Originally published: London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1964.

From the Back Cover: From the moment of its publication in 1961, A.J.P. Taylor's seminal work caused a storm of praise and controversy, and it has since been recognized as a classic: the first book ever to examine exclusively and in depth the causes of the Second World War and to apportion the responsibility among Allies and Germans alike. With crisp, clear prose and brilliant analysis, Taylor established that the war, "far from being premeditated, was a mistake, the result on both sides of diplomatic blunders." He argued that Hitler was more an opportunist than an ideologue who owed his successes to Great Britain's and France's tacking between resistance and appeasement, and to an American policy akin to "the significant episode of the dog in the night, to which Sherlock Holmes once drew attention. When Watson objected: 'But the dog did nothing in the night," Holmes answered: 'That was the significant episode.' "The Times Literary Supplement called The Origins of the Second World War "simple, devastating, superlatively readable, and deeply disturbing," and it remains so now-a groundbreaking book of enduring importance.

This unique new work of reference traces the origins of the modern laws of warfare from the earliest times to the present day. Relying on written records from as far back as 2400 BCE, and using sources ranging from the Bible to Security Council Resolutions, the author pieces together the history of a subject which is almost as old as civilisation itself. The author shows that as long as humanity has been waging wars it has also been trying to find ways of legitimising different forms of combatants and ascribing rules to them, protecting civilians who are either inadvertently or intentionally caught up between them, and controlling the use of particular classes of weapons that may be used in times of conflict. Thus it is that this work is divided into three substantial parts: Volume 1 on the laws affecting combatants and captives; Volume 2 on civilians; and Volume 3 on the law of arms control. This second book on civilians examines four different topics. The first topic deals with the targetting of civilians in times of war. This discussion is one which has been largely governed by the developments of technologies which have allowed projectiles to be discharged over ever greater areas, and attempts to prevent their indiscriminate utilisation have struggled to keep pace. The second topic concerns the destruction of the natural environment, with particular regard to the utilisation of starvation as a method of warfare, and unlike the first topic, this one has rarely changed over thousands of years, although contemporary practices are beginning to represent a clear break from tradition. The third topic is concerned with the long-standing problems of civilians under the occupation of opposing military forces, where the practices of genocide, collective punishments and/or reprisals, and rape have occurred. The final topic in this volume is about the theft or destruction of the property of the enemy, in terms of either pillage or the intentional devastation of the cultural property of the opposition. As a work of reference this set of three books is unrivalled, and will be of immense benefit to scholars and practitioners researching and advising on the laws of warfare. It also tells a story which throws fascinating new light on the history of international law and on the history of warfare itself.

Presented here, in one collection, is the important historical record of Hitler's war directives. From preparations for the invasion of Poland to his last desperate order to his troops on the Eastern Front, this unbroken edition provides a fascinating insight in to the proceedings of the Second World War and the mind of the man that launched the world into chaos. From initial optimism in 1939, to the disarray of later orders, it is fascinating to see how the events of the war were received and processed by the upper echelons of the Third Reich and how these reactions shaped future military policy. This unvarnished publication reveals the true nature of Adolf Hitler as a military commander and sheds light on the events of one of the world's greatest tragedies. All the wartime orders has been typeset in a clear presentation format and presented chronologically.

"Dealing with the military phase of Hitler's expansion, Rich tells an absorbing story of Germany's relentless drive in every direction and provides a vivid account of the relations between Hitler and his newly acquired subjects and satellites." --Hans W. Gatzke, Political Science Quarterly

