This book addresses two questions that are highly relevant for epistemology and for society: What is ignorance and how should we rationally deal with it? It proposes a new way of thinking about ignorance based on contemporary and historical philosophical theories. In the first part of the book, the author shows that epistemological definitions of ignorance are quite heterogeneous and often address different phenomena under the label "ignorance." She then develops an integrated conception of ignorance that recognizes doxastic, attitudinal, and structural constituents of ignorance. Based on this new conception, she carves out suggestions for dealing with ignorance from the history of philosophy that have largely been overlooked: virtue-theoretic approaches based on Aristotle and Socrates, consequentialist approaches derived from James, and deontological approaches based on Locke, Clifford, and Kant. None of these approaches individually provide a satisfying approach to the task of rationally dealing with ignorance, and so the author develops an alternative maxim-based answer that extends Kant’s maxims of the sensus communis to the issue of ignorance. The last part of the book applies this maxim-based answer to different contexts in medicine and democracies. How Should We Rationally Deal with Ignorance? will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology, political philosophy, feminist philosophy, and the social sciences.

Ignorance is trending. Politicians boast, "I'm not a scientist." Angry citizens object to a proposed state motto because it is in Latin, and "This is America, not Mexico or Latin America." Lack of experience, not expertise, becomes a credential. Fake news and repeated falsehoods are accepted and shape firm belief. Ignorance about American government and history is so alarming that the ideal of an informed citizenry now seems quaint. Conspiracy theories and false knowledge thrive. This may be the Information Age, but we do not seem to be well informed. In this book, philosopher Daniel DeNicola explores ignorance -- its abundance, its endurance, and its consequences.

The book provides a thorough exploration of the epistemic dimensions of ignorance: what is ignorance and what are its varieties?

One of the biggest problems with modern democracy is that most of the public is usually ignorant of politics and government. Often, many people understand that their votes are unlikely to change the outcome of an election and don't see the point in learning much about politics. This may be rational, but it creates a nation of people with little political knowledge and little ability to objectively evaluate what they do know. In Democracy and Political Ignorance, Ilya Somin mines the depths of ignorance in America and reveals the extent to which it is a major problem for democracy. Somin weighs various options for solving this problem, arguing that political ignorance is best mitigated and its effects lessened by decentralizing and limiting government. Somin provocatively argues that people make better decisions when they choose what to purchase in the market or which state or local government to live under, than when they vote at the ballot box, because they have stronger incentives to acquire relevant information and to use it wisely.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Case-Based Reasoning, held in London, UK, in September 2011. The 32 contributions presented together with 3 invited talks were carefully reviewd and selected from 67 submissions. The presentations and posters covered a wide range of CBR topics of interest both to practitioners and researchers, including CBR methodology covering case representation, similarity, retrieval, and adaptation; provenance and maintenance; recommender systems; multi-agent collaborative systems; data mining; time series analysis; Web applications; knowledge management; legal reasoning; healthcare systems and planning systems.

David Gauthier is one of the most outstanding and influential philosophers working in moral theory today, and his book Morals by Agreement (1986) has established him as a preeminent defender of contractarian moral theory. This volume brings together a selection of his best essays on contractarianism, many of which have become difficult to find.

New York Post Best Book of 2016 We often think of our capacity to experience the suffering of others as the ultimate source of goodness. Many of our wisest policy-makers, activists, scientists, and philosophers agree that the only problem with empathy is that we don’t have enough of it. Nothing could be farther from the truth, argues Yale researcher Paul Bloom. In AGAINST EMPATHY, Bloom reveals empathy to be one of the leading motivators of inequality and immorality in society. Far from helping us to improve the lives of others, empathy is a capricious and irrational emotion that appeals to our narrow prejudices. It muddles our judgment and, ironically, often leads to cruelty. We are at our best when we are smart enough not to rely on it, but to draw instead upon a more distanced compassion. Basing his argument on groundbreaking scientific findings, Bloom makes the case that some of the worst decisions made by individuals and nations—who to give money to, when to go to war, how to respond to climate change, and who to imprison—are too often motivated by honest, yet misplaced, emotions. With precision and wit, he demonstrates how empathy distorts our judgment in every aspect of our lives, from philanthropy and charity to the justice system; from medical care and education to parenting and marriage. Without empathy, Bloom insists, our decisions would be clearer, fairer, and—yes—ultimately more moral. Brilliantly argued, urgent and humane, AGAINST EMPATHY shows us that, when it comes to both major policy decisions and the choices we make in our everyday lives, limiting our impulse toward empathy is often the most compassionate choice we can make.

Made popular by John Rawls, ideal theory in political philosophy is concerned with putting preferences and interests to one side to achieve an impartial consensus and to arrive at a just society for all. In recent years, ideal theory has drawn increasing criticism for its idealised picture of political philosophy and its inability to account for the challenges posed by inequalities of, for example, race, gender, and class and by structural injustices stemming from colonialism and imperialism. The Routledge Handbook of Non-Ideal Theory is the first handbook or reference source on this important and fast-growing debate. Comprised of 34 chapters by an international team of contributors, the Handbook is divided into three clear parts: Methodological Challenges Intersections Applied Issues and Contemporary Challenges Within these sections key topics are addressed including: the question of whether non-ideal theory is methodologically linked to ideal theory; its intersection with feminist philosophy, critical race theory, decolonial theory, and critical theory; its characteristic features; the role of the non-ideal theorist; its relation to activism; and its application in the context of disability and health studies, climate justice, global injustices, colonialism, and many more. As well as a comprehensive introduction which provides important background to the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory, the Handbook also features a contribution by the late philosopher Charles Mills on non-ideal theory as ideology. The Routledge Handbook of Non-Ideal Theory is essential reading for students and scholars of political philosophy, ethics, and political theory, and will also be of interest to those studying and researching related subjects such as gender, race, and social justice.

Assuming no prior knowledge, this widely-used and critically-acclaimed text provides a clear introduction to, and uniquely fair-minded assessment of, Rational Choice approaches. The substantially revised, updated and extended new edition includes more substantial coverage of game theory, collective action, 'revisionist' public choice, and the use of rational choice in International Relations.