Examines the development of Hume's ideas and their relation to eighteenth-century theories of the imagination and passions.

In his autobiography, David Hume famously noted that A Treatise of Human Nature “fell dead-born from the press.” Yet it is now widely regarded as one of the greatest philosophical works written in the English language. Within, Hume offers an empirically informed account of human nature, addressing a range of topics such as space, time, causality, the external world, personal identity, passions, freedom, necessity, virtue, and vice. This edition includes not only the full text of the Treatise but also Hume’s summarizing Abstract, as well as selections drawn from critical book reviews which showcase the work’s reception in Hume’s own time. Angela Coventry’s expert introduction and annotations serve to contextualize the book’s themes and arguments for modern readers.

This work, first published in 1985, offers a general interpretation of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. Most Hume scholarship has either neglected or downplayed an important aspect of Hume’s position – his scepticism. This book puts that right, examining in close detail the sceptical arguments in Hume’s philosophy.

Reproduction of the original: A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume

This Guide provides students with the scholarly andinterpretive tools they need to understand Hume’s ATreatise of Human Nature and its influence on modernphilosophy. A student guide to Hume’s A Treatise of HumanNature. Focuses on recent developments in Hume scholarship. Covers topics such as the formulation, reception and scope ofthe Treatise, imagination and memory, the passions, moralsentiments, and the role of sympathy. All the chapters are newly written by Hume scholars. Each chapter guides the reader through a portion of theTreatise, explaining the central arguments and keycontemporary interpretations of those arguments.

It is widely held that Hume's Treatise has little or nothing to do with problems of religion. Contrary to this view, Paul Russell argues that it is irreligious aims and objectives that are fundamental to the Treatise and account for its underlying unity and coherence