A classic story of the 47,000 Spaniards who fought for the Third Reich in World War II. • Vivid chronicle of the division of Spanish volunteers who battled the Soviets on the Eastern Front • Centerpiece of their service was the Siege of Leningrad, which is covered in depth here • Details on how Spanish dictator Francisco Franco negotiated his countrymen's participation

On 22 June 1941, Hitler's armies launched Operation Barbarossa and swept in to the Soviet Union. On the same day, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Ramon Serrano Suner, contacted the German embassy in Madrid with an extraordinary proposal - would the German government welcome the addition of a force of Spanish volunteers in the war against the Russians? Officially designed by the Wehrmacht as the 250th Infantry Division, but commonly referred to as the Azul or Blue Division after the color of Spain's Falangist (Fascist) Party, this force initially amounted to some 18,000 volunteers under the command of the fiercely anti-communist General Agustin Munoz-Grandes. Of the first 18,694 men who entrained for Germany during July 1941, seventy percent, including every officer from captain on up, were from the regular army, whilst most of the rest were Spanish Civil War veterans. By the time that the Blue Division returned home, 47,000 Spaniards had been involved in fighting on the Russian front. There were 22,000 casualties: 4,500 dead, 8,000 wounded, 7,800 sick and 1,600 suffering from frostbite. As the authors reveal, Spaniards also volunteered or served in other units or organization. This highly illustrated book examines the history, personalities, and uniforms and equipment of those men and women who volunteered to serve alongside Hitler's armies. Along with full color drawings, there are many rare photographs provided by survivors.

The Spanish Civil War, begun in July 1936, was a preliminary round of World War II. Hitler's and Mussolini's cooperation with General Franco resulted in the Axis agreement of October 1936 and the subsequent Pact of Steel of May 1939, immediately following the end of the Civil War. This study presents comprehensive documentation of Hitler's use of the upheaval in Spain to strengthen the Third Reich diplomatically, ideologically, economically, and militarily. While the last great cause drew all eyes to Western Europe and divided the British and especially the French internally, Hitler could pursue territorial gains in Eastern Europe. This book, based on little-known German records and recently opened Spanish archives, fills a major gap in our understanding of one of the 20th century's most significant conflicts. Its comprehensive treatment of German-Spanish relations from 1936 through 1939, bringing together diplomatic, economic, military, and naval aspects, will be of great value to specialists in European diplomacy and the political economy of Nazi imperialism, as well as to all students of the Spanish Civil War.

Only the indecisiveness of Spanish dictator Franco and diplomatic mistakes by the Nazis, argues Bowed (history, Ouachita Baptist U., Arkadelphia, Arkansas) prevented the Nazi supporters in the Spanish fascist party from bringing Spain into World War II on the side of the Axis. Still, he points out, Spaniards helped Germany by serving in its armies, working in its factories, and promoting its ideas to other nations. The study began as a doctoral dissertation for Northwestern University. Annotation copyrighted by Book News Inc., Portland, OR

Was Franco sympathetic to Nazi Germany? Why didn't Spain enter World War II? In what ways did Spain collaborate with the Third Reich? How much did Spain assist Jewish refugees? This is the first book in any language to answer these intriguing questions. Stanley Payne, a leading historian of modern Spain, explores the full range of Franco’s relationship with Hitler, from 1936 to the fall of the Reich in 1945. But as Payne brilliantly shows, relations between these two dictators were not only a matter of realpolitik. These two titanic egos engaged in an extraordinary tragicomic drama often verging on the dark absurdity of a Beckett or Ionesco play. Whereas Payne investigates the evolving relationship of the two regimes up to the conclusion of World War II, his principal concern is the enigma of Spain’s unique position during the war, as a semi-fascist country struggling to maintain a tortured neutrality. Why Spain did not enter the war as a German ally, joining with Hitler to seize Gibraltar and close the Mediterranean to the British navy, is at the center of Payne’s narrative. Franco’s only personal meeting with Hitler, in 1940 to discuss precisely this, is recounted here in groundbreaking detail that also sheds significant new light on the Spanish government’s vacillating policy toward Jewish refugees, on the Holocaust, and on Spain’s German connection throughout the duration of the war.

