Ever since its employment in the First World War, chemical warfare has always aroused controversy. Governments have responded by pursuing the policies of disarmament and deterrence in the hope of avoiding its recurrence. However, despite the signing of the Geneva Protocol in 1925 which banned the use of poison gas, chemical weapons have been used in subsequent conflicts and most recently in the Gulf War between Iraq and Iran. In this work the policies of disarmament and deterrence will be reassessed within a broad historical and strategic context. It will be argued that poison gas could still be used in a modern European conflict; that the Soviet forces are the best equipped to operate in a contaminated environment; and that weaknesses persist in NATO's anti-chemical defences and in her deterrent. It will be emphasised, too, that the Geneva disarmament talks, which have made some progress in recent years, still face formidable difficulties over the issues of verification and compliance. Above all, it will be claimed that the onset of nuclear parity between the superpowers has eroded the credibility of a deterrent to chemical attack based upon the threat of nuclear release. Accordingly, this book will contend that the United States should modernize her stockpile of chemical weapons to bolster the Western deterrent and to provide more leverage for the negotiations in Geneva.

In the late eighties and early nineties, driven by the post–Cold War environment and lessons learned during military operations, United States policy makers made intelligence support to the military the Intelligence Community's top priority. In response to this demand, the CIA and DoD instituted policy and organizational changes that altered their relationship with one another. While debates over the future of the Intelligence Community were occurring on Capitol Hill, the CIA and DoD were expanding their relationship in peacekeeping and nation-building operations in Somalia and the Balkans. By the late 1990s, some policy makers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far. In Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post–Cold War Relationship, David P. Oakley reveals that, despite these concerns, no major changes to national intelligence or its priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policy makers increasingly focused on tactical and operational actions. As policy makers became fixated with terrorism and the United States fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CIA directed a significant amount of its resources toward global counterterrorism efforts and in support of military operations.

Chemical weapons are still a viable military option. This book assesses their appeal by examining how the agents, munitions and protective equipment of chemical warfare have evolved since 1915; how technological innovations and refinements in weaponry have altered tactical assumptions; and how these weapons have been employed in conflicts from the First World War to the Gulf War. The author argues that the weapon technology has proved inherently dynamic, that a new generation of biochemical agents may soon be available, and that arms control may not be able to curb these developments.