Compiled from the official records and from diaries of members of the regiment by Sergt. Thos. Crofts, Company C, regimental historian.

Examines how Union veterans of the Army of the Cumberland employed the extinction of slavery in the trans-Appalachian South in their memory of the Civil War Robert Hunt examines how Union veterans of the Army of the Cumberland employed the extinction of slavery in the trans-Appalachian South in their memory of the Civil War. Hunt argues that rather than ignoring or belittling emancipation, it became central to veterans’ retrospective understanding of what the war, and their service in it, was all about. The Army of the Cumberland is particularly useful as a subject for this examination because it invaded the South deeply, encountering numerous ex-slaves as fugitives, refugees, laborers on military projects, and new recruits. At the same time, the Cumberlanders were mostly Illinoisans, Ohioans, Indianans, and, significantly, Kentucky Unionists, all from areas suspicious of abolition before the war. Hunt argues that the collapse of slavery in the trans-Appalachian theater of the Civil War can be usefully understood by exploring the post-war memories of this group of Union veterans. He contends that rather than remembering the war as a crusade against the evils of slavery, the veterans of the Army of the Cumberland saw the end of slavery as a by-product of the necessary defeat of the planter aristocracy that had sundered the Union; a good and necessary outcome, but not necessarily an assertion of equality between the races. Some of the most provocative discussions about the Civil War in current scholarship are concerned with how memory of the war was used by both the North and the South in Reconstruction, redeemer politics, the imposition of segregation, and the Spanish-American War. This work demonstrates that both the collapse of slavery and the economic and social post-War experience convinced these veterans that they had participated in the construction of the United States as a world power, built on the victory won against corrupt Southern plutocrats who had impeded the rightful development of the country.

Approaching Atlanta in July of 1864, William Tecumseh Sherman knew he was facing the most important campaign of his career. Lacking the troops and the desire to mount a long siege of the city, Sherman was eager for a quick, decisive victory. A change of tactics was in order. He decided to call on the cavalry. Over the next seven weeks, Sherman's horsemen - under the command of Generals Rousseau, Garrard, Stoneman, McCook, and Kilpatrick - destroyed supplies and tore up miles of railroad track in an attempt to isolate the city. This book tells the story of those raids. After initial successes, the cavalrymen found themselves caught up in a series of daring and deadly engagements, including a failed attempt to push south to liberate the prisoners at the infamous prison camp at Andersonville. Through exhaustive research, David Evans has been able to recreate a vivid, captivating, and meticulously detailed image of the day-by-day life of the Union horse soldier. Based largely upon previously unpublished materials, Sherman's Horsemen provides the definitive account of this hitherto neglected aspect of the American Civil War.

Despite its important role in the early years of the Civil War, the Army of the Ohio remains one of the least studied of all Union commands. With All for the Regiment, Gerald Prokopowicz deftly fills this surprising gap. He offers an engaging history of the army from its formation in 1861 to its costly triumph at Shiloh and its failure at Perryville in 1862. Prokopowicz shows how the amateur soldiers who formed the Army of the Ohio organized themselves into individual regiments of remarkable strength and cohesion. Successive commanders Robert Anderson, William T. Sherman, and Don Carlos Buell all failed to integrate those regiments into an effective organization, however. The result was a decentralized and elastic army that was easily disrupted and difficult to command--but also nearly impossible to destroy in combat. Exploring the army's behavior at minor engagements such as Rowlett's Station and Logan's Cross Roads, as well as major battles such as Shiloh and Perryville, Prokopowicz reveals how its regiment-oriented culture prevented the army from experiencing decisive results--either complete victory or catastrophic defeat--on the battlefield. Regimental solidarity was at once the Army of the Ohio's greatest strength, he argues, and its most dangerous vulnerability.

This study is a historical analysis of the effectiveness of Union cavalry during the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War. In a campaign noted for the highly skilled maneuver conducted by General William Tecumseh Sherman, the effective employment of the cavalry was essential. The Union cavalry had the missions of providing security to the flanks of the army and protecting the supply lines by guarding the railroad and by striking against the Confederate cavalry. Later in the campaign, the Union leadership introduced the task of destroying Confederate railroads as a cavalry mission. The Union cavalry failed to perform these missions adequately. First, this work investigates the tradition of the Union cavalry and the state of Sherman’s cavalry at the beginning of the campaign. Secondly, an analysis of the cavalry operations breaks the use of cavalry into three phases and focuses on the various missions which were attempted. Finally, the study addresses the lessons learned and what the applicability is for modern operations. This study concludes that although the Union cavalry was well manned and well equipped, improper employment and deficient senior leadership caused it to play an unsuccessful and detrimental part in the overall campaign.

Born in Shawneetown, Illinois in time to be newly graduated from West Point when the Civil War started, James H. Wilson became a brigadier general by the age of twenty-six. Fueled by boundless ambition and the desire to serve his country, he reorganized the Union cavalry in time to gain the upper hand over the Confederate army. But the story of this brash, young man did not end with the capture of Jefferson Davis, for which Wilson was ultimately responsible. His life after the Civil War was also representative of American tenacity in the midst of explosive growth and change during the late-nineteenth century. He became a military governor in Georgia during Reconstruction, a railroad baron from the start of the Industrial Revolution, and a military advisor during World War I. The story of Wilson’s life remains a compelling example for us in these rapidly changing times, and resonates as an excellent account of one man’s lasting impression on his century.

“War means fighting, and fighting means killing,” Confederate cavalry commander Nathan Bedford Forrest famously declared. The Civil War was fundamentally a matter of Americans killing Americans. This undeniable reality is what Jonathan Steplyk explores in Fighting Means Killing, the first book-length study of Union and Confederate soldiers’ attitudes toward, and experiences of, killing in the Civil War. Drawing upon letters, diaries, and postwar reminiscences, Steplyk examines what soldiers and veterans thought about killing before, during, and after the war. How did these soldiers view sharpshooters? How about hand-to-hand combat? What language did they use to describe killing in combat? What cultural and societal factors influenced their attitudes? And what was the impact of race in battlefield atrocities and bitter clashes between white Confederates and black Federals? These are the questions that Steplyk seeks to answer in Fighting Means Killing, a work that bridges the gap between military and social history—and that shifts the focus on the tragedy of the Civil War from fighting and dying for cause and country to fighting and killing.

In fascinating detail, Civil War Alabama reveals the forgotten breadth of political opinions and loyalties among white Alabamians during the antebellum period. The book offers a major reevaluation of Alabama's secession crisis and path to war and destruction.