This technical report describes the F-15 programmed depot maintenance (PDM) process as performed at the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) in FYs 2004-2006. The average WR-ALC F-15 PDM visit runs behind schedule and lasts about four months. Also, PDM can wait a long time for parts; aircraft move through PDM steps out of sequence, with missing parts catching up with the aircraft when they become available, or cannibalize other aircraft.

This technical report describes the F-15 programmed depot maintenance (PDM) process as it was performed at the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) in the FY 2004 through FY 2006 time frame. The F-15 is an all-weather, extremely maneuverable tactical fighter designed to permit the Air Force to gain and maintain superiority in aerial combat. F-15s are on a 6-year PDM cycle (i.e., they are to return for PDM within 6 years of completion of a visit). WR-ALC has a sequential process that F-15s follow when undergoing PDM. Fuselage and wing work are, however, performed in parallel. The mean WR-ALC F-15 PDM visit completed in FY 2006 lasted 119.8 days. This total was down from 130.3 days in FY 2005 but similar to FY 2003 (123.1 days) and FY 2004 (117.5 days) mean durations. In FYs 2002 and 2003, the vast majority of WR-ALC F-15s completed PDM behind schedule. This problem was reduced in recent years, largely because planned durations became more realistic (i.e., longer). In FY 2006, the median F-15 was picked up 8 days after WR-ALC completed work. Pickup lags for F-15s based overseas are expected, because they are typically flown overseas in pairs to make more efficient use of aerial tanker refueling. However, even for continental United States (CONUS) based aircraft, it was not uncommon for operators to wait a week or more to retrieve their completed F-15s. There is considerable variation in how much time aircraft spend at specific steps or cells in the F-15 PDM process. WR-ALC is concerned about part issues. The PDM line does not have a particularly high priority, so it can wait considerable periods for parts. One symptom of and adaptation to part problems is "traveling work" (i.e., having an aircraft move forward through WR-ALC's cellular flow without all the tasks prescribed in a cell being completed). When the missing part is obtained, the part catches up with the aircraft and is installed. Another symptom of and adaptation to part problems is cannibalization.

Part of a larger RAND Project Air Force study on capability-based programming, this report introduces a revealed preference methodology to estimate the value to the United States Air Force of expediting F-15 fighter jet programmed depot maintenance (PDM). Such a valuation estimate would be useful in depot-level cost-benefit analysis. The authors rely on the fact that the Air Force has chosen to pay for intermittent PDM on F-15s to assert that F-15s must have enough value after PDM visits to justify PDM costs. Air Force expenditure data suggest that a typical fiscal year 2005 PDM visit cost about $3.2 million. Using the aircraft valuation curves consistent with PDM being worthwhile, the authors find that expediting an F-15's last PDM visit by a month must be worth at least $60,000. However, using a plausible annual aircraft valuation decline rate, they find that expediting an old F-15's last PDM visit by a month would be worth around $75,000, while expediting a new F-15's first PDM visit by a month would be worth more than $180,000. This report also explores various robustness enhancements. Consideration of aging aircraft issues, for instance, tends to increase the estimated value of expedited PDM.

The first encyclopedia in the field, the International Encyclopedia of Ergonomics and Human Factors provides a comprehensive and authoritative compendium of current knowledge on ergonomics and human factors. It gives specific information on concepts and tools unique to ergonomics. About 500 entries, published in three volumes and on CD-ROM, are pre

Many of the aircraft that form the backbone of the U.S. Air Force operational fleet are 25 years old or older. A few of these will be replaced with new aircraft, but many are expected to remain in service an additional 25 years or more. This book provides a strategy to address the technical needs and priorities associated with the Air Force's aging airframe structures. It includes a detailed summary of the structural status of the aging force, identification of key technical issues, recommendations for near-term engineering and management actions, and prioritized near-term and long-term research recommendations.

The ability of the United States Air Force (USAF) to keep its aircraft operating at an acceptable operational tempo, in wartime and in peacetime, has been important to the Air Force since its inception. This is a much larger issue for the Air Force today, having effectively been at war for 20 years, with its aircraft becoming increasingly more expensive to operate and maintain and with military budgets certain to further decrease. The enormously complex Air Force weapon system sustainment enterprise is currently constrained on many sides by laws, policies, regulations and procedures, relationships, and organizational issues emanating from Congress, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Air Force itself. Against the back-drop of these stark realities, the Air Force requested the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, under the auspices of the Air Force Studies Board to conduct and in-depth assessment of current and future Air Force weapon system sustainment initiatives and recommended future courses of action for consideration by the Air Force. Examination of the U.S. Air Force's Aircraft Sustainment Needs in the Future and Its Strategy to Meet Those Needs addresses the following topics: Assess current sustainment investments, infrastructure, and processes for adequacy in sustaining aging legacy systems and their support equipment. Determine if any modifications in policy are required and, if so, identify them and make recommendations for changes in Air Force regulations, policies, and strategies to accomplish the sustainment goals of the Air Force. Determine if any modifications in technology efforts are required and, if so, identify them and make recommendations regarding the technology efforts that should be pursued because they could make positive impacts on the sustainment of the current and future systems and equipment of the Air Force. Determine if the Air Logistics Centers have the necessary resources (funding, manpower, skill sets, and technologies) and are equipped and organized to sustain legacy systems and equipment and the Air Force of tomorrow. Identify and make recommendations regarding incorporating sustainability into future aircraft designs.

Jerry Thigpen's study on the history of the Combat Talon is the first effort to tell the story of this wonderfully capable machine. This weapons system has performed virtually every imaginable tactical event in the spectrum of conflict and by any measure is the most versatile C-130 derivative ever produced. First modified and sent to Southeast Asia (SEA) in 1966 to replace theater unconventional warfare (UW) assets that were limited in both lift capability and speed the Talon I quickly adapted to theater UW tasking including infiltration and resupply and psychological warfare operations into North Vietnam. After spending four years in SEA and maturing into a highly respected UW weapons system the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) chose the Combat Talon to lead the night low-level raid on the North Vietnamese prison camp at Son Tay. Despite the outcome of the operation the Talon I cemented its reputation as the weapons system of choice for long-range clandestine operations. In the period following the Vietnam War United States Air Force (USAF) special operations gradually lost its political and financial support which was graphically demonstrated in the failed Desert One mission into Iran. Thanks to congressional supporters like Earl Hutto of Florida and Dan Daniel of Virginia funds for aircraft upgrades and military construction projects materialized to meet the ever-increasing threat to our nation. Under the leadership of such committed hard-driven officers as Brenci Uttaro Ferkes Meller and Thigpen the crew force became the most disciplined in our Air Force. It was capable of penetrating hostile airspace at night in a low-level mountainous environment covertly to execute any number of unconventional warfare missions.

The Air Force has several options for sustaining weapon systems and components but has, in recent years, increasingly chosen contractor logistics support (CLS) over organic support. Still, questions remain about costs and efficiency, even about whether CLS is the best option. The authors explored these by reviewing the relevant government and DoD documents and data and by speaking with various knowledgeable individuals. The authors noted that CLS contracts have often gone to original equipment manufacturers because, lacking the technical data, the Air Force could not choose a third party. They also noted that contracts that guarantee large annual sums limit the Air Force's ability to adjust when its own funding changes and that the reasons underpinning these decisions are not always complete or consistent across the service. Centralizing and standardizing data and the related management skills would help make them available across the Air Force. More important, to retain all its choices for logistics services throughout a system's life cycle, the Air Force should acquire the technical data or data rights near the start of the acquisition process.