The direction and clarity of the author's argument is commendably clear. Thus it is clear at the outset that he is mainly concerned with pre-contractual information duties as they affect consumers, and thus standard form contracts-although, he argues, individualised information duties, will have a significantly more important part to play in the future, and he gives some consideration to these.

The direction and clarity of the author's argument is commendably clear. Thus it is clear at the outset that he is mainly concerned with pre-contractual information duties as they affect consumers, and thus standard form contracts¢although, he argu

A large literature has analyzed pricing inefficiencies in health insurance markets due to adverse selection, typically assuming informed, active consumers on the demand side of the market. However, recent evidence suggests that many consumers have information frictions that lead to suboptimal health plan choices. As a result, policies such as information provision, plan recommendations, and smart defaults to improve consumer choices are being implemented in many applied contexts. In this paper we develop a general framework to study insurance market equilibrium and evaluate policy interventions in the presence of choice frictions. Friction-reducing policies can increase welfare by facilitating better matches between consumers and plans, but can decrease welfare by increasing the correlation between willingness-to-pay and costs, exacerbating adverse selection. We identify relationships between the underlying distributions of consumer (i) costs (ii) surplus from risk protection and (iii) choice frictions that determine whether friction-reducing policies will be on net welfare increasing or reducing. We extend the analysis to study how policies to improve consumer choices interact with the supply-side policy of risk-adjustment transfers and show that the effectiveness of the latter policy can have important implications for the effectiveness of the former. We implement the model empirically using proprietary data on insurance choices, utilization, and consumer information from a large firm. We leverage structural estimates from prior work with these data and highlight how the model's micro-foundations can be estimated in practice. In our specific setting, we find that friction-reducing policies exacerbate adverse selection, essentially leading to the market fully unraveling, and reduce welfare. Risk-adjustment transfers are complementary, substantially mitigating the negative impact of friction-reducing policies, but having little effect in their absence.

Medicare beneficiaries are rapidly moving into managed care, as attempts to restrain the growth of this costly entitlement program progress. However, advocates for patients question whether the necessary information and structures are in place to enable Medicare consumers to select wisely among private-sector managed care options. Improving the Medicare Market examines how to give Medicare beneficiaries the same choice of health plan options enjoyed in the private sectorâ€"yet protect them as consumers and patients. This book recommends approaches to ensuring accountability and informed purchasing for Medicare beneficiaries in an environment of broader choice and managed careâ€"how the government should evaluate and approve plans, what role the traditional Medicare program should play, how to help to elderly understand their options, and many other practical matters. The committee discusses the information requirements of Medicare beneficiaries and explores in detail how best to respond to their special needs. And it examines the procedures that should be developed to provide the necessary protections for the elderly in a managed care system.

On March 4 and 5, 1998, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on Choice and Managed Care held a 2-day workshop entitled Developing the Information Infrastructure for Medicare Beneficiaries. This workshop was a follow-up to the IOM report entitled Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. The workshop focused on the Medicare provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which mandate that the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) develop a "nationally coordinated education and publicity campaign" in 1998 and move Medicare beneficiaries to an open-season enrollment process by the year 2002.

Are you paying too much for health care or do you not understand all your options?The price of health care and health insurance is increasing faster than the general economy and wages, putting many people in a bind. This straightforward, non-partisan book examines various healthcare options and their pros and cons in light of continually rising costs, helping consumers to make informed choices on health insurance and ways to save money (with and without insurance). This book contains useful information and money-saving tips that everyone should know in order to understand their options and make their health care more affordable.

Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

The United States is unique among economically advanced nations in its reliance on employers to provide health benefits voluntarily for workers and their families. Although it is well known that this system fails to reach millions of these individuals as well as others who have no connection to the work place, the system has other weaknesses. It also has many advantages. Because most proposals for health care reform assume some continued role for employers, this book makes an important contribution by describing the strength and limitations of the current system of employment-based health benefits. It provides the data and analysis needed to understand the historical, social, and economic dynamics that have shaped present-day arrangements and outlines what might be done to overcome some of the access, value, and equity problems associated with current employer, insurer, and government policies and practices. Health insurance terminology is often perplexing, and this volume defines essential concepts clearly and carefully. Using an array of primary sources, it provides a store of information on who is covered for what services at what costs, on how programs vary by employer size and industry, and on what governments doâ€"and do not doâ€"to oversee employment-based health programs. A case study adapted from real organizations' experiences illustrates some of the practical challenges in designing, managing, and revising benefit programs. The sometimes unintended and unwanted consequences of employer practices for workers and health care providers are explored. Understanding the concepts of risk, biased risk selection, and risk segmentation is fundamental to sound health care reform. This volume thoroughly examines these key concepts and how they complicate efforts to achieve efficiency and equity in health coverage and health care. With health care reform at the forefront of public attention, this volume will be important to policymakers and regulators, employee benefit managers and other executives, trade associations, and decisionmakers in the health insurance industry, as well as analysts, researchers, and students of health policy.