The Hyperwar era is upon us. The fusion of distributed artificial intelligence with highly autonomous military systems ushers in a type of lightning-quick conflict that has never been seen before. Yet this is more than a revolution in military affairs, it is a revolution in human affairs that will transform the 21st century defense and security environment. Advances in AI will fundamentally change the human condition, and with it, a profoundly human undertaking, war. In Hyperwar: Conflict and Competition in the AI Century, leading experts in artificial intelligence explore the operational, technological, ethical, and professional military dimensions of this new era in which US dominance is no longer assured.

The effects of the online revolution are being felt far beyond Silicon Valley, and now all businesses -- from start-ups to established companies -- face "survival of the fittest." A company or product can be an industry leader one moment and obsolete six months later. Entire industries, ranging from computer sales to stock trading, are being thrown into chaos as consumers and businesses shift buying patterns to take advantage of the convenience and cost savings that are available over the Web. For companies, this pressing need to continually create new, different, better products to stay one step ahead of the competition defines the new reality of business today, the world of "HyperWars." To stay afloat, business managers need practical guidance, and they need it fast. Drawing on extensive research and his pioneering experience in e-commerce, industry innovator Bruce Judson outlines eleven practical strategies for thriving in this hypercompetitive environment. Including "Use the Internet as the World's Most Sophisticated Telephone" and "The Magic in 'Free,'" these visionary strategies are illustrated with hundreds of examples of Internet initiatives real companies -- from pool suppliers to major businesses like Cisco and Chrysler -- are implementing today. Not just for companies selling products over the Web, HyperWars explains how the Internet can and must be incorporated into all of a business's operations, to do everything from cutting procurement, marketing, and communication costs to deepening customer relationships. Both a wide-ranging analysis of the massive changes the Web is bringing to all industries and a crucial, groundbreaking redefinition of business strategies, HyperWars provides readers with the essential tools they need to survive and profit in the new competitive era.

Pre-war and contemporary resources are available through this site. Emphasis on the service, policy statements, reports, speeches, treaties, and declarations of the armed forces of the United States and its soldiers. Also includes a bibliography.

Future War and the Defence of Europe offers a major new analysis of how peace and security can be maintained in Europe: a continent that has suffered two cataclysmic conflicts since 1914. Taking as its starting point the COVID-19 pandemic and way it will inevitably accelerate some key global dynamics already in play, the book goes on to weave history, strategy, policy, and technology into a compelling analytical narrative. It lays out in forensic detail the scale of the challenge Europeans and their allies face if Europe's peace is to be upheld in a transformative century. The book upends foundational assumptions about how Europe's defence is organised, the role of a fast-changing transatlantic relationship, NATO, the EU, and their constituent nation-states. At the heart of the book is a radical vision of a technology-enabling future European defence, built around a new kind of Atlantic Alliance, an innovative strategic public-private partnership, and the future hyper-electronic European force, E-Force, it must spawn. Europeans should be under no illusion: unless they do far more for their own defence, and very differently, all that they now take for granted could be lost in the maze of hybrid war, cyber war, and hyper war they must face.

Presenting a global history of aerial bombardment, this book shows how certain European powers initiated aerial bombardment of civilians after World War I, and how it was an instrument of choice in World War II. Beau Grosscup shows that such methods, used initially as a means of terrorizing native populations in Africa and the Middle East, have become the primary form of terrorism in more recent decades. While such 'strategic terror' is not classed as 'terrorism' in the West, this reflects an unwillingness to confront the human costs and immorality of aerial bombardment. Grosscup argues that if terrorism is to be diminished, the role of aerial bombing in sustaining global violence must be recognized.

 During the first 10 months of the war in the Pacific, Japan achieved air supremacy with its carrier and land-based forces. But after major setbacks at Midway and Guadalcanal, the empire's expansion stalled, in part due to flaws in aircraft design, strategy and command. This book offers a fresh analysis of the air war in the Pacific during the early phases of World War II. Details are included from two expeditions conducted by the author that reveal the location of an American pilot missing in the Philippines since 1942 and clear up a controversial account involving famed Japanese ace Saburo Sakai and U.S. Navy pilot James "Pug" Southerland.

