three agencies designated the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) as their system for tracking the required info. This statement addresses: (1) how a lack of info. hinders agencies' management and oversight of contracts, grants, coop. agreements, and associated personnel; and (2) the status of the agencies' continued efforts to implement SPOT.

Some vols. include supplemental journals of "such proceedings of the sessions, as, during the time they were depending, were ordered to be kept secret, and respecting which the injunction of secrecy was afterwards taken off by the order of the House."

Consistent with the literature on state building, failed states, peacekeeping and foreign assistance, this book argues that budgeting is a core state activity necessary for the operation of a functional government. Employing a historical institutionalist approach, this book first explores the Ottoman, British and Ba'athist origins of Iraq's budgetary institutions. The book next examines American pre-war planning, the Coalition Provisional Authority's rule-making and budgeting following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the mixed success of the Coalition's capacity-building programs initiated throughout the occupation. This book sheds light on the problem of 'outsiders' building states, contributes to a more comprehensive evaluation of the Coalition in Iraq, addresses the question of why Iraqis took ownership of some Coalition-generated institutions, and helps explain the nature of institutional change.

U.S. gov¿t. agencies, including the DoD and the USAID have spent billions of dollars to develop Afghanistan. From FY¿s 2004 to 2008, DoD has reported obligations of about $1 billion for its Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which enables commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. As troop levels increase, DoD officials expect the program to expand. This report assessed DoD's: (1) capacity to manage and oversee the CERP in Afghanistan; and (2) coordination of projects with USAID. Includes recommendations. Illustrations.