From the book's Foreword: In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Center of Military History contracted with BDM Corporation for a history of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet air and missile threats during the Cold War. The resulting two-volume History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense covers the years 1945-1972 when the strategic arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was at its height. The study was first published for limited distribution in 1975 and recently declassified with minimal redaction. These volumes address the passive and active defense strategies, technologies, and techniques adopted by both U.S. and Soviet defense planners. Much of their actions centered around three common questions: How might we be attacked? How shall we defend our country? What can technology do to solve the basic problems of defending against this new intercontinental threat?

In 1975, U.S. Army Center of Military History commissioned a report on the History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense, Volume I (1945-1955) and Volume II (1956-1972), which was part of a larger study of the strategic arms competition that developed between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. The report addresses each country's approach to civil defense against the threat from the air and each country's emphasis on specific elements of air defense strategy at various periods between 1945 and 1972. Two central questions concerned the U.S. and Soviet defense planners: "How might we be attacked?" and "How shall we defend our country?" Overall, technological changes were the predominant factor affecting air and missile defense strategy during the period primarily as they related to the developing offensive threat. The scope and pace of technological innovations introduced a measure of uncertainty, placed considerable strain on the stability of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and raised fundamental challenges to previous concepts of how best to defend the United States. U.S. strategy was built on the variety of new weapon system developments; while Soviet defense trends demonstrated Soviet awareness and responded to developments in U.S. strategic offensive forces. The basic patterns of action were set by initial, and early, strategic choices. Thereafter, the strategic problem centered on technological development. Threat perceptions increasingly involved possible application of new technologies by the Soviets in order to define or delimit future threats. Perceptions of future threats were influenced by the view of available technologies, whether or not the Soviets had demonstrated the capacity to apply them. Available or known technologies were extrapolated to assess future threats. However, a direct action-reaction cycle was not seen as a factor in the development of U.S. and Soviet strategic air and missile defense systems.

From the book's Foreword: In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Center of Military History contracted with BDM Corporation for a history of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet air and missile threats during the Cold War. The resulting two-volume History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense covers the years 1945-1972 when the strategic arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was at its height. The study was first published for limited distribution in 1975 and recently declassified with minimal redaction. These volumes address the passive and active defense strategies, technologies, and techniques adopted by both U.S. and Soviet defense planners. Much of their actions centered around three common questions: How might we be attacked? How shall we defend our country? What can technology do to solve the basic problems of defending against this new intercontinental threat?

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. This is the second of two vol. on the history of strategic air and ballistic missile defense from 1945 to 1972. It covers 1955¿1972, and is organized into five interrelated chapters. Chapter I provides a comparison of U.S. and Soviet strategies, Chapters II and III deal with U.S. strategy and Soviet strategy, while Chapters IV and V cover U.S. systems and Soviet systems. The Executive Summary has three major groupings: one, to reflect the contextual setting of decision-making, circa 1955; the second, to highlight strategic air defense policy comparisons and contrasts, 1955¿1972; and a third, to present judgments and conclusions about the results of the play of factors and perceptions which molded air defense decisions during these years. Illustrations.

As part of a larger study of the strategic arms competition which developed after World War II between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., this study of the two countries¿ strategies for air and ballistic missile defense addresses two broad subjects: (1) How did each country approach the problem of defense against the threat from the air? (2) Why did each country accent particular elements of an air defense strategy at various periods between 1945 and 1972? The first question concerns the means that leaders chose for defense against an increasingly sophisticated offensive threat. Includes several appendices of chronologies, tables, charts, maps and notes.

In 1975, U.S. Army Center of Military History commissioned a report on the History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense, Volume I (1945-1955) and Volume II (1956-1972), which was part of a larger study of the strategic arms competition that developed between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. The report addresses each country's approach to civil defense against the threat from the air and each country's emphasis on specific elements of air defense strategy at various periods between 1945 and 1972. Two central questions concerned the U.S. and Soviet defense planners: "How might we be attacked?" and "How shall we defend our country?" Overall, technological changes were the predominant factor affecting air and missile defense strategy during the period primarily as they related to the developing offensive threat. The scope and pace of technological innovations introduced a measure of uncertainty, placed considerable strain on the stability of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and raised fundamental challenges to previous concepts of how best to defend the United States. U.S. strategy was built on the variety of new weapon system developments; while Soviet defense trends demonstrated Soviet awareness and responded to developments in U.S. strategic offensive forces. The basic patterns of action were set by initial, and early, strategic choices. Thereafter, the strategic problem centered on technological development. Threat perceptions increasingly involved possible application of new technologies by the Soviets in order to define or delimit future threats. Perceptions of future threats were influenced by the view of available technologies, whether or not the Soviets had demonstrated the capacity to apply them. Available or known technologies were extrapolated to assess future threats. However, a direct action-reaction cycle was not seen as a factor in the development of U.S. and Soviet strategic air and missile defense systems.