This book explains the conditions under which great powers are likely to cooperate to improve their security by engaging in qualitative arms control. In agreeing to limit or proscribe certain classes of weapons, states will constrain their military capabilities and therefore decrease the threat they pose to potential adversaries. Focusing on the expected military impact of technological change and the capacity of states to confidently monitor the activities of its negotiating partners, it may be possible to forge lasting agreements that improves the security of the participating states. However, at other times, the nature technological change may force states to engage in competitive behavior, precluding cooperation and increasing the probability of conflict. Examining a diverse set of cases, including the Washington Naval Conference, The World Disarmament Conference at Geneva, the Baruch Plan for the International Control of Atomic Energy, and the SALT I Accords (including the ABM Treaty), this volume presents a persuasive, comprehensive and interesting contribution to the literature on arms racing and arms control, and should be of interest to students of international relations theory and security studies. By presenting a theoretical-informed model that explicitly links the security strategies of states to their choices about development and deployment of new weapons and, consequently, their willingness to engage in arms control cooperation, this book provides an important refinement upon existing theoretical and historical approaches.

Over the past decade, the international political system has come to be characterized as a Great Power Competition in which multiple would-be hegemons compete for power and influence. Instead of a global climate of unchallenged United States dominance, revisionist powers, notably China and Russia alongside other regional powers, are vying for dominance through political, military, and economic means. A critical battleground in the Great Power Competition is the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Central Asia South Asia (CASA), also known as the Central Region. With the planned withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan, the U.S. has stated its intention of shifting attention away from the CASA Region in favor of a more isolationist foreign policy approach. This book provides an in-depth understanding of the implications for this shift related to regional diplomacy & politics, economic opportunities & rivalries, security considerations & interests, and the information environment. Amplifying the vital importance of success in the Central Region to U.S. prosperity and security, this volume advances dialogue in identifying key issues for stakeholders within and beyond the Central Region to gain a holistic perspective that better informs decision-making at various levels. This collection of work comes from scholars, strategic thinkers, and subject matter experts who participated in the Great Power Competition Conference hosted by the University of South Florida, in partnership with the National Defense University Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Strategies in January 2020.

America needs better options for resolving potential crises In recent years, the Pentagon has elevated its concerns about Russia and China as potential military threats to the United States and its allies. But what issues could provoke actual conflict between the United States and either country? And how could such a conflict be contained before it took the world to the brink of thermonuclear catastrophe, as was feared during the cold war? Defense expert Michael O'Hanlon wrestles with these questions in this insightful book, setting them within the broader context of hegemonic change and today's version of great-power competition. The book examines how a local crisis could escalate into a broader and much more dangerous threat to peace. What if, for example, Russia's “little green men” seized control of a community, like Narva or an even smaller town in Estonia, now a NATO ally? Or, what if China seized one of the uninhabited Senkaku islands now claimed and administered by Japan, or imposed a partial blockade of Taiwan? Such threats are not necessarily imminent, but they are far from inconceivable. Washington could be forced to choose, in these and similar cases, between risking major war to reverse the aggression, and appeasing China or Russia in ways that could jeopardize the broader global order. O'Hanlon argues that the United States needs a better range of options for dealing with such risks to peace. He advocates “integrated deterrence,” which combines military elements with economic warfare. The military components would feature strengthened forward defenses as well as, possibly, limited military options against Russian or Chinese assets in other theaters. Economic warfare would include offensive elements, notably sanctions, as well as measures to ensure the resilience of the United States and allies against possible enemy reprisal. The goal is to deter war through a credible set of responses that are more commensurate than existing policy with the stakes involved in such scenarios.

