The authors present a method for systemically comparing alternative institutional arrangements for the development of rural infrastructure.

Institutions and Incentives in Public Policy: An Analytical Assessment of Non-Market Decision-Making explores, both in theory and in practice, the consequences of using public policy as a tool to achieve specific individual and social goals, as well as its impact on private solutions to address such goals. The chapters examine the institutional incentives that operate in non-market settings, both governmental and non-governmental, using the theoretical frameworks of market process theory and public choice theory, they analyze a diverse set of contemporary public policy issues at both the domestic and international levels. Authored by individuals from a variety of disciplines with diverse interests in public policy, this work includes discussions of topics, such as foreign aid, education policy, environmental policy, health care policy, and the construction of private cities. This volume is relevant to scholars, students, policymakers, and knowledgeable citizens interested in the study of economics, political science, public policy, as well as those interested in particular policies rather than specific disciplines.

This book, authored by public policy practitioners and researchers, tackle such pressing issues as public education, the process for approving medical devices, tax policy, and land use regulation.

Institutions and Incentives in Regulatory Science explores fundamental problems with regulatory science in the environmental and natural resource law field. Each chapter covers a variety of natural resource and regulatory areas, ranging from climate change to endangered species protection and traditional health-based environmental regulation. Regulatory laws and institutions themselves strongly influence the direction of scientific research by creating a system of rewards and penalties for science. As a consequence, regulatory laws or institutions that are designed naively end up incentivizing scientists to generate and then publish only those results that further the substantive regulatory goals preferred by the scientists. By relying so heavily on science to dictate policy, regulatory laws and institutions encourage scientists to use their assessment of the state of the science to further their own preferred scientific and regulatory policy agendas. Additionally, many environmental and natural resource regulatory agencies have been instructed by legislatures to rely heavily upon science in their rulemaking. In areas of rapidly evolving science, regulatory agencies are inevitably looking for scientific consensus prematurely, before the scientific process has worked through competing hypotheses and evidence. The contributors in this volume address how institutions for regulatory science should be designed in light of the inevitable misfit between the political or legal demand for regulatory action and the actual state of evolving scientific knowledge.

Policies targeting individual companies for economic development incentives, such as tax holidays and abatements, are generally seen as inefficient, economically costly, and distortionary. Despite this evidence, politicians still choose to use these policies to claim credit for attracting investment. Thus, while fiscal incentives are economically inefficient, they pose an effective pandering strategy for politicians. Using original surveys of voters in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as data on incentive use by politicians in the US, Vietnam and Russia, this book provides compelling evidence for the use of fiscal incentives for political gain and shows how such pandering appears to be associated with growing economic inequality. As national and subnational governments surrender valuable tax revenue to attract businesses in the vain hope of long-term economic growth, they are left with fiscal shortfalls that have been filled through regressive sales taxes, police fines and penalties, and cuts to public education.

Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets, that are greater in some countries than in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization on political incentives. They argue that the effects of these imperfections are large, but that their implications are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods, and reducing poverty.

Bartik provides a clear and concise overview of how state and local governments employ economic development incentives in order to lure companies to set up shop—and provide new jobs—in needy local labor markets. He shows that many such incentive offers are wasteful and he provides guidance, based on decades of research, on how to improve these programs.

A calculation of the social returns to innovation /Benjamin F. Jones and Lawrence H. Summers --Innovation and human capital policy /John Van Reenen --Immigration policy levers for US innovation and start-ups /Sari Pekkala Kerr and William R. Kerr --Scientific grant funding /Pierre Azoulay and Danielle Li --Tax policy for innovation /Bronwyn H. Hall --Taxation and innovation: what do we know? /Ufuk Akcigit and Stefanie Stantcheva --Government incentives for entrepreneurship /Josh Lerner.

Policies targeting individual companies for economic development incentives, such as tax holidays and abatements, are generally seen as inefficient, economically costly, and distortionary. Despite this evidence, politicians still choose to use these policies to claim credit for attracting investment. Thus, while fiscal incentives are economically inefficient, they pose an effective pandering strategy for politicians. Using original surveys of voters in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom as well as data on incentive use by politicians in the US, Vietnam and Russia, this book provides compelling evidence for the use of fiscal incentives for political gain and shows how such pandering appears to be associated with growing economic inequality. As national and subnational governments surrender valuable tax revenue to attract businesses in the vain hope of long-term economic growth, they are left with fiscal shortfalls that have been filled through regressive sales taxes, police fines and penalties, and cuts to public education.

Many tools are on offer to politicians and other policy-makers when they seek to change policy outcomes. Often they choose to concentrate on one set of tools, but fail to see the costs as well as the benefits – and may not consider the available evidence regarding their effectiveness. This innovative new textbook clearly sets out the main tools of government, and provides an analysis of their efficacy when applied to public problems. Each chapter examines the relative benefits and costs of using a key tool that is available to improve policy outcomes, drawing on a diverse literature, a large number of empirical studies and a range of contexts. Areas covered include: governments and policy outcomes law and regulation public spending and taxation bureaucracy and public management institutions information, persuasion and deliberation networks and governance. Offering a clear and comprehensive evaluation, and highlighting the set of powerful tools commonly available, this text encourages students to consider the most effective combination in order to manage key issues successfully. Including a useful glossary of key terms, this book will be of great interest to all students of public policy, administration and management.