How did American fighter pilots respond to the challenges posed by increasing automation? Spurred by their commanders during the Korean War to be “tigers,” aggressive and tenacious American fighter pilots charged headlong into packs of fireball-spewing enemy MiGs, relying on their keen eyesight, piloting finesse, and steady trigger fingers to achieve victory. But by the 1980s, American fighter pilots vanquished their foes by focusing on a four-inch-square cockpit display, manipulating electromagnetic waves, and launching rocket-propelled guided missiles from miles away. In this new era of automated, long-range air combat, can fighter pilots still be considered tigers? Aimed at scholars of technology and airpower aficionados alike, Steven A. Fino’s Tiger Check offers a detailed study of air-to-air combat focusing on three of the US Air Force’s most famed aircraft: the F-86E Sabre, the F-4C Phantom II, and the F-15A Eagle. Fino argues that increasing fire control automation altered what fighter pilots actually did during air-to-air combat. Drawing on an array of sources, as well as his own decade of experience as an F-15C fighter pilot, Fino unpacks not just the technological black box of fighter fire control equipment, but also fighter pilots’ attitudes toward their profession and their evolving aircraft. He describes how pilots grappled with the new technologies, acutely aware that the very systems that promised to simplify their jobs while increasing their lethality in the air also threatened to rob them of the quintessential—albeit mythic—fighter pilot experience. Finally, Fino explains that these new systems often required new, unique skills that took time for the pilots to identify and then develop. Eschewing the typical “great machine” or “great pilot” perspectives that dominate aviation historiography, Tiger Check provides a richer perspective on humans and machines working and evolving together in the air. The book illuminates the complex interactions between human and machine that accompany advancing automation in the workplace.

Nearly 900 African Americans fought in the Battle of Iwo Jima, but accounts of their service have gone largely unrecorded. This book seeks to correct that omission for the sake of the brave Americans who served and for the sake of a more inclusive American history. Eleven veterans contribute their memories and experiences, starting with their youth in the Depression, their enlistment, the battle itself, and their experience of returning to a nation that continued to treat them as second-class citizens. Appendices include a history of the Montford Point Marines, a history of the Army's 476th Amphibian Truck Company, a chronology of the Battle of Iwo Jima and a task organization chart for the participating U.S. forces.

Operation KE explores the air combat that attended the Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal in early 1943 —a topic which has hitherto received very little attention. Operation KE was successful largely because Japanese strategic planning and tactical execution was basically sound. The traditional view holds that the Japanese got away with the initiative largely because the Americans let them; the US Pacific high command felt it was not worth the effort to try and stop them. Letourneau contends that this was not entirely the case. He argues that the Cactus Air Force and Guadalcanal-based naval units did their best to disrupt the evacuation, still believing that the Tokyo Express was bringing reinforcements and supplies to the 17th Army. Other US forces in the South Pacific did make a half-hearted and questionably-executed attempt to stop the Japanese, but were bluffed into adopting a ""wait-and-see"" posture. Operation KE focuses on the air war fought between the Cactus and US 13th Air Forces on the one hand and the Japanese Navy and Army Air Forces on the other, from mid-December, 1942 to mid-February, 1943. The book scrutinizes the US air strikes against the six KE-related Tokyo Express destroyer runs, plus related air strikes against the Japanese merchant marine, as well as air and naval base-suppression missions undertaken by both sides, to determine what actually happened in order to analyze why the Japanese evacuation succeeded and why Cactus failed to stop it. Background chapters attempt to assess the respective states of readiness of the Japanese and US air arms in the South Pacific to support on the one hand and counter on the other the execution of Operation KE. The central portion of the book narrates in some detail what actually occurred in the air and at sea -—including air strikes, fighter sweeps, base suppression missions, and naval sorties -—during the crucial prelude to and the actual playing out of the interrelated events that comprised the evacuation operation. Concluding chapters analyze, on both strategic and tactical levels, the Japanese planning and execution of Operation KE, and Cactus' initiatives to interdict KE's successful prosecution. The authors conclude that both the Japanese and the American states of readiness on the eve of Operation KE suffered in such matters as optimizing both resources and operating procedures, and combating a hostile environment. Consequently, both combatants were somewhat handicapped in their abilities respectively to carry out and contest Operation KE. The author contends that the Japanese developed a reasonably sound strategy that exploited those methods and tools of war then in use in the South Pacific; to achieve success, they maximized their own strengths while taking advantage of their adversary's limitations. Contrary to the traditional view, the authors are of the opinion that Japanese utilization of their newly-built airstrip at Munda in the Central Solomons played an important role in the success of Operation KE, which was in keeping with the long-range intention of developing Munda and Vila airstrips as major forward airbases to defend against any Allied push toward Rabaul through the Solomons. The U.S., on the other hand, by consistently misreading Japanese intent regarding Operation KE and pursuing a cautious offensive strategy, blunted the tactical impact of their initiatives to counter the evacuation. Several imprudent tactical decisions and a misallocation of resources further diluted the strength of US efforts."