Maritime security threats to the U.S. are broad, incl. the naval forces of potential adversary nations, terrorism, and piracy. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these threats. DoD considers maritime domain awareness -- identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient awareness to make timely decisions -- a means for facilitating effective action in the maritime domain and critical to its homeland defense mission. This report examines the extent to which DoD has developed a strategy to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts and uses a risk-based approach. It is a public version of a previous, sensitive report. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.

Maritime security threats to the United States are broad, including the naval forces of potential adversary nations, terrorism, and piracy. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very real threats. The Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness, that is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient awareness to make timely decisions, a means for facilitating effective action in the maritime domain and critical to its homeland defense mission. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts and uses a risk-based approach. GAO analyzed national and DOD documents; interviewed DOD and interagency maritime domain awareness officials; and conducted site visits to select facilities engaged in maritime related activities. This report is a public version of a previous, sensitive report. GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement a strategy with objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime domain awareness, aligns with DOD's corporate process, identifies capability resourcing responsibilities, and includes performance measures; and (2) perform a comprehensive risk-based analysis, including prioritized capability gaps and future investments. DOD agreed with the recommendations.

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Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness

The DoD¿s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities -- such as satellites and unmanned aircraft systems -- are crucial to military operations, and demand for ISR capabilities has increased. Congress directed DoD to fully integrate its ISR capabilities, also known as the ISR enterprise, as it works to meet current and future ISR needs. This report: (1) describes the challenges that DoD faces in integrating its ISR enterprise; (2) assesses DoD¿s mgmt. approach for improving integration of its future ISR investments; and (3) evaluates the extent to which DoD has implemented key activities to ensure proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not duplicative, and use a joint approach to meeting war-fighters¿ needs. Illustrations.

DOD's important first steps to formulate a strategy for improving the integration of future ISR requirements include developing an ISR Integration Roadmap and designating ISR as a test case for its joint capability portfolio management concept. DOD developed a statutorily required ISR Roadmap that catalogues current ISR capabilities. GAO's preliminary work, however, has shown that the Roadmap does not (1) identify future requirements, (2) identify funding priorities, or (3) measure progress. Also, the Roadmap does not yet clarify what ISR requirements are already filled or possibly saturated, identify critical gaps for future focus, or define requirements for meeting the goal of global persistent surveillance. DOD's second initiative to improve the integration of the services' ISR programs is assigning management of ISR issues as a test case of its joint capability portfolio management concept. The intent of the test case is to explore whether managing groups of ISR capabilities across DOD will enable interoperability of future capabilities and reduce redundancies and gaps. Although in its early stages, GAO identified challenges, such as the extent to which the services will adopt suggestions from portfolio managers. DOD's approach to managing its current ISR assets limits its ability to optimize its use of these assets. U. S. Strategic Command is charged with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to allocate to combatant commanders theater-level assets used to support operational requirements. While it has visibility into the major ISR programs supporting theater-level requirements, it does not currently have visibility into all ISR assets. Also, the commander responsible for ongoing joint air operations does not currently have visibility over how tactical assets are being tasked. Nor do tactical units have visibility into how theater-level and ISR assets embedded in other units are being tasked. Further, DOD lacks metrics and feedback to evaluate its ISR missions. Without better visibility and performance evaluation, DOD does not have all the information it needs to validate the demand for ISR assets, to optimize the capability offered by these assets, to achieve a joint approach to employing its ISR assets, and to acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs. Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the warfighter. We have identified development programs where program managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and where less collaborative efforts could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions. Additionally, most of the 13 airborne ISR development programs that we reviewed had either cost growth or schedule delays. These problems resulted from not following a knowledge-based approach to weapon system development as provided for in Defense policy. In some cases, delay in delivering new systems to the warfighter led to unplanned investments to keep legacy systems relevant.

The Department of Defense's (DOD) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities-such as satellites and unmanned aircraft systems-are crucial to military operations, and demand for ISR capabilities has increased. For example, DOD plans to invest $28 billion over the next 7 years in 20 airborne ISR systems alone. Congress directed DOD to fully integrate its ISR capabilities, also known as the ISR enterprise, as it works to meet current and future ISR needs. GAO was asked to (1) describe the challenges, if any, that DOD faces in integrating its ISR enterprise, (2) assess DOD's management approach for improving integration of its future ISR investments, and (3) evaluate the extent to which DOD has implemented key activities to ensure proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not duplicative, and use a joint approach to meeting warfighters' needs. GAO assessed DOD's integration initiatives and 19 proposals for new ISR capabilities. We supplemented this analysis with discussions with DOD officials.

The safety and economic security of the U.S. depends on the secure use of the world¿s seaports and waterways. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13, also referred to as National Security Presidential Directive-41) directs the coordination of U.S. maritime security policy through the creation of a ¿National Strategy for Maritime Security¿ and supporting implementation plans. This report asked evaluates this strategy and its eight supporting plans. It discusses: (1) the extent to which the strategy and its supporting plans contain desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy; and (2) the reported status of the implementation of these Plans. Charts and tables.

By signing National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13) (Maritime Security Policy, December 21, 2004) President Bush underscored the importance of securing the Maritime Domain, which is defined as "All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances." NSPD-41/HSPD-13 established a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee-the first coordinating committee tasked specifically to address this issue-to oversee the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security and eight supporting implementation plans: National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness lays the foundation for an effective understanding of anything associated with the Maritime Domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States and identifying threats as early and as distant from our shores as possible. Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan uses existing capabilities to integrate all available intelligence regarding potential threats to U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain. Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan aims for coordinated U.S. Government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the Maritime Domain by establishing roles and responsibilities, which enable the government to respond quickly and decisively. International Outreach and Coordination Strategy provides a framework to coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken with foreign governments and international organizations, and solicits international support for enhanced maritime security. Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan recommends procedures and standards for the recovery of the maritime infrastructure following attack or similar disruption. Maritime Transportation System Security Plan responds to the President's call for recommendations to improve the national and international regulatory framework regarding the maritime domain. Maritime Commerce Security Plan establishes a comprehensive plan to secure the maritime supply chain. Domestic Outreach Plan engages non-Federal input to assist with the development and implementation of maritime security policies resulting from NSPD-41/HSPD-13. Although these plans address different aspects of maritime security, they are mutually linked and reinforce each other. Together, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans represent a comprehensive national effort to enhance the security of the United States by preventing hostile or illegal acts within the Maritime Domain. These plans do not alter existing constitutional or statutory authorities or responsibilities of the department and agency heads to carry out operational activities or to provide or receive information.

The Department of Defense's (DoD) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities -- such as satellites and unmanned aircraft systems -- are crucial to military operations, and demand for ISR capabilities has increased. For example, DoD plans to invest $28 billion over the next 7 years in 20 airborne ISR systems alone. Congress directed DoD to fully integrate its ISR capabilities, also known as the ISR enterprise, as it works to meet current and future ISR needs. GAO was asked to do the following: (1) describe the challenges, if any, that DoD faces in integrating its ISR enterprise; (2) assess DoD's management approach for improving integration of its future ISR investments; and (3) evaluate the extent to which DoD has implemented key activities to ensure proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not duplicative, and use a joint approach to meeting warfighters' needs. GAO assessed DoD's integration initiatives and 19 proposals for new ISR capabilities. They supplemented this analysis with discussions with DoD officials. GAO recommends that DoD develop a future ISR enterprise vision and that DoD take steps to improve its process for identifying future ISR capabilities. DoD agreed or partially agreed with some recommendations, but it disagreed with the recommendation to review staffing levels needed for key oversight activities.