Among the many controversies of World War II, prominent is the debate over Germany's strategy in the north of the Soviet Union, as the tide of war turned, and gigantic Russian armies began to close in on Berlin. In this long-awaited work, Henrik Lunde--former U.S. Special Forces officer and author of renowned previous works on the campaigns in Norway and Finland--turns his sights to the withdrawal of Army Group North. Providing cool-headed analysis to the problem, the author first acknowledges that Hitler--often accused of holding onto ground for the sake of it--had valid reasons in this instance to maintain control of the Baltic coast. Without it, his supply of iron ore from Sweden would have been cut off, German naval (U-boat) bases would have been compromised, and an entire simpatico area of Europe--including East Prussia--would have been forsaken. On the other hand, Germany's maintaining control of the Baltic would have meant convenient supply for forces on the coast--or evacuation if necessary--and perhaps most important, remaining German defensive pockets behind the Soviets' main drive to Europe would tie down disproportionate offensive forces. Stalwart German forces remaining on the coast and on their flank could break the Soviet tidal wave. However, unlike during today's military planning, the German high command, in a situation that changed by the month, had to make quick decisions and gamble, with the fate of hundreds of thousands of troops and the entire nation at stake on quickly decided throws of their dice. As Henrik Lunde carefully details in this work, Hitler guessed wrong. By leaving four entire battle-hardened armies in isolation along the Baltic, the Soviets pulling up to the Oder River encountered weaker opposition than they had a right to expect. Having economic (or aid) resources of their own, they cared little for Hitler's own supply line and instead simply lunged at his center of power: Berlin. Once that was taken the remaining German pockets could be wiped out. The Germans deprived themselves of many of their strongest forces when they most needed them, and the climactic battle for their capital took place. In this book, both combats and strategy are described in the final stages of the fighting in the Northern Theater, with Lunde's even-handed analysis of the campaign a reward to every student of World War II. REVIEWS "... tackles "five exceedingly complicated and interrelated subjects to examine and understand Hitler's decision to defend the Baltic States at all costs." They are: military strategy; Hitler's strategic thinking; changing conditions affecting opposing forces; Hitler's fascination with Scandinavia and the Baltic Region; and the validity of Hitler's stated reasons for refusing to withdraw from the Baltic. In his short concluding chapter, Lunde addresses and debunks the validity of the reasons put forth by Hitler for his unshakeable attachment to the defense of the Baltic Region and Scandinavia." Henry Gole, author of Soldiering, The Road to Rainbow, and co-author of Exposing the Third Reich: Colonel Truman Smith in Hitler's Germany "...a detailed examination of one of the worst of Hitler's many bad decisions in the later years of the Second World War, and a valuable addition to the literature on the fighting on the Eastern Front." History of War "In Hitler's Wave-Breaker Concept, historian and former US Special Forces officer Henrik Lunde undertakes a sober, much-needed corrective evaluation of Hitler's military decisions, with a stress on the defensive actions of Army Group North after the attempt to defeat the Soviet Union had disintegrated."--Michigan War Studies Review The lessons for political masters and military commanders in this book are numerous and they speak to the challenges of juggling operational and strategic balls concurrently. Lunde has written a very telling book about a region and a campaign that did not adjust to the changing strategic and operational realities on the ground. Casemate has published a high quality book and I would strongly recommend it for those interested in further appreciating the multi-faceted approach required in the interaction between international relations and military operations. War History Online

This book is a study of Adolf Hitler in his role as military commander and strategist from the beginning of the Second World War until the end of 1942, examining in detail the campaign in southern Russia that year. The thesis challenges the post-war narrative of Hitler as a dilettante who was solely responsible for the strategic and operational errors that led to Germany’s defeat in the war. Instead, this research highlights that decisions made by Hitler with respect to such disparate themes as strategy, operations, logistics, intelligence, economics, air and naval power, and coalition warfare were generally sound if viewed from his perspective, even if they were not ultimately successful. It also gives an overview of his own ideas concerning all aspects of military affairs, such as intelligence, command, and morale. The careful analysis of Hitler’s decision-making process offers a unique contribution to Second World War scholarship and moves beyond a superficial understanding that the war’s outcome was a result of Hitler’s ineptitude as a military leader. Warlord Hitler will appeal to postgraduates and specialists in military history, as well as general readers interested in a deeper study of the Second World War.