"This book argues that Hume is a radical epistemic skeptic who gives only practical reasons for retaining belief in sensory beliefs and the deliverances of reason. He advises us to take a moderate approach to the demands of philosophy, since they sometimes diverge from the demands of life"--

Hume and the Demands of Philosophy: Science, Skepticism, and Moderation offers a comprehensive interpretation of the relationship between Hume’s scientific project and his skepticism. Nathan I. Sasser argues that Hume is a radical epistemic skeptic who has purely practical reasons for retaining the beliefs that are essential for ordinary life and scientific research. On Sasser’s reading, the key to Hume’s epistemology is his conception of philosophy as a normative method of inquiry governing the special sciences. Philosophy approves of the mental faculties that produce reasoning and sensory beliefs. But sensory beliefs and the products of reason themselves face insuperable rational defeater arguments, and because they do, philosophy demands that we suspend these beliefs. Hume’s solution to this skeptical dilemma is to point out the fatal practical consequences of doing so. He advises us not to submit to the demands of philosophy when doing so is neither agreeable nor useful to ourselves or others. Hume’s moderate approach to philosophy recognizes that if the human mind is not created by a beneficent deity, then we must learn to live with the divergence between the epistemic demands of philosophy and the practical demands of life.

Provides a sustained interpretation of Part 4 of Book 1 of Hume's Treatise, arguing that Hume uses our reactions to the sceptical arguments as evidence in favor of his model of the mind.

Defines the cutting-edge of scholarship on ancient Greek history employing methods from social science.

David Hume is traditionally seen as a devastating critic of religion. He is widely read as an infidel, a critic of the Christian faith, and an attacker of popular forms of worship. His reputation as irreligious is well forged among his readers, and his argument against miracles sits at the heart of the narrative overview of his work that perennially indoctrinates thousands of first-year philosophy students. In Toward a Humean True Religion, Andre Willis succeeds in complicating Hume’s split approach to religion, showing that Hume was not, in fact, dogmatically against religion in all times and places. Hume occupied a “watershed moment,” Willis contends, when old ideas of religion were being replaced by the modern idea of religion as a set of epistemically true but speculative claims. Thus, Willis repositions the relative weight of Hume’s antireligious sentiment, giving significance to the role of both historical and discursive forces instead of simply relying on Hume’s personal animus as its driving force. Willis muses about what a Humean “true religion” might look like and suggests that we think of this as a third way between the classical and modern notions of religion. He argues that the cumulative achievements of Hume’s mild philosophic theism, the aim of his moral rationalism, and the conclusion of his project on the passions provide the best content for this “true religion.”

Hume's Philosophy of Religion brings together for the first time the whole range of Hume's immensely important critique of religion. The major concern is with a clear discussion and presentation of philosophical issues wherever they occur in Hume's writings, but items in the history of ideas, questions of interpretation and biographical details are introduced when they contribute to an understanding of Hume's position. Already reviewed as a standard work on Hume on religion and as a good general introduction to Hume's thought, this new edition has been extensively revised and extended. '...it is hard to imagine how a study of Hume on religion could have been at once more comprehensive, accurate, readable and scholarly than this...it is strongly to be recommended to all who have occasion to study or to teach Hume in colleges or universities.' W.D.Hudson, Expository Times.

In his writings, Hume talks of our 'gilding and staining' natural objects, and of the mind's propensity to 'spread itself' on the world. This has led commentators to use the metaphor of 'projection' in connection with his philosophy: Hume is held to have taught that causal power and self are projections, that God is a projection of our fear, and that value is a projection of sentiment. By considering what it is about Hume's writing that occasions this metaphor, P. J. E. Kail spells out its meaning, the role it plays in Hume's work, and examines how, if at all, what sounds 'projective' in Hume can be reconciled with what sounds 'realist'. In addition to offering some highly original readings of Hume's central ideas, Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy offers a detailed examination of the notion of projection and the problems it faces.

A foundational text in empiricism and skepticism, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding comprehensively examines the nature of human cognition, the limits of human knowledge, and the role of reason in understanding the world. Hume argues that our understanding of the world is based on custom, habit, and experience, rather than pure reason or innate knowledge. He challenges the notions of causality, induction, and the concepts of connections between cause and effect, arguing that our understanding of these relationships is based on probability and custom. It lays the groundwork for modern philosophy, emphasizing the importance of empirical evidence and the role of human psychology in shaping our beliefs and understanding of reality. This book is part of the Standard Ebooks project, which produces free public domain ebooks.