This paper analyses the UK's approach to identifying and managing threats to the national security of the UK, and the implications for these arrangements of a vote for independence. It complements analysis of the UK's approach to defence explored elsewhere in the Scotland analysis series. It is clearly in the UK's interests to be surrounded by secure and resilient neighbouring countries, including - in the event of a yes vote - an independent Scottish state. While the UK endeavours to work with other countries and international organisations to improve security and fight organised crime for everyone's mutual benefit there is something qualitatively different about being influential and intimately connected with the rest of the UK by being a part of it. Issues of national security are of the utmost sensitivity, linked to a country's foreign, security and defence policy posture, and any decisions are closely related to matters of sovereignty and democratic accountability. For this reason, a security union is closely connected to the existence of a political union. The creation of an independent Scottish state would see an end to the current arrangements for ensuring Scotland's security, as Scotland, including Police Scotland, would no longer be part of the UK's national security infrastructure and capabilities. In practical terms this means that the present level of strategic and operational communication and co-ordination that occurs everyday across the UK, with Scotland playing a key role within it - whether concerned with counter-terrorism, fighting serious and organised crime or protecting against cyber threats - would end

The 2014 Referendum on Scottish independence sparked debate on every dimension of modern statehood. Levels of public interest and engagement were unprecedented, as demonstrated by record-breaking voter turnout. Yet aside from Trident, the issue of security was relatively neglected in the campaigns, and there remains a lack of literature on the topic. In this volume Andrew Neal has collated a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives on security and constitutional change in Scotland and the UK, including writing from experts in foreign policy analysis, intelligence studies, parliamentary studies, and journalism. Security in a Small Nation provides an illuminating analysis of the politics of security. Its authors reflect on a number of related issues including international comparisons, alliances, regional cooperation, terrorism, intelligence sharing, democratic oversight, and media coverage. It has a particular focus on what security means for small states and democratic politics. The book draws on current debates about the extent of intelligence powers and their implications for accountability, privacy, and human rights. It examines the foreign and security policy of other small states through the prism of Scottish independence, providing unique insight into the bureaucratic and political processes associated with multi-level security governance. These contributions provide a detailed picture of the changing landscape of security, including the role of diverse and decentralised agencies, and new security interdependencies within and between states. The analysis presented in this book will inform ongoing constitutional debates in the UK and the study of other secessionist movements around the world. Security in a Small Nation is essential reading for any follower of UK and Scottish politics, and those with an interest in security and nationhood on a global scale.

The Scottish Government's White Paper must make absolutely clear the details of both its foreign and defence policies. Much of what has been suggested up to now suffers from a conspiracy of optimism. The most explicit pledges made to date include: that the whole cost of security and defence will be no more than £2.5 billion, that personnel in the armed services will total 15,000 full time and 5,000 reserve personnel, and that the defence force will include "current Scottish raised and restored UK regiments". Will we then have a defence force which is army heavy? An army which is infantry heavy? Or will historic regiments be redesignated as platoons, reserves or non-infantry units? If Faslane is to be kept at its existing workforce, how will people be retrained? What costs will be inccurred in the transition to the new Scottish Defence Force? What are the implications for procurement whether or not Scotland gets the assets it wants? Hanging over all of this is the future of Trident. Will a separate Scotland impose unilateral nuclear disarmament on the UK? Furthermore, membership for Scotland of NATO will require not only the unanimous agreement of all the existing NATO members, but also the resolution of any disputes with the UK. The Scottish Government must spell out what wages and conditions it would propose to offer to compensate those who would leave behind participation in world class armed services. The people of Scotland are entitled to expect that those who propose drastic change can explain what the consequences would be.

This study offers the first detailed examination of the varied means by which parliament through its committees and the work of individual members has sought to scrutinise the British intelligence and security agencies and the government's use of intelligence.

Global value chains (GVCs) powered the surge of international trade after 1990 and now account for almost half of all trade. This shift enabled an unprecedented economic convergence: poor countries grew rapidly and began to catch up with richer countries. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, however, the growth of trade has been sluggish and the expansion of GVCs has stalled. Meanwhile, serious threats have emerged to the model of trade-led growth. New technologies could draw production closer to the consumer and reduce the demand for labor. And trade conflicts among large countries could lead to a retrenchment or a segmentation of GVCs. World Development Report 2020: Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains examines whether there is still a path to development through GVCs and trade. It concludes that technological change is, at this stage, more a boon than a curse. GVCs can continue to boost growth, create better jobs, and reduce poverty provided that developing countries implement deeper reforms to promote GVC participation; industrial countries pursue open, predictable policies; and all countries revive multilateral cooperation.

