The role of institutions is to establish the domains of public activity and the rules to select leaders. Democratic regimes organize in simple institutional frameworks to foster the concentration of power and alternative successive absolute winners and losers. They favour political satisfaction of relatively small groups, as well as policy instability. In contrast, pluralistic institutions produce multiple winners, including multiparty co-operation and agreements. They favour stable, moderate, and consensual policies that can satisfy large groups' interests on a great number of issues. The more complex the political institutions, the more stable and socially efficient the outcome will be. This book develops an extensive analysis of this relationship. It explores concepts, questions and insights based on social choice theory, while empirical focus is cast on more than 40 democratic countries and a few international organizations from late medieval times to the present. The book argues that pluralistic democratic institutions are judged to be better than simple formula of their higher capacity of producing socially satisfactory results.

Addresses current questions in political, administrative and organizational science. The contributors seek to define the logics of political choice by examining such aspects as the rules, logics, and contingencies which govern the political decision-making process in political institutions.

The study of political institutions is among the founding pillars of political science. With the rise of the 'new institutionalism', the study of institutions has returned to its place in the sun. This volume provides a comprehensive survey of where we are in the study of political institutions, covering both the traditional concerns of political science with constitutions, federalism and bureaucracy and more recent interest in theory and the constructed nature of institutions. The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions draws together a galaxy of distinguished contributors drawn from leading universities across the world. Authoritative reviews of the literature and assessments of future research directions will help to set the research agenda for the next decade.

This book applies the basic ideas and models of economics to develop a single transactions framework to explain the key institutional arrangements across the whole range of public sector organization: the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau, and the state-owned enterprise. This book also explores the link between agency form and administrative function, agency independence from the legislature, the rights extended to private interests to influence administrative decision making, the role of civil service arrangements that are so often seen as simply frustrating efficiency and responsiveness, and the boundary between public and private sectors. This book should be of value to those with a practical interest in public administration as well as students of political science, public administration, economics, and public policy.

This book was first published in 2004. Under what conditions, in what ways, and with what effects do actors engage in politics with respect to, rather than merely within, political institutions? Using multiple methods and original data, Procedural Politics develops a theory of everyday politics with respect to rules - procedural politics - and applies it to European Union integration and politics. Assuming that actors influence maximizers, it argues and demonstrates that the jurisdiction ambiguity of issues provides opportunities for procedural politics and that influence-differences among institutional alternatives provide the incentives. It also argues and demonstrates that procedural politics occurs by predictable means (most notably, involving procedural coalition formation and strategic issue-definition) and exerts predictable effects on policymaking efficiency and outcomes and long-run institutional change. Beyond illuminating previously under-appreciated aspects of EU rule governance, these findings generalize to all rule-governed political systems and form the basis of fuller accounts of the role of institutions in political life.

This book presents the latest research in the field of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. The authors are eminent scholars from the U.S., Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, Mexico and the Philippines. Many of them have been influenced by Nobel laureate Douglass North, who pioneered the new institutional social sciences, or by William H. Riker who contributed to the field of positive political theory. The book focuses on topics such as: case studies in institutional analysis; research on war and the formation of states; the analysis of corruption; new techniques for analyzing elections, involving game theory and empirical methods; comparing elections under plurality and proportional rule, and in developed and new democracies.

This book, subtitled "political actors in institutional settings", addresses the main lines of reasoning of the new political institutionalism and rational choice theory. It discusses the question: Which particular rules, logics, or strategies of action can be found in the realm of politics?

This book explores how the United States institutions of democracy have affected a citizen’s ability to participate in politics. The 2000 election and the ensuing decade of research demonstrated that that the institutions of elections vitally affect participation. This book examines turnout and vote choice, as well as elections as an institution, administration of elections and the intermediaries that affect a citizen’s ability to cast a vote as intended. Kropf traces the institutions of franchise from the Constitutional Convention through the 2012 election and the general themes of how institutions have changed increasing, democratization and production federal growth over time in the United States.