The authors analyze the impact of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and SEC regulations regarding selective disclosure and insider trading.

This study investigates the profitability of insider trading around the times when investment bankers appoint their representatives to the board of directors. If Chinese Walls at security firms are somewhat porous, then the presence of investment bankers on the boards is expected to increase the information efficiency of the clients' stocks and reduce the profitability of insider trading. Consistent with expectations, arrival of investment bankers on the boards of directors eliminates the profitability of insider trading, and reduces both the bid-ask spreads and volatility. These effects are temporary and they are reversed when the representatives depart. The finding that Chinese Walls are porous has a number of important economic, legal, and regulatory implications.

Here, at last, is a clear, practical guide on what's legal and what isn't in insider trading. It's the only book that gives you everything you need to: Identify every potential source of insider trading liability -- Deter inadvertent violations with an effective compliance program -- Raise powerful defenses to government and private actions, formations, and transactions. With comprehensive, up-to-date coverage and analysis of such significant aspects as government enforcement, which private plaintiffs can sue, and transnational transactions, you'll find more information -- and more readily usable strategy -- than in any other source on the subject. In one convenient volume, Insider Trading shows you all the ways to avoid liability exposure under all applicable law, including: The Supreme Court case, United States v. O'Hagan -- Federal mail and wire fraud statutes -- Section 10(b) and Section 16(b) -- Bilateral treaties and SEC memoranda with 21 foreign jurisdictions -- Transnational transactions -- State law pitfalls.

A thorough analysis of insider trading requires the integration of law and finance, and this book presents a theoretical and empirical examination of insider trading by incorporating a synthesis of securities law with that of financial theory. The book begins with a conceptual framework that explores the theoretical roles of markets, firms and publicly held corporations, including a discussion of corporate governance to determine both who may have access to nonpublic information, and their legal rights and responsibilities. The book then examines different aspects of the securities laws, including the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and a critique of the SEC disclosure rules and their ramifications for market efficiency. This is followed by a detailed chronology of insider trading regulations enacted in the U.S. since 1934 and an overview of the existing empirical literature on insider trading. Empirical evidence is presented on insider trading activities and the merit of anti-insider trading laws is evaluated on theoretical arguments and recent empirical developments. The authors conclude by arguing that insider trading laws and enforcement activities have failed and propose the decriminalization of insider trading.

This Article examines the emergence of modern regulation of information flows in securities markets in the form of restrictions on insider trading and Chinese Walls within financial intermediaries during the 1960s and early 1970s. It is argued that these regulatory developments can be traced to the demise of the fixed brokerage commissions regime on the New York Stock Exchange and other national securities exchanges and the corresponding use of inside information by brokers as a means of competing for brokerage revenues. In fact, the overall enforcement program of the SEC, which led to insider trading regulation and the creation of Chinese Walls, was strongly influenced by the existence of the fixed brokerage commissions regime and the related concern about the representation of financial institutions on corporate boards. This Article also examines the evolution of the fixed brokerage commissions regimes in the United Kingdom and Japan and argues that such price controls strongly influenced insider trading practices and the emergence of the regulation of information flows in these countries.