Det 10. symposium i en serie af Internationale Puggwash Symposier er organiseret af udvalget for Puggwash konferencerne for "Science and World Affairs". Bogen indeholder de enkelte oplæg samt de efterfølgende diskussioner, med hovedvægt på den teknologiske udvikling indenfor våbenproduktion, især i forhold til antiballistiske missilforsvar.

Evangelista provides a new framework for analyzing U.S. and Soviet innovations in weapons technology. In America, development is generated from the bottom up with scientists providing the initial impetus. Soviet weapons innovation occurs from the top down, as soviet leaders react to external forces, particularly American initiatives. With current weapons programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, the author sees opportunities for arms control. The United States must recognize that technological innovation is no guarantee of security. The Soviet Union must decide not to match American innovation. ISBN 0-8014-2165-9: $32.95.

A leading international security strategist offers a compelling new way to "think about the unthinkable." The cold war ended more than two decades ago, and with its end came a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons—a luxury that we can no longer indulge. It's not just the threat of Iran getting the bomb or North Korea doing something rash; the whole complexion of global power politics is changing because of the reemergence of nuclear weapons as a vital element of statecraft and power politics. In short, we have entered the second nuclear age. In this provocative and agenda-setting book, Paul Bracken of Yale University argues that we need to pay renewed attention to nuclear weapons and how their presence will transform the way crises develop and escalate. He draws on his years of experience analyzing defense strategy to make the case that the United States needs to start thinking seriously about these issues once again, especially as new countries acquire nuclear capabilities. He walks us through war-game scenarios that are all too realistic, to show how nuclear weapons are changing the calculus of power politics, and he offers an incisive tour of the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia to underscore how the United States must not allow itself to be unprepared for managing such crises. Frank in its tone and farsighted in its analysis, The Second Nuclear Age is the essential guide to the new rules of international politics.

The war instinct is part of human nature, but the means to fight war depend on technology. Alex Roland traces the co-evolution of technology and warfare from the Stone Age to the age of cyberwar, describing the inventions that changed the direction of warfare throughout history: from fortified walls, the chariot, battleships, and the gunpowder revolution to bombers, rockets, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and nuclear weapons. In the twenty-first century, new technologies continue to push warfare in unexpected directions, while warfare stimulates stunning new technological advances. Yet even now, the newest and best technology cannot guarantee victory. Brimming with dramatic narratives of battles and deep insights into military psychology, this book shows that although military technologies keep changing at great speed, the principles and patterns behind them abide.

This timely sourcebook presents the essential technical, political, legal, and historical background needed for informed judgments about the recent expansion of military interest in the life sciences particularly in the weapons potential of the new biotechnology. Beyond providing a history and analysis of trends in these areas, "Preventing a Biological Arms Race also develops the case for strengthening national and international commitments to biological disarmament and proposes courses of action to achieve this goal. "In theory, " Susan Wright observes, "the menace of biological warfare should no longer be with us." Developing, producing, and stockpiling biological weapons are unconditionally banned by international treaty. EastWest military rivalry and confrontations in the Middle East have eroded confidence in the treaty regime, however. The advent of genetic engineering and other new biotechnologies has revived military interest in biological weaponry, generating concern about the potential weapons applications of biological research. The 15 contributions by experts from a wide range of disciplines include a history of U.S. biological warfare policy, analysis of the ethical issues posed by defensive biological warfare research, case studies of alleged violations of the international legal regime prohibiting biological weapons, reviews of that regime, and proposals for strengthening the barriers to biological warfare. A series of 14 appendices collect important data and documents related to biological weapons. Susan Wright is a historian of science at the Residential College of the University of Michigan where she directs the Science and Society Program. This book was prepared underthe sponsorship of the Council for Responsible Genetics.

This report published by ISPI and the Brookings Institution analyzes the challenges to international order posed by the ongoing race for technological superiority. From artificial intelligence and quantum computing to hypersonic weapons and new forms of cyber and electronic warfare, advances in technology have threatened to make the international security environment more unpredictable and volatile – yet the international community remains unprepared to assess and manage that risk. What is needed is a mature understanding of how technology has emerged as a key enabler of sovereignty in the XXI century, how the ongoing race for technological supremacy is disrupting the balance of power globally, and what the attendant strategic and security implications of those transformations will be. This report is an effort to that end.

With most of the world's advanced economies now stuck in recession; Western support for defense cuts and nuclear disarmament increasing; and a major emerging Asian power at odds with its neighbors and the United States; it is tempting to think our times are about to rhyme with a decade of similar woes—the disorderly 1930s.Might we again be drifting toward some new form of mortal national combat? Or, will our future more likely ape the near-half-century that defined the Cold War—a period in which tensions between competing states ebbed and flowed but peace mostly prevailed by dint of nuclear mutual fear and loathing?The short answer is, nobody knows. This much, however, is clear: The strategic military competitions of the next 2 decades will be unlike any the world has yet seen. Assuming U.S., Chinese, Russian, Israeli, Indian, French, British, and Pakistani strategic forces continue to be modernized and America and Russia continue to reduce their strategic nuclear deployments, the next arms race will be run by a much larger number of contestants—with highly destructive strategic capabilities far more closely matched and capable of being quickly enlarged than in any other previous period in history.

This volume contains the proceedings of the International Conference on Technology, Arms Race and Disarmament which took place at Castiglioncello, Italy, in September 1987. The papers examine strategic defence policies, nuclear weapons proliferation and arms control among many other topics.

Originally published in 1983, this book presents both the technical and political information necessary to evaluate the emerging threat to world security posed by recent advances in uranium enrichment technology. Uranium enrichment has played a relatively quiet but important role in the history of efforts by a number of nations to acquire nuclear weapons and by a number of others to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For many years the uranium enrichment industry was dominated by a single method, gaseous diffusion, which was technically complex, extremely capital-intensive, and highly inefficient in its use of energy. As long as this remained true, only the richest and most technically advanced nations could afford to pursue the enrichment route to weapon acquisition. But during the 1970s this situation changed dramatically. Several new and far more accessible enrichment techniques were developed, stimulated largely by the anticipation of a rapidly growing demand for enrichment services by the world-wide nuclear power industry. This proliferation of new techniques, coupled with the subsequent contraction of the commercial market for enriched uranium, has created a situation in which uranium enrichment technology might well become the most important contributor to further nuclear weapon proliferation. Some of the issues addressed in this book are: A technical analysis of the most important enrichment techniques in a form that is relevant to analysis of proliferation risks; A detailed projection of the world demand for uranium enrichment services; A summary and critique of present institutional non-proliferation arrangements in the world enrichment industry, and An identification of the states most likely to pursue the enrichment route to acquisition of nuclear weapons.