Autographed photograph America Henry Lewis Stimson (September 21, 1867 - October 20, 1950) was an American statesman, lawyer and Republican Party politician and spokesman on foreign policy. He twice served as Secretary of War 1911-1913 under Republican William Howard Taft and 1940-1945, under Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt. In the latter role he was a leading hawk calling for war against Germany. During World War II he took charge of raising and training 13 million soldiers and airmen, supervised the spending of a third of the nation's GDP on the Army and the Air Forces, helped formulate military strategy, and took personal control of building and using the atomic bomb. He served as Governor-General of the Philippines. As Secretary of State (1929-1933) under Republican President Herbert Hoover he articulated the Stimson Doctrine which announced American opposition to Japanese expansion in Asia.

Henry L. Stimson’s 1947 autobiography features an account of Stimson's 13 years' public service, and explores his actions, motives, and results in great detail. On Active Services in Peace and War is highly recommended for those with an interest in the life and work of this great American statesman, and would make for a worthy addition to any collection. The contents include: - Attorney for the Government - Roosevelt and Taft - Responsible Government - The World Changes - As Private Citizen - Governor General of the Philippines - Constructive Beginnings - The Beginnings of Disaster - The Far Eastern Crisis - The Tragedy of Timidity Henry Lewis Stimson (1867–1950) was an American politician who held many important governmental positions under numerous American presidents, including Herbert Hoover, Harry S. Truman, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. We are republishing this volume now in an affordable, modern, high-quality edition complete with a specially commissioned new biography of the author.

Henry Stimson’s life story parallels America’s rise to international power in the 20th century. Godfrey Hodgson shows how this remarkable statesman helped define and carry out his country’s new responsibilities as America became the most powerful nation on earth. After Yale and Harvard Law School in the 1880s, Stimson helped found a law firm that is still a major force on Wall Street. He served as US Attorney for New York, and ran for governor of the state on the Republican ticket. After World War I and renewed legal work, Stimson rejoined public life as special emissary to Nicaragua for Calvin Coolidge, and then as Governor General of the Philippines. He served as William Howard Taft’s Secretary of War, and as Herbert Hoover’s Secretary of State. At age 72, Stimson accepted to become FDR’s Secretary of War, and he organized American victory in World War II and oversaw the birth of American military and political hegemony in the nuclear age. Stimson’s career spanned Teddy Roosevelt’s imperialist expansionism to the world of Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. He dealt with the role of corporations and how to control them, civil war in Central America (Stimson negotiated the first truce between Somoza and Sandino in Nicaragua in 1927), the US position in the Philippines, the rise of Japan (which he dealt with before World War I), America’s commitment to helping Europe achieve stability, the terrors of the nuclear age (Stimson chaired the meetings that decided to drop the bomb on Hiroshima, and shortly before his death, wrote the earliest and most profound reassessment and repudiation of nuclear weaponry). In his many positions, Stimson mentored some of the best and brightest in American public service — Acheson, Lovett, Harriman, Bundy, and Marshall. “Henry L. Stimson was Secretary of War under Taft, Governor-General of the Philippines under Coolidge, Secretary of State under Hoover, and Secretary of War under FDR. The atom bombs were built and dropped under Stimson’s supervision and authority... The public figure as well as the private man are richly delineated in this elegant, learned biography, which offers deep insight into the process by which the U.S. emerged from the periphery of world events to the center of global power.” — Publishers Weekly “After Dean Acheson, in many ways [Stimson’s] spiritual heir, Stimson was the most impressive statesman in the American century. To understand [him] is to understand how the United States was able to establish a Pax Americana over much of the globe. This lucid and penetrating biography of ‘Colonel Stimson’... is written with deft clarity... Hodgson... has shown himself to be one of the keenest observers of American politics.” — James Chace, The New York Times “Hodgson raises troubling questions about Stimson’s understanding of what we now call the third world, discusses Stimson’s racial and ethnic prejudices... and pays particular attention to [his] central role in the decision to use atomic weapons against Japan. What most clearly distinguishes this book... is Hodgson’s continuing interest in the idea of the American establishment and his effort to define its values.” — Alan Brinkley, The New York Review of Books “Hodgson’s first-rate biography of the old statesman and warrior, who died 40 years ago, has a particular relevance to the events gripping the world today. It is as good a guide as any to understanding what George Bush is up to in the Middle East... [Hodgson’s] concluding chapter... is the best essay I have ever read in a genre that could be loosely termed ‘establishment studies.’ [He] writes with a sure hand and lively touch about the private man as well as the public one.” — Evan Thomas, Washington Post “Meticulously researched and masterfully written, Godfrey Hodgson’s biography of Henry L. Stimson breathes life into one of America’s most formidable public figures. In the process, Hodgson provides fresh information and insights into the management of the United States during the first half of the twentieth century.” — Stanley Karnow “A lucid and meticulous account that measures up to its monumental subject and will hasten Henry Stimson’s passage into legend.” — John Newhouse

