With two distinct objectives, this text’s approach to managerial economics takes models from recent economics research and applies the research to the internal structure of a firm. After teaching basic applied economics, the authors look inside the firm and apply this analysis to management decision making. Authors Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman contend that organizational architecture consists of three aspects of corporate organization: the assignment of decision rights within the company; methods of rewarding individuals; the structure of systems to evaluate the performance of both individuals and business units. These three components can be likened to a stool with three legs. If one of the legs is shorter, the stool is out of balance. These three elements must be in balance in the organization as well.

Managerial economics refers to the application of economic theory and the tools of analysis of decision science to examine how a firm can make optimal managerial decisions in the face of constraints it faces.

A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.