We document that the past three ?jobless? recoveries also featured asymmetries in labor force participation and labor compensation, with each falling to new lows during each cycle. We model these asymmetries as resulting from a strategic complementarity in firms' wage setting and workers' job search strategies. Strategic complementarity results in a continuum of possible equilibria with higher-wage equilibria welfare dominating lower-wage equilibria. Assuming that no economic agent deviates from an existing strategy unless deviation is a unilateral best response, the model exhibits (1) periods of endogenous rigidity in wages and participation, (2) persistent changes in wages, participation, and output in response to transitory movements in labor productivity, (3) sluggish recoveries including both a ?jobless " phase, in which productivity recovers while unemployment remains elevated, and a ?wageless " phase, in which employment recovers but wages remain depressed Calibrating the model suggests that the U.S. unemployment rate may need to fall to around 3 percent before labor compensation recovers to pre-Financial Crisis levels.

We document that the past three "jobless" recoveries also featured asymmetries in labor force participation and labor compensation, with each falling to new lows during each cycle. We model these asymmetries as resulting from a strategic complementarity in firms' wage setting and workers' job search strategies. Strategic complementarity results in a continuum of possible equilibria with higher-wage equilibria welfare dominating lower-wage equilibria. Assuming that no economic agent deviates from an existing strategy unless deviation is a unilateral best response, the model exhibits (1) periods of endogenous rigidity in wages and participation, (2) persistent changes in wages, participation, and output in response to transitory movements in labor productivity, (3) sluggish recoveries including both a "jobless" phase, in which productivity recovers while unemployment remains elevated, and a "wageless" phase, in which employment recovers but wages remain depressed. Calibrating the model suggests that the U.S. unemployment rate may need to fall to as low as 2.8 percent before labor compensation recovers to pre-Financial Crisis levels.

Traditionally, economic growth and business cycles have been treated independently. However, the dependence of GDP levels on its history of shocks, what economists refer to as “hysteresis,” argues for unifying the analysis of growth and cycles. In this paper, we review the recent empirical and theoretical literature that motivate this paradigm shift. The renewed interest in hysteresis has been sparked by the persistence of the Global Financial Crisis and fears of a slow recovery from the Covid-19 crisis. The findings of the recent literature have far-reaching conceptual and policy implications. In recessions, monetary and fiscal policies need to be more active to avoid the permanent scars of a downturn. And in good times, running a high-pressure economy could have permanent positive effects.

Much of today's conventional macroeconomic theory presumes that markets for goods approach the state of perfect competition. Monopolistic Competition and Macroeconomic Theory assumes that markets are imperfect, so that sellers have some power over price, and must therefore form quantity expectations about the location of the firm's demand curve. The question is then about the macroeconomic implications of imperfect competition in goods markets. The first chapter is a brief survey of ideas proposed in economics including multiple equilibria. The second chapter describes a particular micro-based macro model that allows several families of equilibria. The third chapter shows how a standard locational model can be used to describe a sample macroeconomy when firms have close rivals. In this volume derived from his Federico Caffe Lecture, Nobel Laureate Robert Solow shows that there are simple and tractable micro-based models that offer the possibility of a richer and more intuitive macroeconomics.

Most trade is invoiced in very few currencies. Despite this, the Mundell-Fleming benchmark and its variants focus on pricing in the producer’s currency or in local currency. We model instead a ‘dominant currency paradigm’ for small open economies characterized by three features: pricing in a dominant currency; pricing complementarities, and imported input use in production. Under this paradigm: (a) the terms-of-trade is stable; (b) dominant currency exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices is high regardless of destination or origin of goods; (c) exchange rate pass-through of non-dominant currencies is small; (d) expenditure switching occurs mostly via imports, driven by the dollar exchange rate while exports respond weakly, if at all; (e) strengthening of the dominant currency relative to non-dominant ones can negatively impact global trade; (f) optimal monetary policy targets deviations from the law of one price arising from dominant currency fluctuations, in addition to the inflation and output gap. Using data from Colombia we document strong support for the dominant currency paradigm.

The initial purposes of this book were to update and extend the discussion and the results presented ill our previous book, The Labor Market and Business Cycle Theories. Our 1990 article, which appeared in The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, represented a first step in this direction. The consequences of this effort have materialized in a number of new chapters that has led de facto to a new book, in which the surviving parts have been largely revised. The 1989 book was too mathematically oriented for many Keynesians and post Keynesians to be fully appreciated and insufficiently microfounded for both new classicals and new-Keynesians to be warmly accepted, yet we received positive and encouraging comments, and it was sold out very quickly. It was an attempt to dis cuss dynamics in Keynesian terms, based on a double assumption that maintains its validity-that both economic facts and analytical and methodological innova tions had contributed to a renewed interest in business cycles, which over time has had its "ups and downs." Since then, many more articles and books have appeared, stressing in particular the role of microfoundations and of nonlinearities in shaping business cycle theory.

We explore two issues triggered by the crisis. First, in most advanced countries, output remains far below the pre-recession trend, suggesting hysteresis. Second, while inflation has decreased, it has decreased less than anticipated, suggesting a breakdown of the relation between inflation and activity. To examine the first, we look at 122 recessions over the past 50 years in 23 countries. We find that a high proportion of them have been followed by lower output or even lower growth. To examine the second, we estimate a Phillips curve relation over the past 50 years for 20 countries. We find that the effect of unemployment on inflation, for given expected inflation, decreased until the early 1990s, but has remained roughly stable since then. We draw implications of our findings for monetary policy.

Over the last decade, the developed world has been hit by the deepest recession since the Great Depression and a rollercoaster in commodity prices. And yet, core inflation has been both low and fairly stable. A rule of thumb that inflation is always near 2%, though more often than not just a bit below, has been quite reliable. The young, or those with short memories, could be forgiven for looking condescendingly at their older friends who speak of inflation as a major economic problem. But, like Galileo Galilei told his contemporaries who thought the Earth was immovable, "Eppur si muove" ("and yet it moves"). Since most societies regard stable inflation as a goal, it is tempting to describe this solid anchoring of inflation as a great achievement of monetary policy. But what if it was just luck? Will the great anchoring soon lead a great bout of inflation, just as the Great Moderation was followed by the Great Recession? Do we need to change the way in which policy is set to better handle changed circumstances since the financial crash? The 19th Geneva Report on the World Economy starts by analysing outcomes across countries for the last ten years. Inflation is compared with its behaviour in the period before the financial crash to assess the extent to which it really has been stable, what the proximate causes are, and whether it will stay low in future. The report then assesses theories of inflation in light of these facts, and tries to make sense of them. Next, the report turns to the question we posed at the start: was it good policy or good luck that prevented severe deflation and kept inflation relatively steady? A description of what policies were adopted and how they interacted with economic shocks informs the conclusions on appropriate policies--both monetary and fiscal--for the future. The report pays particular attention tothe role of central banks and the extent of their activities.