It has become axiomatic to contend that U.S. foreign policy must adapt to an era of renewed “great-power competition.” The United States went on a quarter-century strategic detour after the Cold War, the argument goes, basking in triumphalism and getting bogged down in the Middle East. Now China and Russia are increasingly challenging its influence and undercutting the order it has led since 1945. How should it respond to these two formidable authoritarian powers? In this timely intervention, Ali Wyne offers the first detailed critique of great-power competition as a foreign policy framework, warning that it could render the United States defensive and reactive. He exhorts Washington to find a middle ground between complacence and consternation, selectively contesting Beijing and Moscow but not allowing their decisions to determine its own course. Analyzing a resurgent China, a disruptive Russia, and a deepening Sino-Russian entente, Wyne explains how the United States can seize the "great-power opportunity" at hand: to manage all three of those phenomena confidently while renewing itself at home and abroad.

This is a thoroughly revised second edition of a book that we published in 2010. Exporting Security is about the US military's role in military-to-military partnerships, such as helping to support and train foreign militaries, and about the US military's role in missions other than war, ranging from diplomacy, to development, to humanitarian assistance after disasters or during epidemics. Reveron is a proponent of these non-warfighting missions because he views them as an economical way to promote human security and regional security in trouble spots, which he says is in the US national interest. He also sees these efforts as making it less likely that the US will feel compelled to intervene directly in hot spots around the globe if our partners can maintain their own security or if humanitarian disasters can be averted. This second edition will take into account the Obama administration's foreign policy, the poor legacy of training the Iraqi army, the implications of more assertive foreign policies by Russia and China, and the US military's role in recent humanitarian crises such as the Ebola epidemic in West Africa--

In this thoroughly updated second edition, Derek S. Reveron provides a comprehensive analysis of the shift in US foreign policy from coercive diplomacy to cooperative military engagement. The US military does much more than fight wars; it responds to humanitarian crises and natural disasters, assists advanced militaries to support international peace, and trains and equips almost every military in the world. Rather than intervening directly, the United States can respond to crises by sending weapons, trainers, and advisers to assist other countries in tackling their own security deficits created by subnational, transnational, and regional challengers. By doing so, the United States seeks to promote partnerships and its soft power, strengthen the state sovereignty system, prevent localized violence from escalating into regional crises, and protect its national security by addressing underlying conditions that lead to war. Since coalition warfare is the norm, security cooperation also ensures partners are interoperable with US forces when the US leads international military coalitions. Exporting Security takes into account the Obama administration's foreign policy, the implications of more assertive foreign policies by Russia and China, and the US military's role in recent humanitarian crises and nation-building efforts.

Defining and conceptualizing Northeast Asia’s security complex poses unique quandaries. The security architecture in Northeast Asia to date has been predominately U.S.-dominated bilateral alliances, weak institutional structures and the current Six Party Talks dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. There has been a distinct lack of desire among regional countries as well as the U.S. to follow in the footsteps of Europe with its robust set of multilateral institutions. However, since the late 1990s, there has been burgeoning interest among regional states towards forming new multilateral institutions as well as reforming and revitalizing existing mechanisms. Much of this effort has been in the economic and political arenas, with the creation of bodies such as the East Asian Summit, but there have also been important initiatives in the security sphere. This book offers detailed examinations about how this potentially tense region of the world is redefining certain longstanding national interests, and shows how this shift is the result of changing power relations, the desire to protect hard-won economic gains, as well as growing trust in new processes designed to foster regional cooperation over regional conflict. Presenting new and timely research on topics that are vital to the security future of one of the world’s most important geographical regions, this book will be of great value to students and scholars of Asian politics, regionalism, international politics and security studies.

The Great Power coalition of the early 19th century succeeded in keeping the peace among the major states of England, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria. For the last century and a half, however, no truly encompassing coalition has emerged, and in its absence the 20th century was plagued by world wars and peripheral conflicts. Only now, at the outset of the 21st century, is a new Great Power coalition possible. This book examines the prospect of a Great Power coalition that would be sustained by the development of 'overlapping international clubs.' The new set of Great Powers--the United States, Japan, the European Union, China, and Russia--can be increasingly bound together through a combination of status and economic incentives, international norms and regimes, and the emulation of national and regional 'best practices.' The construction of such a coalition presents special problems and opportunities for the United States. In the years ahead, America will need to adjust its policies to bring China and Russia into membership of such a group or see them progressively adopt recalcitrant and antagonistic attitudes toward world affairs.