In this book, Myles Brand ushers in a third exciting stage, linking the philosophical with the scientific study of action, with psychology and artificial intelligence.

'Knowledge-First' constitutes what is widely regarded as one of the most significant innovations in contemporary epistemology in the past 25 years. Knowledge-first epistemology is the idea that knowledge per se should not be analysed in terms of its constituent parts (e.g., justification, belief), but rather that these and other notions should be analysed in terms of the concept of knowledge. This volume features a substantive introduction and 13 original essays from leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of knowledge-first philosophy. The contributors' essays range from foundational issues to applications of this project to other disciplines including the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of perception, ethics and action theory. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind aims to provide a relatively open-ended forum for creative and original scholarship with the potential to contribute and advance debates connected with this philosophical project.

Parents in our culture today are bombarded by "experts" offering "tools," "programs," diagnoses," treatments" and medications. Why doesn't any of it seem to help our children act and feel better? With this book parents will learn: . Children's brains are wired from conception through adolescence to need certain parenting and educational conditions that are different from almost everything that we have grown up with or have learned from our culture. . What people in peaceful tribal cultures have known about parenting and education for millennia . How to heal their children's mental health, behavioral and learning problems at the root causes, resulting in genuine improvements in family happiness. "Instead of Medicating and Punishing" is for parents of children of all ages, from pregnancy through late adolescence. It is for parents of children who have mild, moderate or severe mental health, learning or behavioral problems and also addresses the special needs of adoptive children.

In this volume, Carolina Sartorio makes the case for big-picture causalism: a naturalistic conception of agency and free agency that unifies the two phenomena under a common thesis. This is the thesis that actions/free actions are behaviors that have the right kinds of causes or explanations. The book discusses how a causalist view of action and free action fit together--the latter as a natural extension of the former--and how they are motivated by similar considerations having to do with causal control. The result is a compelling "package deal" view of our practical agency, one that is put forth as the default view (the view that deserves to be regarded as the starting point of our theorizing). Sartorio examines both the skeleton of the causalist view as well as potential enrichments that result from exploiting the grounds of the relevant causal facts. The discussion is enriched by an account of the role played in causalism by key metaphysical notions such as causation, grounding, absences, and powers.

Perfectionism is one of the leading moral views of the Western tradition. Defined broadly, it holds that what is right is whatever most promotes certain objective human goods such as knowledge, achievement, and deep personal relations.

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a series of volumes presenting outstanding new work on a set of connected themes, investigating such questions as: · What does it mean to be an agent? · What is the nature of moral responsibility? Of criminal responsibility? What is the relation between moral and criminal responsibility (if any)? · What is the relation between responsibility and the metaphysical issues of determinism and free will? · What do various psychological disorders tell us about agency and responsibility? · How do moral agents develop? How does this developmental story bear on questions about the nature of moral judgment and responsibility? · What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our questions about agency and responsibility? OSAR thus straddles the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of action, but also draws from a diverse range of cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (including experimental and developmental), philosophy of psychology, philosophy of law, legal theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, political philosophy, and more. It is unified by its focus on who we are as deliberators and (inter)actors, embodied practical agents negotiating (sometimes unsuccessfully) a world of moral and legal norms.