Harold Wilson's direction of the second British application to join the EEC us ripe for reinterpretation. With new and exciting material now available in the Public Record Office and abroad, this is an extremely propitious moment to reconsider Wilson's motivations, and to contextualise them in light of evidence on foreign policy-making contained in the official record.

NJR - BLURB IN RAW FORM The second British application to join the European Communities (EC) was made during Harold Wilson's second Labour government. It ended in failure with French President Charles de Gaulle's veto in November 1967. This book traces the development of Britain's policy towards the EC from the veto to the end of Wilson's government in June 1970. It is based upon recently released British archival resources, and begins with the puzzle of how it was possible for Edward Heath's Conservative government to open negotiations for membership just twelve days after taking office. The book suggests that Wilson's earlier diplomacy was vital for the Conservatives' successful negotiation of British entry by 1973. Despite the 1967 veto, the Wilson government continued to focus on Western Europe, to the diminution of previously important relationships with the United States, the Commonwealth and the European Free Trade Association. The book is focused on Wilson, and examines his personal role in European policy, demonstrating his control over the application, his management of cabinet, and his efforts to win over key European allies. It suggests that a key enabling factor for the pursuit of accession was the complacency of most ministers - with the exception of key foreign office ministers. On the continent, British diplomacy was crucial in creating an environment conducive to the eventual lifting of the French veto and success of the British application. It first facilitated meaningful collaboration with some EC member-states. Second, it prevented harmful developments in the Communities that might otherwise have made British accession more difficult. Wilson was crucially important to this policy and personally strove to ensure its success. Labour's defeat at the 1970 general election meant that the policy was carried to fruition by Heath and the Conservatives, but Wilson's efforts paved the way to eventual British membership.

This book examines the development of Harold Wilson's ambiguous policy towards the European Community within the context of Britain's shift from a global to a regional power.

Harold Wilson's direction of the second British application to join the EEC us ripe for reinterpretation. With new and exciting material now available in the Public Record Office and abroad, this is an extremely propitious moment to reconsider Wilson's motivations, and to contextualise them in light of evidence on foreign policy-making contained in the official record.

Title Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Notes on Contributors -- Preface - Sir Gerald Kaufman MP -- Foreword - George Howarth MP -- Introduction - Andrew S. Crines and Kevin Hickson -- Part One: Themes -- 1: WILSON AND BRITISH SOCIALISM -- 2: WILSON AND SOCIAL CHANGE -- 3: 1966: AN OPPORTUNITY SQUANDERED -- 4: WILSON AS ORATOR -- 5: WILSON AND THE CONSERVATIVES -- Part Two: Policies -- 6: ECONOMIC POLICY -- 7: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS -- 8: EDUCATION POLICY -- 9: SOCIAL POLICY -- 10: SOCIAL AND SEXUAL LIBERALISATION -- 11: SPORT POLICY: AN UNHERALDED SUCCESS STORY -- 12: HAROLD WILSON AND THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION -- 13: DEVOLUTION -- 14: NORTHERN IRELAND -- 15: FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY -- 16: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION -- Part Three: Perspectives -- 17: A VIEW FROM THE LEFT -- 18: A VIEW FROM THE CENTRE -- 19: A VIEW FROM THE RIGHT -- 20: WILSON IN HISTORY -- RETROSPECT -- Index -- Copyright

Explores how the European policies of the British Labour Party and Danish Social Democrats evolved between 1958 and enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, comparing how they each responded to the integration process at key moments and, more innovatively, highlights the impact of informal contacts between them.

The forefathers of the European Union, led by Jean Monnet, hoped to create a 'United States of Europe' with national sovereignties subordinated to a federal government. Few in Britain shared their dream. Yet Britain abandoned her aloof stand of 1950, and eventually joined the European Communities. Lord Beloff asks whether the key figures - Harold Macmillan, Sir Edward Heath and Harold Wilson, knowingly deceived the electorate into thinking that entry could be combined with the country's independence of action and historic constitution, or whether they thought that they could persuade continental statesmen from inside of the merits of a much looser structure. The actions and words of Lady Thatcher and John Major are scrutinised with this same question in mind, as are Labour's oscillations under Gaitskell, Wilson and Foot before plunging wholeheartedly into Eurofederalism under Kinnock and Blair. The key theme which emerges is of mutual misunderstanding between Britain and the continent, due to basic differences of outlook and interest, which have guaranteed continual controversy throughout our involvement in Europe.

British policy towards European integration has been one of the most divisive issues in British politics since 1945. This book analyses the formative period of British European policy between 1945 and de Gaulle's veto against British EEC membership in 1963. It is the first historical study to look at Britain's role in the integration process on the basis of a detailed evaluation of the newly accessible government records, of Conservative Party records, private papers and interviews. It argues, in particular, that it is necessary to understand the unexplored ambiguities in Britain's first EEC application of 1961, shown here as an attempt to appease the American government, to hold the Conservative Party together and to split Labour, in order to appreciate the continuing problems in its relations with Europe. In conclusion, the epilogue highlights the most important continuities in British European policy until the present.

Explores how the European policies of the British Labour Party and Danish Social Democrats evolved between 1958 and enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, comparing how they each responded to the integration process at key moments and, more innovatively, highlights the impact of informal contacts between them.

This book is the second in the three volume set The Labour governments 1964-1970 and concentrates on Britain's international policy under the Labour governments in the 1960s and is available for the first time in paperback.The coverage ranges from defence policy and the government machine to European integration, NATO and the Vietnam war. Harold Wilson and his ministers have often been accused of betraying the sense of promise that greeted their victory in 1964. Using recently released archival evidence, John Young argues that a more balanced view of the government will recognise the real difficulties that surrounded decision-making, not only on Vietnam, but also on Aden, the Nigerian civil war and Rhodesia.Economic weakness, waning military strength, Cold War tensions and the need to placate allies all placed limits on what a once-great but now clearly declining power could achieve. Furthermore the government proved of pivotal importance in the history of Britain's international role, in that it presided over a major shift from positions East of Suez to a focus on European concerns, a focus that has remained until the present day.The book will be of vital importance to students of British history and international relations during this exciting period. Together with the other books in the series, on domestic policy and economic policy, it provides a complete picture of the development of Britain under the premiership of Harold Wilson.