In this 1906 work, Frederick Jane (1865-1916) questioned the widely accepted view that naval supremacy was a precondition of military success.

At the beginning of the 21st century much has remained the same in naval terms but much has changed. Geoffrey Till's study is an exploration of how change will impact upon the world's navies.

DigiCat Publishing presents to you this special edition of "A History of Sea Power" by William Oliver Stevens, Allan F. Westcott. DigiCat Publishing considers every written word to be a legacy of humankind. Every DigiCat book has been carefully reproduced for republishing in a new modern format. The books are available in print, as well as ebooks. DigiCat hopes you will treat this work with the acknowledgment and passion it deserves as a classic of world literature.

In an era of increasing geopolitical tensions, disruptive technologies, and the rise of authoritarianism, the question of who masters the seas is more than ever central to the future of the international order. But while naval operations, maritime security, and ocean governance have become increasingly relevant in world politics, the concept and definition of seapower have largely been neglected by the scholarship in the international relations field. Seapower in the Post-modern World fills this gap with an analysis of the naval, economic, and ideational dimensions of seapower from antiquity to today. Exploring the extent to which the permanent elements associated with seapower – such as technology, commerce, and maritime culture – transcend historical periods, Basil Germond frames contemporary seapower as a combination of components, including traditional naval power, post-modern conceptions of collective and civilian seapower, and the neo-modern phenomena of maritime territorialization and the naval arms race. By giving seapower a new conceptual definition, Seapower in the Post-modern World offers key analytical tools for understanding the stability of the global maritime order and seapower’s contribution to global leadership more broadly.

Stevens, professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, wrote this first and complete work covering the evolution and influence of sea power from the beginnings until 1920.

Excerpt from Heresies of Sea Power Now it may equally well be advanced that the Carthaginians 1 selected their 'long march through Gaul' because Spain was the base they drew their best troops from and because they proposed extending their Spanish empire down into Italy. All through this Second Punic War Carthage was as able to use the sea as Rome, and Hannibal's brother Mago took his reinforcements to Spain by sea. He took them to Spain for military reasons, though they were destined for Italy direct, and the influence of Sea Power in the war was often trifling save in so far as both sides had full use of the sea as a highway whenever inclined. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the United States has sought to achieve Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's vision of "command of the sea" using large battle fleets of capital ships. This strategy has been generally successful: no force can oppose the U.S. Navy on the open seas. Yet capital ship theory has become increasingly irrelevant. Globally, irregular warfare dominates the spectrum of conflict, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Fleet engagements are a thing of the past and even small scale missions that rely on capital ships are challenged by irregular warfare. In a pattern evident since World War II, the U.S. Navy has attempted to adapt its capital ship theory to irregular conflicts--with mixed results--before returning to traditional operations with little or no strategic debate. This book discusses the challenges of irregular warfare in the 21st century, and the need for U.S. naval power to develop a new strategic paradigm.