What explains variation in institution-building under foreign occupations? Why do some state-building missions produce effective and durable state institutions, while others leave a legacy of weak or dysfunctional ones? I explored these questions through a comparative study of the Japanese colonization of Taiwan (1895-1945) and the American colonization of the Philippines (1898-1941), which produced contrasting institutional legacies despite the presence of similar initial conditions. While a strong bureaucratic Taiwanese state arose in the aftermath of Japanese colonization, the legacy of the American occupation of the Philippines was a weak postcolonial state penetrated by parochial interests. I explain variation in institution-building outcomes through two causal variables: (i) the degree of discretionary power afforded to the occupational administration by the home government; and (ii) the ability of native elites to effectively resist the institution-building effort. Discretionary power allows reform agents to abandon any pre-formulated (and likely ill-conceived) plans, and instead flexibly integrate native laws, norms, and customs with their new institutional designs. Additionally, and contrary to conventional wisdom, more effective institutions emerge when native elites possess the willingness and capacity to resist (even violently) the institution-building effort of foreign agents. The reformist state-building agenda of occupiers is likely to be in direct opposition to the distributional interests of native elites, who seek to maintain their advantageous position within the existing order. It is, therefore, only under the threat of effective resistance that foreign agents will accommodate the interests of native elites to forge institutions with local ownership. The main empirical chapters of the dissertation draw on more than two years of original archival research in fourteen libraries and depositories across Japan, Taiwan, and the United States. In both cases, my analysis focused on the similarities and differences in the process through which education and police institutions were developed over time; these two areas were chosen due their importance for a country's political stability and socioeconomic development. The applicability of conclusions drawn from the historical cases to contemporary state-building missions was assessed through an examination of recent U.S. efforts at building a police institution in Afghanistan.

How do modern states emerge from the turmoil of undergoverned spaces? This is the question Reo Matsuzaki ponders in Statebuilding by Imposition. Comparing Taiwan and the Philippines under the colonial rule of Japan and the United States, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, he shows similar situations produce different outcomes and yet lead us to one conclusion. Contemporary statebuilding efforts by the US and the UN start from the premise that strong states can and should be constructed through the establishment of representative government institutions, a liberalized economy, and laws that protect private property and advance personal liberties. But when statebuilding runs into widespread popular resistance, as it did in both Taiwan the Philippines, statebuilding success depends on reconfiguring the very fabric of society, embracing local elites rather than the broad population, and giving elites the power to discipline the people. In Taiwan under Japanese rule, local elites behaved as obedient and effective intermediaries and contributed to government authority; in the Philippines under US rule, they became the very cause of the state's weakness by aggrandizing wealth, corrupting the bureaucracy, and obstructing policy enforcement. As Statebuilding by Imposition details, Taiwanese and Filipino history teaches us that the imposition of democracy is no guarantee of success when forming a new state and that illiberal actions may actually be more effective. Matsuzaki's controversial political history forces us to question whether statebuilding, given what it would take for this to result in the construction of a strong state, is the best way to address undergoverned spaces in the world today.

This edited volume presents the social ontology of institutions. It questions what institutions are, what features and properties institutions have and what kinds of institution are present in the social world. The book answers these questions from both a speculative and an applied approach, it argues for a specific definition of institutions as a rule-based equilibria, as collective epistemic agent that is characterized by meaning, principles and power and as product of a We-mode and an imposition of a function. This book started from the interdisciplinary conference Playing by the Rules in Rijeka and contains contributions from Philosophy, Sociology and Economy. Institutions in Action is the first book to offer a comprehensive overview of the many different aspects and accounts about the social ontology of institutions. This much needed book presents researchers a very wide state of the art about the topic of institution by presenting the many differences that emerge in comparing the different positions.

