The General Staff Division of Fremde Heere Ost (Military Intelligence Service, Eastern Section) which from 1942 was led by Reinhard Gehlen, was the nerve-centre of Hitler's military reconnaissance on the Eastern Front. This department worked professionally and was operationally and tactically reliable. However, at a strategic level there were clear deficits: the industrial capacity of the Soviet arms industry, the politico-military intentions and the details of the Red Army's plans for their offensive remained for the most part hidden from the department. When the Second World War ended, Gehlen put the documents and personnel of Fremde Heere Ost at the disposal of the Americans. With their support he was able to build a new foreign secret service which later evolved into the Federal Intelligence Service. In this book, military historian Magnus Pahl presents a complete overview of the structure, personnel and working methods of Fremde Heere Ost based on a tremendous array of archival sources. This work includes an extensive case study of the East Pomeranian Operation 1945. Pahl's study is a significant contribution to our understanding of German strategic, operational and tactical thinking on the Eastern Front 1941-45.

By a world renowned specialist in intelligence history. The best and definitive book on the subject.

A penetrating study of the German army's military campaigns, relations with the Nazi regime, and complicity in Nazi crimes across occupied Europe For decades after 1945, it was generally believed that the German army, professional and morally decent, had largely stood apart from the SS, Gestapo, and other corps of the Nazi machine. Ben Shepherd draws on a wealth of primary sources and recent scholarship to convey a much darker, more complex picture. For the first time, the German army is examined throughout the Second World War, across all combat theaters and occupied regions, and from multiple perspectives: its battle performance, social composition, relationship with the Nazi state, and involvement in war crimes and military occupation. This was a true people's army, drawn from across German society and reflecting that society as it existed under the Nazis. Without the army and its conquests abroad, Shepherd explains, the Nazi regime could not have perpetrated its crimes against Jews, prisoners of war, and civilians in occupied countries. The author examines how the army was complicit in these crimes and why some soldiers, units, and higher commands were more complicit than others. Shepherd also reveals the reasons for the army's early battlefield successes and its mounting defeats up to 1945, the latter due not only to Allied superiority and Hitler's mismanagement as commander-in-chief, but also to the failings--moral, political, economic, strategic, and operational--of the army's own leadership.

Rolf Dieter Mller is Professor of Military History at the Humboldt University, Berlin; Scientific Director of the German Armed Forces Military History Research Institute in Potsdam; and Coordinator of the 'The German Reich and the Second World War project. He is the author of numerous publications on World War II. At the beginni.

In the spring of 1944, Adolf Hitler firmly believed that the llies would invade the Continent via the beaches of Normandy. Anti-Nazi officers in German Intelligence ultimately persuaded him that Normandy would be a mere diversion, assuring him that the real invasion would occur at Calais. Their campaign of deception convinced Hitler to keep half of the German forces in northern France in Calais to defend against an attack that would never happen. This misinformed decision ultimately cost Hitler the war.

Friedrich von Boetticher was Germany's only military attaché accredited to the United States between the world wars. As such, he was Germany's official military observer in the capital of the nation whose potential as an ally of those powers arrayed against Adolf Hitler in the 1930s might have given the dictator pause in any predatory plans he harbored against his neighbors. Though von Boetticher produced a rich and detailed commentary on military and political affairs in Washington in the eight years prior to the outbreak of war between Germany and the United States in 1941, he was nonetheless accused after the war of misjudging America's productive potential and misleading Hitler with overly optimistic reports. As Alfred M. Beck points out, what he actually told German authorities in Berlin is strikingly different from what his detractors later claimed. Von Boetticher "permits a glimpse into the sociology of a conservative officer caste at once assailed by the politics of a regime and the impossibilities imposed on it, its weaknesses in resisting its evils, and its eventual failure to present an alternative to National Socialism's illusory attractions." A loyal German, von Boetticher had strong ties to America. His mother was American-born, he spoke English fluently, and he was enamored of American military history. He was also anti-Semitic and believed that "Jewish wire-pullers" had undue influence over the U.S. government and its policies. His professional ties to U.S. Army officers in the War Department were so strong--supplying them, for example, with details on German air strength and operations during the Battle of Britain in 1940--that they survived until August 1941 and long after the German ambassador himself had been recalled. Torn between his duty to Germany (though the Nazi regime had attempted to harm his son) and his deep affection for America, von Boetticher stood among the broad middle range of German officials who were neither perpetrator nor victim.

In early 1945, the Red Army plunged into the Third Reich from the east, rolling up territory and crushing virtually everything in its path, with one exception: the city of Breslau, which Hitler had declared a fortress-city, to be defended to the death. This book examines in detail the notorious four-month siege of Breslau. • The first full-length English-language account of the bloody siege • Chronicles the bitter struggle as the Red Army encircled Breslau and eventually pillaged the city, taking savage retribution on the survivors • Details the brutal methods used by the city's Nazi leaders to keep German troops fighting and maintain order

Challenging previous accounts, Geoffrey Megargee shatters the myth that German generals would have prevailed in World War II if only Hitler had not meddled in their affairs. Indeed, Megargee argues, the German high command was much more flawed than many have suspected or acknowledged. Inside Hitler's High Command reveals that while Hitler was the central figure in many military decisions, his generals were equal partners in Germany's catastrophic defeat. Megargee exposes the structure, processes, and personalities that governed the Third Reich's military decision making and shows how Germany's presumed battlefield superiority was undermined by poor strategic and operational planning at the highest levels. His study tracks the evolution of German military leadership under the Nazis from 1933 to 1945 and expands our understanding of the balance of power within the high command, the role of personalities in its organizational development, and the influence of German military intellectuals on its structure and function. He also shows how the organization of the high command was plagued by ambition, stubbornness, political intrigue, and overworked staff officers. And his "a week in the life" chapter puts the high command under a magnifying glass to reveal its inner workings during the fierce fighting on the Russian Front in December 1941. Megargee also offers new insights into the high command crises of 1938 and shows how German general staff made fatal mistakes in their planning for Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Their arrogant dismissal of the Soviet military's ability to defend its homeland and virtual disregard for the extensive intelligence and sound logistics that undergird successful large-scale military campaigns ultimately came back to haunt them. In the final assessment, observes Megargee, the generals' strategic ideas were no better than Hitler's and often worse. Heinz Guderian, Franz Halder, and the rest were as guilty of self-deception as their Fuhrer, believing that innate German superiority and strength of will were enough to overcome nearly any obstacle. Inside Hitler's High Command exposes these surprising flaws and illuminates the process of strategy and decision making in the Third Reich.