This now-classic examination of the development of viable political institutions in emerging nations is a major and enduring contribution to modern political analysis. In a new Foreword, Francis Fukuyama assesses Huntington's achievement, examining the context of the book's original publication as well as its lasting importance."This pioneering volume, examining as it does the relation between development and stability, is an interesting and exciting addition to the literature."-American Political Science Review"'Must' reading for all those interested in comparative politics or in the study of development."-Dankwart A. Rustow, Journal of International Affairs

The history of Britain's complex relationship with Europe, untangled Is Britain a part of Europe? The British have been ambivalent on this question since the Second World War, when the Western European nations sought to prevent the return of fascism by creating strong international ties throughout the Continent. Britain reluctantly joined the Common Market, the European Community, and ultimately the European Union, but its decades of membership never quite led it to accept a European orientation. In the view of the distinguished political scientist Vernon Bogdanor, the question of Britain’s relationship to Europe is rooted in “the prime conflict of our time,” the dispute between the competing faiths of liberalism and nationalism. This concise, expertly guided tour provides the essential background to the struggle over Brexit.

On September 1, 1939, the day World War II broke out in Europe, Gen. George Marshall was sworn in as chief of staff of the U.S. Army. Ten months later, Roosevelt appointed Henry Stimson secretary of war. For the next five years, from adjoining offices in the Pentagon, Marshall and Stimson headed the army machine that ground down the Axis. Theirs was one of the most consequential collaborations of the twentieth century. A dual biography of these two remarkable Americans, The Partnership tells the story of how they worked together to win World War II and reshape not only the United States, but the world. The general and the secretary traveled very different paths to power. Educated at Yale, where he was Skull and Bones, and at Harvard Law, Henry Stimson joined the Wall Street law firm of Elihu Root, future secretary of war and state himself, and married the descendant of a Founding Father. He went on to serve as secretary of war under Taft, governor-general of the Philippines, and secretary of state under Hoover. An internationalist Republican with a track record, Stimson ticked the boxes for FDR, who was in the middle of a reelection campaign at the time. Thirteen years younger, George Marshall graduated in the middle of his class from the Virginia Military Institute (not West Point), then began the standard, and very slow, climb up the army ranks. During World War I he performed brilliant staff work for General Pershing. After a string of postings, Marshall ended up in Washington in the 1930s and impressed FDR with his honesty, securing his appointment as chief of staff. Marshall and Stimson were two very different men who combined with a dazzling synergy to lead the American military effort in World War II, in roles that blended politics, diplomacy, and bureaucracy in addition to warfighting. They transformed an outdated, poorly equipped army into a modern fighting force of millions of men capable of fighting around the globe. They, and Marshall in particular, identified the soldiers, from Patton and Eisenhower to Bradley and McNair, best suited for high command. They helped develop worldwide strategy and logistics for battles like D-Day and the Bulge. They collaborated with Allies like Winston Churchill. They worked well with their cagey commander-in-chief. They planned for the postwar world. They made decisions, from the atomic bombs to the division of Europe, that would echo for decades. There were mistakes and disagreements, but the partnership of Marshall and Stimson was, all in all, a bravura performance, a master class in leadership and teamwork. In the tradition of group biographies like the classic The Wise Men, The Partnership shines a spotlight on two giants, telling the fascinating stories of each man, the dramatic story of their collaboration, and the epic story of the United States in World War II.

Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace was an earnest supporter of the Stimson Proposal, a disarmament proposal submitted to the Truman administration by then Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson immediately after World War II. This proposal suggested direct dialogue with the Soviets over control of the newly-released atomic energy used against Japan in August 1945. Wallace, who had nurtured a deep scientific knowledge in his early life, was trusted in his Vice Presidency (19411945) for his scientific skills by not only President Franklin D. Roosevelt, but also scientific administrator Vannevar Bush. Because of this, Wallaces postwar vision was similar to Stimsons Proposal and the views of atomic scientists, who believed that basic scientific knowledge could not be contained because science had no national boundaries. Why was Wallace so thoroughly neglected by incumbent President Harry S. Truman and his fellow policy-makers? Wallaces idea, basically encouraging a joint partnership with the Soviets, failed to find favor with Truman, his aides, and the American public. Their belief was that the USs secret of atomic bomb was a national asset. This book illustrates that Wallaces idea of international atomic controls with Soviet partnership a position embraced by atomic scientists could prevent a postwar nuclear proliferation. The failure of Wallaces concept of postwar world order, a product of rejection by President Truman, has revealed an ideological conflict between democracy and nuclear weaponry. Amazingly, Wallace daringly made this historic attempt and kept to his vision, a commitment which led to his alienation and eventual ousting from Trumans cabinet.

“A comprehensive exploration of spying in its myriad forms from the Bible to the present day . . . Easy to dip into, and surprisingly funny.” —Ben Macintyre in The New York Times Book Review The history of espionage is far older than any of today’s intelligence agencies, yet largely forgotten. The codebreakers at Bletchley Park, the most successful WWII intelligence agency, were completely unaware that their predecessors had broken the codes of Napoleon during the Napoleonic wars and those of Spain before the Spanish Armada. Those who do not understand past mistakes are likely to repeat them. Intelligence is a prime example. At the outbreak of WWI, the grasp of intelligence shown by US President Woodrow Wilson and British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith was not in the same class as that of George Washington during the Revolutionary War and eighteenth-century British statesmen. In the first global history of espionage ever written, distinguished historian and New York Times–bestselling author Christopher Andrew recovers much of the lost intelligence history of the past three millennia—and shows us its continuing relevance. “Accurate, comprehensive, digestible and startling . . . a stellar achievement.” —Edward Lucas, The Times “For anyone with a taste for wide-ranging and shrewdly gossipy history—or, for that matter, for anyone with a taste for spy stories—Andrew’s is one of the most entertaining books of the past few years.” —Adam Gopnik, The New Yorker “Remarkable for its scope and delightful for its unpredictable comparisons . . . there are important lessons for spymasters everywhere in this breathtaking and brilliant book.” —Richard J. Aldrich, Times Literary Supplement “Fans of Fleming and Furst will delight in this skillfully related true-fact side of the story.” —Kirkus Reviews “A crowning triumph of one of the most adventurous scholars of the security world.” —Financial Times Includes illustrations

In the wake of WWII, President Truman established the US Strategic Bombing Survey to determine how effectively strategic air power had been applied during the war. The final study has been used for decades as an objective primary source and a guiding text. Gentile (history, US Military Academy) re-examines this document to reveal how it reflected the American conceptual approach to strategic bombing. He exposes the survey as largely tautological, throwing into question many of the central tenets of American air power philosophy and strategy. He shows how recent problems with bomb damage assessment in the Balkans reinforce his conclusions. Annotation copyrighted by Book News Inc., Portland, OR