As a stunning tide of democratization sweeps across much of the world, countries must cope with increasing problems of economic development, political and social integration, and greater public demand of scarce resources. That ability to respond effectively to these issues depends largely on the institutional choices of each of these newly democratizing countries. With critics of national political institutions in the United States arguing that the American separation-of-powers system promotes ineffectiveness and policy deadlock, many question whether these countries should emulate American institutions or choose parliamentary institutions instead. The essays in this book fully examine whether parliamentary government is superior to the separation-of-powers system through a direct comparison of the two. In addressing specific policy areas—such as innovation and implementation of energy policies after the oil shocks of 1970, management of societal cleavages, setting of government priorities in budgeting, representation of diffuse interest in environmental policy, and management of defense forces—the authors define capabilities that allow governments to respond to policy problems. Do Institutions Matter? includes case studies that bear important evidence on when and how institutions influence government effectiveness. The authors discover a widespread variation among parliamentary systems both in institutional arrangements and in governmental capabilities, and find that many of the failings of policy performance commonly attributed to American political institutions are in fact widely shared among western industrial countries. Moreover, they show how American political institutions inhibit some government capabilities while enhancing others. Changing American institutions to improve some aspects of governmental performance could hurt other widely valued capabilities. The authors draw important guidelines for institutional reformers wh

An analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies is developed in this analysis of economic structures.

A long theoretical literature in economics addresses the heavy reliance of the U.S. criminal justice system on very expensive forms of punishment - prison - when cheaper alternatives - such as fines and other sanctions - are available. This paper analyzes the role of fines as a criminal sanction within the existing institutional structure of criminal justice agencies, modeling heterogeneity in how people respond to various sanctions and threat of sanctions. From research on the application of fines in the U.S., we conclude that fines are economical only in relation to other forms of punishment; for many crimes fines will work well for the majority of offenders but fail miserably for a significant minority; that fines present a number of very significant administrative challenges; and that the political economy of fine imposition and collection is complex. Despite these facts, and with the caveats that jurisdictions vary tremendously and that there are large gaps in our knowledge about them, we build a model showing that it is possible to expand the use of fines as a criminal sanction if institutional structures are developed with these concerns in mind -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Economy, Society, and Public Policy is a new way to learn economics. It is designed specifically for students studying social sciences, public policy, business studies, engineering and other disciplines who want to understand how the economy works and how it can be made to work better. Topical policy problems are used to motivate learning of key concepts and methods of economics. It engages, challenges and empowers students, and will provide them with the tools to articulate reasoned views on pressing policy problems. This project is the result of a worldwide collaboration between researchers, educators, and students who are committed to bringing the socially relevant insights of economics to a broader audience.KEY FEATURESESPP does not teach microeconomics as a body of knowledge separate from macroeconomicsStudents begin their study of economics by understanding that the economy is situated within society and the biosphereStudents study problems of identifying causation, not just correlation, through the use of natural experiments, lab experiments, and other quantitative methodsSocial interactions, modelled using simple game theory, and incomplete information, modelled using a series of principal-agent problems, are introduced from the beginning. As a result, phenomena studied by the other social sciences such as social norms and the exercise of power play a roleThe insights of diverse schools of thought, from Marx and the classical economists to Hayek and Schumpeter, play an integral part in the bookThe way economists think about public policy is central to ESPP. This is introduced in Units 2 and 3, rather than later in the course.

In Imposing Standards, Martin Hearson shifts the focus of political rhetoric regarding international tax rules from tax havens and the Global North to the damaging impact of this regime on the Global South. Even when not exploited by tax dodgers, international tax standards place severe limits on the ability of developing countries to tax businesses, denying the Global South access to much-needed revenue. The international rules that allow tax avoidance by multinational corporations have dominated political debate about international tax in the United States and Europe, especially since the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Hearson asks how developing countries willingly gave up their right to tax foreign companies, charting their assimilation into an OECD-led regime from the days of early independence to the present day. Based on interviews with treaty negotiators, policymakers and lobbyists, as well as observation at intergovernmental meetings, archival research, and fieldwork in Africa and Asia, Imposing Standards shows that capacity constraints and imperfect negotiation strategies in developing countries were exploited by capital-exporting states, shielding multinationals from taxation and depriving nations in the Global South of revenue they both need and deserve. Thanks to generous funding from the Gates Foundation, the ebook editions of this book are available as Open Access volumes from Cornell Open (cornellpress.cornell.edu/cornell-open) and other repositories.

Tackles one of the most enduring and contentious issues of positive political economy: common pool resource management.