Illustrations: 4 Maps Description: History of the Sikhs is a five volume series which deals with all aspects-religious, philosophical, political, military, social, economic and cultural, and the contribution of Sikhism to world civilization, in particular to human rights, principles of liberty, equality and fraternity, and to the creed of democracy and secularism. The aim is to present a comprehensive view of the rise, growth and development of Sikh thought and action almost in every direction. The whole series is based on original contemporary sources in English, Gurmukhi, Marathi, Persian and Urdu known to exist in India and abroad. This fourth volume deals with the rise and fall of Sikh misls. In Sikh history this term was first used by Guru Gobind Singh in the battle Bhangani in 1688, when he organised his forces into eleven misls. Banda Bahadur adopted the same organisation of eleven divisions in the battle of Sarhind in May 1710. In 1734 Nawab Kapur Singh divided the Khalsa into Budha Dal and Taruna Dal, both comprising eleven groups. This division was permanently adopted at the formation of Dal Khalsa in 1748. The Phulkian states were not a Sikh misl. They developed as petty kingdoms from the beginning. They owed allegiance to the Mughals and Durranis, the enemies of their faith. They purchased titles from them. The Sikh misls never agreed to serve under Muslim masters. Lahna Singh Bhangi flatly rejected to become Ahmad Shah Durrani's viceroy of Panjab. Baghel Singh Karorasinghia controlled Delhi for nine months as an independent chief. He thrice turned down Emperor Shah Alam's firman appointing him governor of the Upper Ganga Doab. The Sikh misls dominated the whole country from river Indus to the Ganga, and from punch in Kashmir to the borders of Sind and Baluchistan. The Mughal Emperor, his prime ministers, Rohillas, Jats, Rajputs, Marathas, the British, hill rajas, and Durrani monarchs, all were terribly afraid of Sikh misls in spite of their complete disunity and mutual warfare. The misls in the western region were unceremoniously finished by Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and by the British Government in the eastern region.

This book argues that the role of the British East India Company in transforming warfare in South Asia has been overestimated. Although it agrees with conventional wisdom that, before the British, the nature of Indian society made it difficult for central authorities to establish themselves fully and develop a monopoly over armed force, the book argues that changes to warfare in South Asia were more gradual, and the result of more complicated socio-economic forces than has been hitherto acknowledged. The book covers the period from 1740, when the British first became a major power broker in south India, to 1849, when the British eliminated the last substantial indigenous kingdom in the sub-continent. Placing South Asian military history in a global, comparative context, it examines military innovations; armies and how they conducted themselves; navies and naval warfare; major Indian military powers - such as the Mysore and Khalsa kingdoms, the Maratha confederacy - and the British, explaining why they succeeded.

In historical terms, religions do not exist apart from the people who practise them. This is the first collection of biographical studies of figures from religions around the globe and from traditions both ancient and modern. It represents the work of an enormous international team of scholars, and although many entries involve original research, this substantial work of reference is intended to be of use to both the specialist and the general reader. Particular care has been taken to ensure a balance between religions and to include figures from the diverse branches of the different religions. Indexes and an extensive bibliography make it an invaluable working tool.

This book examines the differences and similarities between warfare in China and India before 1870, both conceptually and on the battlefield. By focusing on Chinese and Indian warfare, the book breaks the intellectual paradigm requiring non-Western histories and cultures to be compared to the West, and allows scholarship on two of the oldest civilizations to be brought together. An international group of scholars compare and contrast the modes and conceptions of warfare in China and India, providing important original contributions to the growing study of Asian military history.

This monograph analyses the rhythms of war and the geopolitical significance of Afghanistan with a focus on the interrelated concepts of weak/rentier state, great power rivalry, and counter-insurgency. It analyses why the Mughals, the British, the Soviets, and the Americans won the conventional wars in Afghanistan but were defeated in the unconventional ones. It takes a comprehensive view of the history of the region and provides a political and military narrative of conventional and unconventional war in Afghanistan during the last five centuries. It, therefore, covers wide ranging aspects such as empire building and military operations in Afghanistan in the pre-modern period, regular and irregular warfare in Afghanistan during the British era, the Russian intervention and the emergence of the fragile 'rentier state' after the world war, and the American and NATO activities and the nature of on-going war in light of the recent debates on the changing character of war in the twenty-first century. With a special emphasis on ecology, terrain, and logistics, this book explores the trajectory of state building and contextualizes the Afghan 'problem' as part of the wider struggle among the great powers for controlling the 'heart' of Eurasia.

Records publications acquired from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, by the U.S. Library of Congress Offices in New Delhi, India, and Karachi, Pakistan.