The first textbook to present a comprehensive and detailed economic analysis of electricity markets, analyzing the tensions between microeconomics and political economy. The power industry is essential in our fight against climate change. This book is the first to examine in detail the microeconomics underlying power markets, stemming from peak-load pricing, by which prices are low when the installed generation capacity exceeds demand but can rise a hundred times higher when demand is equal to installed capacity. The outcome of peak-load pricing is often difficult to accept politically, and the book explores the tensions between microeconomics and political economy. Understanding peak-load pricing and its implications is essential for designing robust policies and making sound investment decisions. Thomas-Olivier Léautier presents the model in its simplest form, and introduces additional features as different issues are presented. The book covers all segments of electricity markets: electricity generation, under perfect and imperfect competition; retail competition and demand response; transmission pricing, transmission congestion management, and transmission constraints; and the current policy issues arising from the entry of renewables into the market and capacity mechanisms. Combining anecdotes and analysis of real situations with rigorous analytical modeling, each chapter analyzes one specific issue, first presenting findings in nontechnical terms accessible to policy practitioners and graduate students in management or public policy and then presenting a more mathematical analytical exposition for students and researchers specializing in the economics of electricity markets and for those who want to understand and apply the underlying models.

This book presents International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium commissioned papers. The papers systematically explore the conceptual and empirical dimensions of the new trade theory and try to determine the potential application to agricultural trade and trade policy analysis.

Innovation is the turning of ideas into concrete realities. To the extent that this process is an economic one, it must also be subject to political decisions, and these determine which ideas are to have resources made available for their in novation. This book attempts to trace the relationship between ideas, resources and politics. Chapter I deals with the way economic innovation depends both upon markets and upon interference with markets. Schumpeter taught us how market power is essential for innovation. This chapter stresses that the inverse is also true: Innovation can take place wherever there is market power. A most important corollary of this, is that failure to develop any particular type of market power, need not prevent innovation from happening. It will then take place under the protection of whatever market power there is, and it will be geographically located wherever that market power is effective. Chapter II identifies and seeks to fill a major gap in the literature on innova tion, by showing how important modern marketing has become for providing the conditions under which money may be rationally invested at high risk to get new things done. Marketing monopoly, or Persuasive market power, is now at least as important as the market power of Capability, or as the several types of Specific market power, in interference with market forces. It is therefore equally important for innovation.

First published in 1998. This work contributes to the discussion of Knight by showing that uncertainty broadens the conception of economic welfare, and that a new cost analysis holds the key to unlocking the Knightian corpus. It develops Knight's suggestion that uncertainty-control costs can be reduced - arguing that the large firm enjoys economic rent from utilizing its dominant vantage point in the market. The author demonstrates that while Knight provides the intellectual stimulus which propelled Chamberlin's thesis of monopolistic competition, Chamberlin uses a very abstract form of uncertainty in his analysis.

The history of policymaking has been dominated by two rival assumptions about markets. Those who have advocated Keynesian-type policies have generally based their arguments on the claim that markets are imperfectly competitive. On the other hand laissez faire advocates have argued the opposite by claiming that in fact free market policies will eliminate "market imperfections" and reinvigorate perfect competition. The goal of this book is to enter into this important debate by raising critical questions about the nature of market competition. Drawing on the insights of the classical political economists, Schumpeter, Hayek, the Oxford Economists’ Research Group (OERG) and others, the authors in this book challenge this perfect versus imperfect competition dichotomy in both theoretical and empirical terms. There are important differences between the theoretical perspectives of several authors in the broad alternative theoretical tradition defined by this book; nevertheless, a unifying theme throughout this volume is that competition is conceptualized as a dynamic disequilibrium process rather than the static equilibrium state of conventional theory. For almost all the others the growth of firm is consistent with a heightened degree of competitiveness, as both Marx and Schumpeter emphasized, and not a lowered one as in the conventional 'monopoly capital' view.

The need for careful research on trade policy is particularly acute, and this volume empirically addresses these and many other important issues. The contributors offer studies which integrate the institutional details of current trade policy with creative economic analyses. Marked by a shift from a traditional reliance on simulation models, these papers take their inspiration from recent changes in the assumptions traditionally underlying research in international trade theory. No longer are government policies viewed as being somehow "given" to the researcher; in part 1, "Analyses with a Political Economy Perspective," four papers treat such policies as endogenous and explicable in terms of political economy. Neither are product and factor markets seen as perfectly competitive; instead, the three papers in part 2, "Trade Policy Effects under Imperfectly Competitive Market Conditions," assume that firms consider the actions of other companies when formulating their decisions. In part 3, "A New Measure of Trade Restrictiveness and Estimates of Trade Policy Effects with CGE Models," the first essay explores the quantitative restrictions on cheese to develop and implement a new model of restrictive trade. Two final contributions address problems for which simulation modeling is especially useful. The first considers the effectiveness of an import surcharge in reducing the U.S. trade deficit and the second treats the welfare effects of liberalization in South Korea where increasing returns to scale are significant These innovative studies focus on economic behavior that will provide valuable insights for policymakers, academic economists, and students.