The UK Government is undertaking a major cross-government programme of analysis prior to the referendum on Scottish independence in 2014. The aim is to provide a comprehensive and detailed analysis of Scotland's place in the UK. This paper, the first of a series to be published in 2013 and 2014, examines the UK's constitutional set-up and the legal implications of independence. The UK Government is convinced that the current devolution offers the best for Scotland: the Scottish Parliament and Government are empowered to take decisions on a range of domestic policy areas - such as health, education, policing - while Scotland continues to benefit from decisions made for the UK as a whole - defence and security, foreign representation, economic affairs. Independence is very different to devolution. Based on independent expert opinion (published as Annex A), the paper concludes that if there were to be a vote in favour of leaving the UK, Scotland would become an entirely new state whilst the remainder of the UK would continue as before, retaining the rights and obligations of the UK as it currently stands. Any separation would have to be negotiated between both governments. Legal and practical implications of independence, both at home and abroad, are addressed. An independent Scotland would have to apply to and/or negotiate to become a member of whichever international organisations it wished to join, including the EU and NATO. Scotland would also have to work through its positions on thousands of international treaties to which the UK is currently party.

This is a new strategy to deal with the challenges we face from serious and organised crime. It is published to coincide with the launch of the new National Crime Agency (NCA) and reflects changes to the threats faced and the lessons learned from previous work. Organised crime includes drug trafficking, human trafficking, and organised illegal immigration, high value fraud and other financial crimes, counterfeiting, organised acquisitive crime and cyber crime. The aim of the strategy is to substantially reduce the level of serious and organised crime affecting the UK and its interests. The strategy uses the framework developed for our counter-terrorist work and has four components: prosecuting and disrupting people engaged in serious and organised crime (Pursue); preventing people from engaging in this activity (Prevent); increasing protection against serious and organised crime (Protect); and reducing the impact of this criminality where it takes place (Prepare). The strategy lists strategic objectives under each of the four areas of work. Tactical operational objectives (e.g. priority crime groups) will be set by the NCA with law enforcement agency counterparts. Our immediate priority is the work set out under Pursue to prosecute and relentlessly disrupt organised criminals and reduce the threat they pose. Like other threats to our national security, serious and organised crime requires a response across the whole of government, and close collaboration with the public, the private sector and with many other countries

Tourism security is an important part of both security management and tourism. Private security professionals and police departments in tourism cities, as well as hotels, major attractions, and theme parks, have all come to realize that tourism security and safety issues (often called tourism surety) are essential for industry survival and success. In Tourism Security, leading expert Peter Tarlow addresses a range of key issues in tourism safety and security.The book guides the reader through a study of tourism security themes and best practices. Topics include the relationship between tourism security and the economy, hotel and motel security, risk and crisis management, public places, transportation, and legal issues. The book also includes case studies of four popular tourist destinations. With each destination, an interview with a police or security representative is included—providing unique, in-depth insight to security concerns.Tourism Security is an invaluable resource for private security professionals, police departments that serve tourist destinations, and tourism professionals who work in hotels or convention centers, or at attractions, casinos, or events. - Explains what tourism security is and outlines safety procedures for different tourism environments - Serves as a resource tool and how-to for implementing best practices - Includes detailed case studies of four popular tourist destinations: Charleston, South Carolina, the Dominican Republic, Las Vegas, Nevada, and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

The national security strategy of the United Kingdom is to use all national capabilities to build Britain's prosperity, extend the country's influence in the world and strengthen security. The National Security Council ensures a strategic and co-ordinated approach across the whole of Government to the risks and opportunities the country faces. Parts 1 and 2 of this document outline the Government's analysis of the strategic global context and give an assessment of the UK's place in the world. They also set out the core objectives of the strategy: (i) ensuring a secure and resilient UK by protecting the country from all major risks that can affect us directly, and (ii) shaping a stable world - actions beyond the UK to reduce specific risks to the country or our direct interests overseas. Part 3 identifies and analyses the key security risks the country is likely to face in the future. The National Security Council has prioritised the risks and the current highest priority are: international terrorism; cyber attack; international military crises; and major accidents or natural hazards. Part 4 describes the ways in which the strategy to prevent and mitigate the specific risks will be achieved. The detailed means to achieve these ends will be set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (Cm. 7948, ISBN 9780101794824), due to publish on 19 October 2010.