The Spanish Civil War, begun in July 1936, was a preliminary round of World War II. Hitler's and Mussolini's cooperation with General Franco resulted in the Axis agreement of October 1936 and the subsequent Pact of Steel of May 1939, immediately following the end of the Civil War. This study presents comprehensive documentation of Hitler's use of the upheaval in Spain to strengthen the Third Reich diplomatically, ideologically, economically, and militarily. While the last great cause drew all eyes to Western Europe and divided the British and especially the French internally, Hitler could pursue territorial gains in Eastern Europe. This book, based on little-known German records and recently opened Spanish archives, fills a major gap in our understanding of one of the 20th century's most significant conflicts. Its comprehensive treatment of German-Spanish relations from 1936 through 1939, bringing together diplomatic, economic, military, and naval aspects, will be of great value to specialists in European diplomacy and the political economy of Nazi imperialism, as well as to all students of the Spanish Civil War.

“An imperative starting point of any future inquiry concerning Nazi Germany’s incursion into and manipulation of Spain’s civil strife.” —International History Review The Spanish Civil War, begun in July 1936, was a preliminary round of World War II. Hitler’s and Mussolini’s cooperation with General Franco resulted in the Axis agreement of October 1936 and the subsequent Pact of Steel of May 1939, immediately following the end of the Civil War. This study presents comprehensive documentation of Hitler’s use of the upheaval in Spain to strengthen the Third Reich diplomatically, ideologically, economically, and militarily. While the last great cause drew all eyes to Western Europe and divided the British and especially the French internally, Hitler could pursue territorial gains in Eastern Europe. This book, based on little-known German records and recently opened Spanish archives, fills a major gap in our understanding of one of the twentieth century’s most significant conflicts. Its comprehensive treatment of German-Spanish relations from 1936 through 1939, bringing together diplomatic, economic, military, and naval aspects, will be of great value to specialists in European diplomacy and the political economy of Nazi imperialism, as well as to all students of the Spanish Civil War. “A major contribution to understanding not only the Spanish conflict, but also the history of the thirties and, in particular, the failure of Britain, France and the Soviet Union to make common cause against fascist powers.” —History Workshop Journal

In the waning days and immediate aftermath of World War II, Nazi diplomats and spies based in Spain decided to stay rather than return to a defeated Germany. The decidedly pro-German dictatorship of General Francisco Franco gave them refuge and welcomed other officials and agents from the Third Reich who had escaped and made their way to Iberia. Amid fears of a revival of the Third Reich, Allied intelligence and diplomatic officers developed a repatriation program across Europe to return these individuals to Germany, where occupation authorities could further investigate them. Yet due to Spain's longstanding ideological alliance with Hitler, German infiltration of the Spanish economy and society was extensive, and the Allies could count on minimal Spanish cooperation in this effort. In Hunting Nazis in Franco's Spain, David Messenger deftly traces the development and execution of the Allied repatriation scheme, providing an analysis of Allied, Spanish, and German expatriate responses. Messenger shows that by April 1946, British and American embassy staff in Madrid had compiled a census of the roughly 10,000 Germans then residing in Spain and had drawn up three lists of 1,677 men and women targeted for repatriation to occupied Germany. While the Spanish government did round up and turn over some Germans to the Allies, many of them were intentionally overlooked in the process. By mid-1947, Franco's regime had forced only 265 people to leave Spain; most Germans managed to evade repatriation by moving from Spain to Argentina or by solidifying their ties to the Franco regime and Span-ish life. By 1948, the program was effectively over. Drawing on records in American, British, and Spanish archives, this first book-length study in English of the repatriation program tells the story of this dramatic chapter in the history of post--World War II Europe.