This report describes a risk assessment mission in the Federated States of Micronesia, undertaken by the EpiCentre, School of Veterinary Sciences, Massey University, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) under FAO Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP/SAP/3801). The overall aim was to evaluate the risk of introducing the African swine fever virus (ASFV) into the Federated States of Micronesia and use the findings to propose recommendations that enable professionals, communities and key stakeholders to implement prevention and mitigation measures to reduce the impacts of African swine fever (ASF) incursion. ASF is a highly contagious viral disease of domestic and wild pigs. It has emerged from Africa, spreading to eastern Europe, China and Southeast Asia. Due to ASF outbreaks in Asia and Papua New Guinea, Pacific Islands countries now prioritise preventing the introduction of ASF. A risk assessment of ASFV introduction is necessary for deciding which preventive actions would be most effective. The assessment of risk was conducted using the OIE import risk analysis framework. The most likely pathway for introducing ASFV into the Federated States of Micronesia was importing unauthorised pork products that international arrival passengers may bring in via airport or searport. Should infected products enter the Federated States of Micronesia, there is a distinct pathway for exposure because pigs are routinely fed food scraps (swill) from households. The likelihood of transmission of ASFV to other susceptible pigs was considered extremely high due to the lack of farm biosecurity and the presence of feral pigs. The assessment method was a systematic, qualitative import risk analysis of ASFV introduction to the Federated States of Micronesia. Results provide information about high-risk areas for ASF introduction, exposure and spread in FSM. They also identify gaps in control and prevention measures. The following steps are being proposed to minimise the likelihood of entry and exposure and the consequence of ASFV introduction.

Following the re-introduction of the African swine fever virus (ASFV) in the Americas after 40 years of absence, FAO conducted a qualitative risk assessment for the likelihood of entry of ASF from the Dominican Republic and Haiti to unaffected countries and territories of the Americas and the likelihood of exposure to susceptible animal populations should the disease be introduced. In addition, the potential economic and social impact of ASFV spreading across the continent was assessed. The risk assessment covers the period of December 2021 to February 2022 and considered six risk pathways of introduction and spread. The methodology, information used and results of the risk assessment and economic impact assessment are available in this publication along with recommendations for prevention and control of ASFV introduction and spread in the region. In addition, the publication compiles information collected from 35 countries/territories in the Americas through a questionnaire and presents evidence on the complex swine/pork value chains in the region retrieved from various sources.

African swine fever (ASF) is a highly fatal infectious disease of domestic and wild pigs with no effective vaccine or treatment. The incursion of ASF into Asia and the Pacific region has been a major concern as the region is the major pig production area, which produces over 58 percent of pigs globally (FAOSTAT). The impact of ASF on economies and food security is increasingly worrying. As the disease continues to expand into new territories, preparedness and control activities need to be constantly adjusted to adapt to situations observed in the field that may be contrary to what was expected based on international standards or experiences from other parts of the world. Through various regional and national consultation meetings, affected countries have requested technical relevant technical guidelines for ASF control that are practical especially for smallholder pig farmers in the context of Asia (SO5). This volume is the fourth of the series of the “Guidelines for African swine fever (ASF) prevention and control in smallholder pig farming in Asia” which outlines the principles of an ASF clean-chain system for smallholder pig producers in Southeast Asia. It provides recommendations on the practical application of good biosecurity management practices combined with traceability in smallholder pig systems necessary for the continued production and supply of commodities along the pork value chain irrespective of the prevailing ASF virus risk situation.

African swine fever (ASF) is endemic in some parts of eastern and southern Africa. The introduction of ASF into free areas leads to losses because of the devastating effects it causes. In order to minimize these losses, it is essential that there is a strong early warning and early reaction capacity. The key to such a system is disease recognition. The purpose of this manual is to enhance recognition of ASF at all levels for early warning and early reaction, so that the disease can be identified and eliminated at its earliest appearance in any area. Special attention has been given to the clinical, anatomical and pathological similarity of African swine fever with classical swine fever.

After moving from Europe to China in 2018, the African swine fever (ASF) virus spread throughout China in less than a year after the country's first outbreaks were reported, dramatically reducing China's pork supplies. This report investigates the impacts on China's pork market that resulted from the virus and how China's increased demand for imported pork affected markets for pork-exporting countries. China's swine herd experienced a 30-month cycle of decline and recovery, as the country lost an estimated 27.9 million metric tons of its pork output. Pork prices in China more than doubled despite a surge of pork exports from the European Union, United States, Canada, Brazil, and other countries.

The recent introduction and spread of African swine fever (ASF) into Europe and Asia has shown that an integrated, multidisciplinary effort is needed to tackle this disease and the complex challenges it poses. This book presents practical guidelines on surveillance for detection of ASF virus, how to prevent outbreaks in the domestic pig sector through biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection routines, including in backyard holdings, and how to control and eradicate this disease in wild boar. Information on pathological lesions and diagnostic practices are provided to support practitioners. Virus infection mechanisms and the consequent host immune response are reported together with an overview on the status of vaccine and treatment development. Information on ASF epidemiology and the European wild boar and domestic pig populations is presented to assist breeders, wildlife managers and policy makers in designing practices aimed at preventing, or controlling and eradicating, this disease. The book provides currently available knowledge in a single place, and identifies knowledge gaps, prompting policy makers and funding bodies to support the scientific community in investigating the gaps.

African swine fever (ASF) is caused by a virus that is classified as a member of the Iridovirinae family. The disease in the warthog, the natural host, in Africa was described in 1921 by R. E. Montgomery. The reservoir of the vi rus is inti cks. The i ntroduct i on of domestic pi gs into territory occupied by warthogs i nf ected wi th ASF in the 1960's has endangered the pig industry around the world. The domestic pig is highly sensitive to ASF and develops a devastating disease that kills the pig without giving the immune system a chance to defend the animal against the virus infection. The ability of ASF virus to infect and destroy cells of the reticuloendothelial system leaves a defenseless host that succumbs to an infection which may be described as an acquired immune deficiency di sease of domestic pi gs. Introduction of the virus into Iberia in the 1960's led to a series of ASF epidemics in Spain and Portugal . . and later in France, that caused heavy economic losses. Between 1976 and 1960, ASF virus made its appearance in Malta and Sardinia . . as well as in Brazil, The Dominican Republic . . Haiti, and later in Cuba. In 1985-6 . . ASF appeared in Belgium and The Netherlands.

The purpose of document is to provide fact based overview of ASF ecology in the Northern and Eastern European populations of wild boar and briefly describe a range of practical management and biosecurity measures or interventions, which can help stockholders in the countries experiencing large scale epidemic of this exotic disease to address the problem in a more coherent, collaborative and comprehensive way. The handbook should not be viewed as an authoritative manual providing readymade solutions on how to eradicate ASF from wild boar. The facts, observations and approaches described in the document are presented with the intention to broadly inform veterinary authorities, wildlife conservation bodies, hunting community, farmers and general public about complexity of this novel disease and the need to wisely plan and carefully coordinate any efforts aiming at its prevention and control.